DISSENT

INDIA — Stanley Plastrik reports on his conversations and observations in the cities and villages

ENGLAND — Norman Birnbaum, John P. Roche debate BLP issues; Lewis Coser discusses "Out of Apathy"

CUBA — Edward Friedman, Richard Kraus weigh trends; Daniel M. Friedenberg reviews "Listen Yankee!"

FRANCE — In a letter from Paris, Paul Parisot offers a topical estimate of a "Nation in Agony"

U.S.A. — Michael Walzer, Henry Pachter assess policy problems as President Kennedy takes office

Language and Technology	HERBERT MARCUSE
Nature and Limits of Freedom	DAVID SPITZ
The Addict and the Law	EDWIN M. SCHUR
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WINTER 1961 — 75c

DISSENT

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RICHARD WRIGHT

It is with deep sadness that we must record here the death of Richard Wright, the American novelist and a Contributing Editor to *Dissent*. The contribution that Wright made to American literature, above all as the author of the novel *Native Son* and the autobiography *Black Boy*, seems likely to be a permanent one. He wrote with honesty and power about those experiences felt and suffered by Negroes, which the rest of us can only try to imagine. But for us of *Dissent* Richard Wright was also a warm collaborator and friend, who helped our project in whichever ways he could, always glad to give us for publication those of his writings that seemed appropriate and to suggest ways of improving and strengthening the magazine. Whenever one of us found himself in Paris, he was assured of a friendly reception at Wright's home, and all of us felt of him that he was a true friend, a true comrade.

Now, at the terribly premature age of 52, he is gone. There were still so many things he wished to do, books to write, places to visit, people to befriend! We mourn his passing, we remember his life.

I. H.

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DISSENT

VOLUME VIII
WINTER 1961

NUMBER 1

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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TO OUR READERS

The response to our bi-annual fund drive has thus far been disappointing.

As of December 20, slightly less than $5,000 has been pledged. In our appeal we had estimated the need of the magazine as $8,000 for the coming two years.

Let us be perfectly frank: unless an additional $1,500 reaches us from our readers and friends, the survival of DISSENT is in question. We have never before cried wolf, nor are we doing so now. This is a statement of the simple truth.

It would be a shame for the magazine to collapse because of so small a sum.

Many readers have already sent in pledges. But others, including a good number of those who did so in previous years, have yet to be heard from.

We earnestly request you to fill out the blank below and send it to us immediately. It is a matter of life-and-death for the magazine.

I pledge $..... for the coming two-year period, so that **Dissent** may continue. Enclosed is $..... in cash; the remainder I will pay by .....

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Journal of the Quarter

AFTER THE ELECTION

Michael Walzer

On one point everyone seems agreed: had Eisenhower run again he would have won again. It seems likely that even Nixon would have won, had Eisenhower entered the campaign a week or so earlier than he did. The President, our greatest celebrity, might have carried the country for the Republicans had he only been a bit more energetic. Instead he was loyal to his principles: his contribution to the campaign consisted of pious words and a little golf, the suppression of unemployment figures and a final ride through cheering crowds. It is worth recording that the Republicans lost because of a failure of will and energy—and that they only barely lost, since after all, this very lack was once their greatest strength.

The central theme of Kennedy's campaign was America's decline. Whatever that means in terms of future policy, it marks the end of the great celebration. And for the moment, at least, the atmosphere in Washington is definitely changed. Kennedy has yet to prove himself, but he has made the point that complacency is out of date. There is an openness to new ideas probably unlike anything since the thirties; we are told to expect significant new policies. The liberal critics of the past eight years are job-hunters at last; they do not always get from the careful Mr. Kennedy the positions they would like, but they will be active and even important members of the new administration.

IT IS DOUBTFUL, however, that there exists a liberal politics which can provide a background of ferment, discontent, agitation—and, where necessary, support—for Kennedy's "new frontier." We find ourselves in the sixties almost by accident. No great liberal movement swept Kennedy into the White House. To be sure, both parties felt compelled in 1960 to adopt the most liberal platforms in their history, and they were surely both responding to a kind of public demand. The '58 elections seemed to indicate some vague but pervasive sense of things gone wrong, of the need for new ideas and energies at the center of government. Kennedy managed to express this restlessness—to make it somehow more urgent, though no

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more specific—and there was just enough dissatisfaction to elect him president.

At the same time, however, liberal congressional candidates were defeated in many parts of the country and the new Congress will be more conservative than the last. The group of young Congressmen who worked together on the Liberal Project was decimated: almost half its members will not return—among them Porter of Oregon and Meyer of New Hampshire. The point is not simply that Kennedy failed to win a big enough victory to pull local candidates behind him. What is more important is that *in the course of the campaign the "new frontier" acquired no programmatic substance;* Kennedy did not win support for his policies or for the men who would support his policies. Narrow as his victory was, it was his own—another triumph of personality. Like an Eisenhower victory, it was accompanied by such extensive ticket-splitting that it provided no mandate. Eisenhower, of course, required no mandate, since he was not going to do anything.

Voting for Kennedy (as distinct from voting against Nixon) was an act of faith. Having elected him, his supporters are now holding their breath to see what he will do. He is a president presumably liberal, but without a liberal constituency—that is, with no constituency at all of any definite political shape. Workers, Negroes, urban Catholics, Jews: all voted Democratic in proportions similar to those of New Deal days. But only the Negroes still make specific demands, and the unions in some limited areas; Kennedy is not obligated in any precise way to most of the groups that supported him. How can he hold their support? In the future, he must try to avoid running against a candidate like himself. Otherwise he will quickly discover the volatile, unstable quality of contemporary interest groups. There are already large numbers of voters who do not ask the primary political questions: would this or that candidate be good for business, good for labor, good for the Jews? Such voters are "autonomous," disinterested, and thus far, at any rate, their behavior is quite unpredictable. They are politically educated only through the mass media; they respond mainly to the "image" a candidate or a party projects.

THE RESULT of this kind of an election is that the winner cannot simply proceed to carry out a program to which he is committed and for which he is held responsible by a substantial, organized section of the population. Kennedy has something like a free hand—he must worry about his "image," yet in a new way he is irresponsible. The need to appeal to "disinterested" men tends to break down the connection between policies and politics. The President-elect will govern in what is almost a vacuum of organized, articulate, programmatic support. At the same time, there are enormous opportunities for men of good will—which is why, perhaps, the politics of liberal intellectuals has concentrated so much in recent years on getting "men like ourselves" into official positions.

They have succeeded, and now the politics of personal influence and position is to be tested. We may well get many liberal reforms without getting a liberal movement. In Washington today, for example, it is pos-

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sible to talk practically about health insurance for the aged and federal aid for education; the curious thing is that both are likely to be enacted—in some partial, emasculated form—*before* they become significant political issues in the country at large. Liberals in government may discover, however, that they need more support outside of government than they yet have.

Almost through default, Kennedy represents the various possibilities of the Democratic party; he is a man capable of looking in different directions for support. For some years now neither the old New Deal elements nor the union politicians have had sufficient power or intellectual force to provide the basis for a consistent liberalism. And Kennedy himself has hardly been a consistent liberal. Today it is urgently necessary to recreate a left-wing constituency, to reestablish intellectually and then practically the excluded politics of the fifties—from the radical ginger group to the pragmatic liberal organization. As it is, Kennedy lacks what Roosevelt so obviously had: a steady source of new ideas and energetic men on the left, a barrage of criticism, a radical conscience. He has academic advisors, but they are not kept honest, so to speak, by an extracurricular enthusiasm. The organizations which have grown up in the civil rights struggle, groups like SANE which seek to influence foreign policy, the new student politics: these constitute the bare beginnings of a new liberalism, which may someday act together with the dormant but still powerful labor unions. Without a far more substantial development, however, liberal politics will remain largely a matter of trusting Kennedy.

•

SOCIALISTS and radicals can and should work within these new liberal groups —as many of us have done on issues like civil rights and peace. But it is also necessary to make demands of our own. Though the election does not suggest any radical change in American politics, there are new possibilities, however limited, and there is a new audience. There are young people ready to listen to our critique of the compromises and hesitations of politics in Washington, and to our suggestions of alternatives. Michael Reagan's program for the sixties, printed in the last DISSENT, suggests a minimum demand. It has the great virtue of being concrete, even when, given Democratic party politics, it may be dismissed as wildly impractical. Concrete we must be: in our attack upon inequality, in our demand for steps to combat unemployment and the threatening consequences of automation, in our concern for cultural integrity, in our new interest in city planning and urban renewal. In all these areas there may well be people involved again, devising schemes, seeking support. And all this suggests the possibility of a restored political life in America; without that elections mean very little.

December 20, 1960.

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A FOREIGN POLICY

Henry Pachter

"New Frontiers" and "Leadership" will now replace the golf links and committee rule. Taking, for the while, at face value the claims of the new administration, I wish to present my own bill as a simple voter, who is especially concerned with U.S. foreign policy. I do not speak of any agonizing reappraisal; in many areas it is too late for that. Whatever merit the criticisms of NATO, German rearmament and the common market may have had in the past, these decisions have been made and are irreversible. I shall instead name a few questions which demand immediate answers. I shall not name those which the United States or its President are not free to decide by themselves, but only those on which a decision can be expected from the new President.

The most important decision affecting the stature of the United States in the world is a domestic one. The world expects a "New Frontier" in race relations. The previous administration has advanced equality among the races "with all deliberate speed" (where speed is used not in the sense of speeding-up, but as a neutral term covering the slow end of the speedometer). Its reasoning was dominated by fear: too many Little Rocks may rock the boat; too much noise may create an even more adverse impression abroad. If there was any merit in this consideration, it no longer applies. The provocation which moves the White Citizens' Councils to violence no longer is the work of the Supreme Court alone; the Negro population no longer suffers silently. There will be strife, provocation, even riots. The question no longer is, whether to avoid them, but how to end them quickly. *That means to decide on which side the Government will stand.* The colored nations will watch with anxiety whether Kennedy gives the promised leadership; he cannot make the White Citizens' Councils acceptable in the United Nations, but he can restore respect for the U.S.

A RELATED QUESTION concerns colonialism. Here, too, irrevocable conditions have been created and make it impossible to apply recipes which may have been helpful in the past. There was a time when the colonial revolutions might have been bought off with a few billion dollars of foreign aid. I do not say that the underdeveloped countries need these dollars any less than before; in fact they need more. But I have always warned in these pages that foreign aid cannot be a substitute for a foreign policy. Instead of unilaterally making gifts, we should be paying fairer prices to producers of imported food and materials. The direction of surplus funds to development areas should be planned by an independent international agency and the funds should be made available on economic rather than political grounds. (There is some ironical justice in the isolationist gloating over the dollar crisis, but these gentlemen forget that foreign aid has been good business, too.) The most revealing criticism of foreign aid I ever heard

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was the remark of an African delegate after Eisenhower's opening speech in the last General Assembly. The President had offered the most generous aid and expressed his most sincere concern for the development of the new nations; this delegate, however, summed the speech up in a pithy sentence: "He did not say anything against colonialism." The issue is not economic, but political; I am tempted to say that it is not rational but emotional, and unless the American government can satisfy the new nationalism of the former colonial nations, it will not be dealing with them in terms they understand.

The difficulty here is immense. We don't really know what the new nations mean by colonialism and anti-colonialism. We know that at least some of their notions are mistaken or even irrational. We have experienced the consequences of uninhibited demagoguery in this area and we must expect more difficulties when patently immature nations (and every new nation when first entering the theater of world politics has been immature) presume to act like big powers. But the trend is irresistible, and the cure for the disease of nationalism is to allow these nations to make their own mistakes. We have made enough for them in the past, and further tutelage will not keep them from wanting to imitate our mistakes. And at the same time we must strive to convince our colonialist allies that they cannot hold out for long and that if they try to, they risk losing our sympathy. This may be painful, but it is not an agonizing decision; the agony has been consummated in the last ten years.

But we should not dispose of other people's dishonestly earned property without proving our own willingness to overcome colonialism. The U.S. is today being accused of an indirect colonialism, notably in the Latin American republics. The offense is threefold: the Panama Canal, the support of a few unsavory dictators, and the economic power of U.S. firms in some Latin American countries. To remove these sources of anger may cause some inconvenience to interested parties, but we have to weigh the advantage to be gained against the disadvantage we may risk. There is no valid reason why the Canal Zone should not be returned to Panama and the canal itself made over to a joint board of the American States. The conventions which must be devised to protect the waterway may even afford the U.S. an opportunity to engage the sister republics in a common task. This opportunity far outweighs the loss in dollars and it may well prevent a loss of face. The U.S. may lose prestige if and when it surrenders the canal under pressure; it may gain prestige by doing so of its own volition, under orderly procedures and under the necessary precautions.

American investments may help the industrialization of underdeveloped countries, but the Cadillacs of American managers are visible to the naked eye. The wages of American enterprise may be higher than in the native industries, but the profits are used by absentee owners to increase their power. Sooner or later most of these investments will be nationalized, and each time the American government will be called upon to defend them—only to abandon them in the end. Why not propose an organized withdrawal while the loss still can be minimized? The great myth which fosters the anti-Yankee demonstrations promises Paradise once the factories are nationalized. The truth is that national management will not bring

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decisive improvements unless simultaneously the native economies are placed on a modern basis. But to find that out, the nationalists must first get the experience of responsibility for their own economic affairs. I am afraid that most of them still have to learn that the wealth of the foreign companies comes from the development of markets rather than from the ownership of real estate (which still is the image of wealth in semi-feudal countries). Again, this can be learned better "by doing," or rather by trying to do, than from economic textbooks. It is obvious that nationalist governments will need guidance and help in taking such responsibilities, and also that compensation for the expropriated companies must be negotiated. For both sides, the U.S. government can lend its good offices.

The charge of support for dictators will lose much of its sting once a withdrawal from colonialism is under way. Dictators are a feature of underdeveloped countries; some are leftist and others rightist in ideology, some are more and others less corrupt. The U.S. government must deal with them—which is not to say, to sustain them—as long as they are in power, for it has undertaken not to intervene in internal affairs. To depose or reform them is the business of the nations concerned, not ours. We dare not punish any people (and that should apply to Santo Domingo as well as to Cuba) because we don't like its dictator. What matters is that the dictator should represent not foreign interests but the interests of his country, and that the U.S. government's relations with a foreign government should not be dictated by the special interests of some U.S. citizens but by the interests of the U.S. as a nation.

THIS LEADS TO THE THORNY question of recognition in general. In contrast to some writers on the left, I don't believe that recognizing China—which might have helped ten years ago—would make much of a difference now; but by the same token, arguments against recognition have lost much of their force. I am particularly unconvinced by the assertion that China must be received in the United Nations now in order to sign a disarmament convention; China is now so powerful she will not be controlled any more than the Soviet Union, and she will build her atomic power not one day later than her physicists and engineers learn how to do it. On the other hand, the advantage of opening contacts with a government which in some respect is the rival of Soviet power in Asia seems great enough to set aside considerations of prestige. Incidentally, what I am advocating is a return to an older American policy—using China to stop or embarrass the Russians who remain the first rival of both, the U.S. and China. I suspect that many who would seek a Russian alliance against China are motivated by racialism. The proper solution to the Chinese problem is to negotiate the independence of Taiwan against recognition of the People's Republic on the mainland.

While I do not feel that recognition of China now would mean loss of face for the U.S., recognition of the Ulbricht regime in Eastern Germany amounts to acknowledging that we have lost the cold war. What we might have done to achieve unification of Germany is now a matter for historians; the fact is we did not achieve this admitted aim, and as every hot war must end in a peace treaty, so sooner or later, the cold war over Germany must end with a document

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confirming the stalemate. Since Khrushchev has us over a barrel in Berlin and can renew the pressure any time he pleases, the best way out would be to negotiate recognition of the (East) German Democratic Republic against Soviet recognition of West Berlin as part of the (Western) German Federal Republic, with ironclad guarantees for its survival.

CONTRARY to some friends on the left, I do not believe that our German position is negotiable any more. The German army exists; the best hope still is to integrate it into a European army, as Acheson had planned in his original European Defense Community scheme. The only way to withhold atomic weapons from the German army—as a majority of Germans wish we would do—is to reserve their use for NATO. The threat of arming NATO with atomic weapons may be negotiable; if the Russians really want to prevent it they ought to make a concession on inspection. But on this side we should be ready to receive such a concession with an open mind, and to view the possibilities of a standstill agreement not as a military calamity but as a political opportunity. The same approach is a prerequisite for any agreement to stop atomic tests. A President who exercises leadership must not be guided by the desires of the military but by the opportunities for diplomacy. He will strive to negotiate such standstill agreements with a tough and sober mind; he will not share the illusion that this is disarmament or that such an agreement will stop the Russians from making tests if they feel they need them. He will nevertheless strive for such an agreement in order to stop "fourth nations" from acquiring atomic bombs and to give Khrushchev an alibi for denying them to his allies.

I doubt that disarmament is a real possibility in the near future. We shall have more disarmament diplomacy, disarmament propaganda and even some unilateral disarmament (another name for the scrapping of obsolete material and the automatization of services). We shall even have more rearmament, which looks less frightening at a second and calm glance than at the first shock. But there is one phase of the arms race which does send shivers down my spine—the supply of obsolete material to underdeveloped nations. What we urgently need—more urgently even than an agreement to stop atomic tests—is a convention to neutralize all neutralists, i.e., to deny them war material which they cannot produce themselves. It does not make sense for a nation to declare itself "neutral" and then to accept protection from another or make itself dependent upon weapons supplies from that nation. As history shows, it is often the rivalry of these small nations which brings the big nations into the fray. We can, however, make a beginning with an act of renunciation. We must be ready to release some of our weaker retainers from their treaty obligations, provided they seek strength and protection in regional agreements of their own. This will not remove the danger of Communist coups d'etat; but it may minimize the danger that such coups will find support in partisan warfare or that opposition to any unstable government in Asia or Africa automatically assumes a pro-Russian orientation in foreign politics. The aim of our foreign policy must be to insulate new nations sufficiently from the world conflict so that they can work out their domestic problems at leisure.

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I AM NOT ASKING the new President to make no blunders; he has a right to his share of mistakes. I am not even asking him to make no avoidable mistakes. I am asking him, however, to make no deliberate mistakes. A deliberate mistake is one resulting from unproven and unchecked premises, from hide-bound prejudices and traditional attitudes. A mistake from guessing wrongly is forgivable; a refusal to gauge the temper of the time is unforgivable. Opportunistic evasion of the issues is unforgivable; holding on to straws is unforgivable. All too long have our policy makers defended (or seemed to defend) positions whose value to particular interests hardly matched the national interests which had to be sacrificed in their defense. We are looking forward to a leadership that calmly steers toward a modus vivendi in regard to the world power struggle and does not have to rescue us from periodical crises. That dream being what it is, we might settle for a leadership which does not panic and can conduct foreign policy without having recourse to the marines, and for a leader that is not identified with all reactionary forces in the world and may yet be welcome in foreign lands.

December 20, 1960.

POSTSCRIPT, *New Year's Eve*:
Stevenson to U.N. where his halo might not wear off before the middle of the XVIth Assembly; Galbraith to India; Bowles in the largely administrative job of Undersecretary; Rostow as foreign economic adviser—it looks as though we were going to export the New Deal. Note to Liberals: It was not a good idea to proclaim that Mr. Stevenson will be in a "policy-making position"; no Ambassador is ever in that position, and that Mr. Stevenson in particular is not, was made abundantly clear when Mr. Nitze received responsibility for Disarmament. An Ambassador, however, has the right to be listened to; if that is not done, the policy becomes unrealistic. Mr. Wadsworth is not to be blamed for the mistakes of Mr. Herter, but he did not lose standing while he could claim innocence. By conceding to Mr. Stevenson a power which he does not have, Mr. Kennedy in fact diminishes his usefulness. The job consists largely in explaining and trading votes; but propaganda is no substitute for a policy. That policy cannot be made in United Nations, for the simple reason that United Nations is not a Parliament and cannot now be re-converted to a destination it might have had 15 years ago. The worst mistake Liberals tend to be susceptible to is "retrospective utopianism"—wishing to fulfill yesterday's dreams with institutions no longer yesterday's hopes.

An Apology to Our Readers

Because of a series of technical difficulties which were beyond our control, this issue of DISSENT *comes to you very late. We hope to recover this lost time with the prompt appearance of our next issue in April. Please accept our apologies—it has not happened before; and we hope it will not happen again.—*
THE EDITORS

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British Labor in Crisis

The policy and ideological disputes that have been wracking the British Labor Party continue unabated. They reflect the problems of socialists everywhere, and we of DISSENT *look with interest upon the discussions involved and with concern for the health and unity of the British Labor movement. Below we print two sharply variant interpretations of the crisis in the Labor Party. One is by Norman Birnbaum, a teacher of sociology at Oxford, an editor of* New Left Review *and an advocate of the opinions of the Labor left. The other is by John Roche, a professor of politics at Brandeis University, who has written frequently on British affairs and defends, generally, the outlook of the Labor right.* —EDITORS

A VIEW FROM THE LEFT

Norman Birnbaum

DEAR FRIENDS,

You asked for a letter on the current situation inside the Labor party—from the point of view of the left. It's late in the evening and I'll simply write this out until I've finished: spontaneity may bring its own rewards, and those interested can in any case refer to two of my more formal reports ("The Year Zero of British Socialism," *Antioch Review,* Summer, 1960 and "Ideology and Actuality in Britain," *Commentary,* December, 1960). You say that someone else will be writing from the other side. No doubt, but the boundary lines are shifting and not always clear, the situation is complex, and the positions of most participants in Labor's great dispute—except for some few on left and right ineradicably attached to simplistic views of the world—are not without nuance and/or ambiguity. Nor should you think that an editor (one of many) of *New Left Review* necessarily speaks for his colleagues, or that a teacher at Oxford is at the center of British politics. Oxford is, to be sure, very much behnid Mr. Gaitskell: so responsible a figure must attract the admiration and support of many (particularly in these critical times when Labor's very loyalty to NATO, and to a genteel gradualism, has been called into question) who, if they do not vote for his party, wish it well in some more general sense.

What follows, then, is my own, but you too read the newspapers. Come to think of it, however, as bad as even the respectable British press has been on this issue, you have been horribly served by the *New York Times.* Drew Middleton's dispatches have not only been

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biased (that we expect); they've been systematically ill-informed. Mr. Middleton has convinced himself, or thinks he ought to convince his readers, that the Labor party decision was the work of a small band of crackpots, out of touch with public opinion, and unlikely to have anything but limited disturbance value in British politics. Now it is true that the Conference decision was very much ahead of public opinion, as measured by the polls, on the issue of nuclear disarmament. But there is in this country a deep and widening undercurrent of anxiety on this score, which the Labor left might one day turn to electoral advantage. And the Conference revolt against the Party leadership is not something adventitious. It is, among other things, a counterattack rooted in a long series of humiliations for the party's left—going back to the last years of the Attlee government and to the Party's bitter dispute over German rearmament in 1954.

For the moment, the counterattack appears to be damaging the Labor party and not the Tory Government. This past week, a "Little General Election" was fought: seven by-elections for vacant Parliamentary seats. "Little General Election" is a misnomer, as most of the seats were in the south and west of England. In Wales Michael Foot, the editor of the left Labor weekly *Tribune,* easily won Nye Bevan's old seat. In another contest, where Labor had a chance to win (an industrial seat won in 1959 by the Tories with a small majority), the intervention of a Liberal candidate split Labor's vote as well as that of the Tory—and the latter won. In four of the five other seats, the Liberals displaced Labor as the second party. Excluding the Welsh seat, Labor received twenty-five per cent of the popular vote in six contests—and the Liberals twenty-eight per cent.

Richard Crossman, now National Chairman of the Labor Party, thinks that the result is due to the continuing split in the party and a corresponding decline of its electoral energy. He has characterized the Party's internal controversies over nationalization and defense as "arid" and "unnecessary." In one sense, Crossman is right: this month's issues may well evaporate under pressure of next month's events. The Government's decision to cancel the project for a British missile has made nonsense of Labor's support for an independent British deterrent, and the new difficulties in Britain's auto and other exporting industries show that the case for further nationalization is by no means so implausible as the Labor right alleged when its present policy was formulated some four years ago.

But if logic is on Crossman's side, psychology is not. The current conflict inside the Labor party has mobilized fundamental and irreconcilable political attitudes. These attitudes are of course connected with differing views of the possibilities in the present situation, with different assessments of the ultimate balance of forces in the British social structure and in the world outside. Few participants in the discussion are entirely impervious to reasonable persuasion—although for many a reasonable argument would be one that promised them votes

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and office. I emphasized, some lines above, the shifting nature of the dispute and my present remarks have to be read as a specification rather than a contradiction. However complex the issues and however fluid the lines, decisions have to be made in a framework set by the extremes. The latent centrifugal tendencies of the Labor party have now come to the surface; they will not subside for a long time.

Consider very recent events. After the Party Conference in October rejected the National Executive Committee's proposals on defense, two "unofficial" resolutions were passed by small majorities. The one repudiated any defense policy based on the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The other explicitly called for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain—and the closing of America's airfields and missile sites in the United Kingdom. Gaitskell and his colleagues announced that they would not be bound, in Parliament, by these decisions (although they have in the past been tough with left Labor MPs who defied Party policy).

There has been considerable discussion of the constitutional proprieties involved: Edmund Burke's letter to the Bristol electorate has been recalled. The constitutional issue is real enough, but for our purposes not all that important. What does count is that the neutralists have forced the issue. And those who see no other leaders in sight, or who fear for the party's "image," or who support NATO in far more qualified fashion than does Gaitskell, have to a large extent come out for him.

The vote in the Parliamentary party for this year's leader was 166 for Gaitskell, 81 for Harold Wilson, and a few abstentions. Among those behind Gaitskell was the new Deputy Leader, George Brown, who wavered at the Party Conference (and who has never quite forgiven the Government for dropping the British missile) and many others who in other circumstances might have voted against him. Wilson himself—so disliked in Oxford, where he once taught, that I am sure he must be a committed socialist—is not in favor of unilateral disarmament, but offered himself as a candidate with the intention of reuniting the Party. His lack of success suggests that it won't be reunited so soon.

No sooner had the election taken place, than the Polaris submarine controversy developed: its symptomatic character is pronounced. The Polaris, as every American taxpayer should know, is a rocket (with nuclear or thermonuclear warhead) that can be fired from a submerged submarine. This is supposedly advantageous, since the submarines are mobile, and a "deterrent" mounted on submarines theoretically reduces the liability of civilian populations to counter-annihilation. In this case, unfortunately, Britain won't be spared. Polaris-equipped American submarines will be using as a base a bay near Glasgow (named Holy Loch), and the control exercised by the British government over these ships is to be minimal. In the House debate, the Prime Minister (who more and more resembles an upper-class spiv) lied on the extent of British control—Washington quickly, if inadvertently, exposed him and a fearsome row developed. The row, however, was less between the

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Opposition and the Government than between the two segments of the Opposition. Some of Labor's neutralists went so far as to suggest that since they represented the views of Party Conference, they were entitled to negotiate with the Government on allocation of time for debates. The reverberations of the affair have been considerable.

LABOR NEUTRALISM represents not alone a pacifist tradition in the Labor party, and certainly not alone the rather benign view some of the Labor left take of the Soviet Union. Behind the Party Conference on this issue was the most remarkable political phenomenon in recent British history: the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Begun but three years ago by a group of intellectuals, at first systematically ignored and then pilloried by the press, the Campaign has mobilized some of the last residues of idealism—among people young or non-political or both—in this society. Frank Cousins, the Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union who has campaigned against the Gaitskell line on defense (and on nationalization), is said to have been under constant pressure from his undergraduate children to support CND. Perhaps the story is somewhat apocryphal, but it has a ring of truth about it.

CND has brought and will bring into Labor politics a kind of militant who is on this issue single-minded, but who may later apply "utopian" criteria to the other issues dividing Labor. For the time being, the CND recruits to Labor are forced into alliance with Labor's old leftists—and these, it will be recalled, have in the past year won within the Party a singular victory on domestic policy.

Shortly after the 1959 electoral defeat, Gaitskell proposed to a special Party Conference that the party drop from its constitution the clause which called for the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. The fight was long, and bitter, and the fronts confused. Suffice it to say that in March of 1960 Gaitskell was compelled—at a meeting of the National Executive Committee—to drop this proposal. Instead, what has been called the "Old Testament" was reaffirmed along with a "New Testament" more appropriate, in the view of the Labor right, to changed conditions. This struggle, too, smolders.

It is remarkable, however, that neither side has very many concrete proposals to make. The Right, it may be said, doesn't dare propose non-action and the Left cannot think of what action to suggest: both are agreed that the old-style nationalized corporation needs to be recast.

IT WILL BE SEEN that I have shifted from discussing the Parliamentary party to discussing the rest of the Labor party. Precisely: the point I wish to make is that in the party outside Parliament, Gaitskell does not lead his opponents by two to one. The correct ratio, more or less, is about one to one. Some unions with block votes at the Party Conference may change, of course—but some may change from supporting Gaitskell to opposing him. Gaitskell took something like three-fifths of the Constituency votes at the Party Conference, but he may not do

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that well next year—when he hopes to reverse the decision. A few more episodes like Polaris, and he will do worse.

Meanwhile internecine warfare is growing. The victors at the Conference have demanded of Crossman, as Party chairman, that the Party's propaganda machine be put at their disposal to expound their views. (Crossman, himself, incidentally, backed Wilson for the leadership—on the grounds that Gaitskell was so far to the right that he was incapable of uniting the Party). De jure, they have an unanswerable case. De facto, the Parliamentary leadership will do everything to use the Party machine not to convince the public of the rightness of Party policy, but to convince the Party of the rightness of the Parliamentary leadership's policy. The press, at least, is unanimously behind Gaitskell: theoretical leftism is one thing, but a threat to Britain's place in the "free world" is clearly another.

Where will it all end? My own guess is that it will have to be fought out to the bitter end, to a definite and final split in the Party. The question really is: who, in that event, will retain the Party machine and the right to the designation, Labor? Who, in other words, will have to go off and form a new party—or (a possibility for certain elements of the Right) join the Liberals in some sort of alliance or fusion? I cannot say. Either side might pull it off, and the decision may well drag itself out over one, two, even three years.

IT IS CLEAR that Labor's electoral chances, for the immediate future, have already been severely damaged by the disturbance. Patchwork will do little to convince the electorate that Labor is fit to govern. The Labor left does have a long-term opportunity. It can develop a socialism adequate to the new structural tendencies of postwar capitalism, it can attack the sources of that creeping stagnation which has afflicted British society, it can press for a British contribution to an end to the Cold War. It can shake off that mild reformism which has attenuated the chances of using the Welfare State for an advance toward a total reconstruction of British society and which, today, is reduced in large measure to a defense of the Welfare State against the new inegalitarianism of an affluent Britain. The internal obstacles to this are very great; the Labor left still lacks the theoretical and intellectual resources at the disposal of the Right. But no obstacle is so great as the kinds of policy assumptions that dictate the political decisions of the Labor right. The great changes in British politics and society seem to be generational ones, and a generation has not yet elapsed since 1945. If the Labor left is willing to wait, to accept long years of opposition, its ultimate chances of overcoming the classical difficulties of social democracy may be very considerable indeed. My own view is that the Left ought not to refuse the consequences of the situation: a split, which is in any event likely, may also be necessary and desirable.

OXFORD
20th November, 1960.

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THE TRIUMPH OF PRIMITIVISM

John P. Roche

If one believes, as I do, that it makes a difference whether the Tories or the Laborites govern Britain, the outcome of the Labor Party's 1960 Conference at Scarborough has implications of historical tragedy. Indeed, I feel that Gaitskell's defeat was a calamity not just for British socialism, but for democratic socialists everywhere. By endorsing unilateral nuclear disarmament, and forcing the Parliamentary leadership to challenge this absurd substitute for a defense policy a motley coalition has in the span of a few short days jeopardized the Party's accomplishments over a period of sixty years. The impossibilist compulsion, which is latent in all socialist movements, has—at least temporarily—triumphed over the integrating forces of solidarity and common sense. The internal consequences are likely to be disintegration and schism; the external consequence is probably a long period of undisturbed Toryism.

In effect, the Labor party has lost its pragmatic coherence. As the cracked drum of unilateralism beat out the death march, the hard-shell primitives and their odd congeries of allies overpowered the humanistic empiricists who have been attempting to adapt the Party to life in the 1960's. If they can consolidate their hold by successfully dominating the Parliamentary Labor party, the British Labor party will be destroyed as an effective political instrument. Life in the wilderness may be morally fortifying for the desert fathers of unilateralism, but the political cost of this self-imposed isolation will be permanent conservatism in the society at large.

For the benefit of those readers who may find such a stark focus disconcerting—those who may have dedicated their energies to the quest for Third or Fourth Positions—I should set forth my basic analytical assumption. It is my view that ideological disputes, however esoteric, always in political life come down to a choice between bodies, to a decision to support either X or Y. While metaphysicians and mystics have, of course, the right to evaluate ideologies abstractly, no one in real life has ever found a theory running for office. In fact if one backs a "new course," he is simultaneously backing a set of "new corsairs" and I insist that the primary concern of the analyst should be the character of the new elite rather than the specific gravity of its ideology. I take my stand with Eduard Bernstein in asserting that the character of the movement is more important than the symmetry or perfection of its goals.

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THIS MODE OF ANALYSIS, by the way, is neither "left wing" nor "right wing" in the traditional sense. Indeed, it bears no relationship whatever to classical programmatic categories. One who utilizes it approaches the whole problem of the nature of a social movement from a different perspective than is customary in socialist circles. About ten years ago, for example, when Guy Mollet, the "rank-and-file" spokesman from Arras, wrested control of the French Socialist party from "wishy-washy humanists" (to use the current phrases) of the Blum dispensation, some of us were deeply disturbed. Although Mollet was equipped with a program designed to revitalize the SFIO's Marxist tradition and to rescue it from the "revisionist" clutches of men like André Philip and Daniel Mayer, his rise to power in the Party was based on ruthless, unprincipled bureaucratic manipulation. Those socialists still rigidly attached to Marxist rhetoric, rejoiced that the SFIO was back on its authentic course—and were later disconcerted to discover Mollet underwriting a savage Algerian policy while Philip, Mayer and other stuffy old lib-labs followed their principles and founded the Autonomous Socialist party on a program of unconditional opposition to the shambles in Algeria.

Those who deny that there is a meaningful connection between human character and ideological pretensions have had some problems with Castro's Cuba. A year or so ago when an enthusiastic friend told me we must all rally to Fidelism and bring "real socialism" to Latin America, I suggested gently that I could not see social democrats canonizing a man in love with a tommy-gun. The reply: Castro was "utterly unimportant"; it was Fidelism that counted. But Castro was and is important, and I have never known a man who treated a gun as a symbol—instead of an instrument—who was not fundamentally depraved. When such an addict of romantic violence appears in politics mouthing left wing slogans, are we to deny the insights of experience for the nostalgia of a phrase?

The reader may agree or disagree with this formulation as he chooses, but he should keep it in mind as the foundation of my analysis of the internal situation in the British Labor party. First I will briefly discuss the historical background of the Scarborough Conference; second, the events and alignments at the meeting; and finally the current alarms and prospects.

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WHILE UNILATERAL nuclear disarmament was the pivotal issue at the Scarborough Conference, Gaitskell's defense policy was not the fundamental cause of dispute. It was merely the fuse which touched off an explosion that has been building up for a decade. The basic problem that has confronted the Party since the War, and particularly since 1951, is the withering away of its "natural" constituency, the self-conscious British workingclass. In objective terms, the "proletariat" still constitutes the overwhelming majority of the British population. But even in Labor's halcyon days roughly a quarter of the objective workingclass voted Liberal or Tory, and the proportion of the nation's

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workers and their families which is class oriented has declined steadily since the War.

The impact of (relative) affluence has been particularly noticeable in the *embourgeoisement* of those who have come of age since 1945. Increasingly the Labor party has become an in-gathering of elderly and middle-aged workers, those whose political attitudes were frozen in the depressed interwar years. This segment is dedicated, in a somewhat ritualized fashion, to Labor, but alone it cannot win a general election. If the Party is to win, it must gain the support of the young and of the women, the two categories of the British population which have been most "Americanized."

This "Americanization" of British social values has occurred under Tory auspices in the period since 1951—a fact which has led some socialist intellectuals to attack television, kitchen appliances, and even social mobility as though they were the work of the Devil. This Luddite manifestation is both perverse and absurd; in fact what has happened is that the destruction of traditional British values has paradoxically worked to the advantage of the *ancien régime* and to the disadvantage of the Jacobins. For half a century the Labor party fought the class system in the name of equality and the capitalist system in the name of (we must admit it) affluence. The Labor Government of 1945 destroyed the economic foundations of the class system—or those foundations which survived the War—and the Tories reaped the political harvest.

Only this savage paradox can explain the bitterness of the so-called "Labor left." If one assumes that his political convictions have a cosmic imprimatur, their failure in practice can only be explained by betrayal, by the treason of misleaders. Thus the leaders of the Party, who had the bitter historical misfortune of being the receivers in bankruptcy of the United Kingdom and the British Empire, discovered after six years of desperate struggle for survival that their substantial political and economic accomplishments had earned for them a public reputation for austerity and a private indictment for treason. As the supple Conservatives moved in from one side with a program of blatant affluence, the leaders of the Party found a guerrilla force of assorted malcontents sniping on the other.

AND AT THIS PARTICULAR moment in time a new set of leaders took over. The oldtimers who had nursed the movement from its cradle and supplied great vitality in the 1920s and 1930s began to drop in the 1940s. In private the leadership was something less than a band of brothers: Attlee lived in aloof taciturnity (Morrison noted wistfully in his recent autobiography that he wished he could say that he *knew* Attlee!), Morrison and Ernie Bevin detested each other, Greenwood sulked in his corner, and Cripps and Nye Bevan were always suspect, even when in good standing.

But publicly and collectively they had that enormous zest which arises from constant participation in a living movement, from solidarity and historical assurance. They were, to put it differently, political men

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who had grown up in the movement, suffered the "treason" of MacDonald and the electoral massacre of 1931 and come back, lived and breathed "socialism," and known together the unnerving, unexpected, and magnificent moment of triumph in 1945. True, they never really defined "socialism," but why bother? Their people knew what it meant. (Besides, only trouble-makers, ILP-types out to rock the boat, raised divisive questions like that. In operational terms, socialism: socialists in power.) Thus, despite their feuds, the old leaders had that sort of confidence in their mission which made it possible for them to work fruitfully in an atmosphere of stabilized distrust. After all, Bevin and Morrison were old enemies, and who is more predictable than an old enemy?

Suddenly in the early 1950s the Labor Government was out and the old leadership was through: dead, sick, or just played out. And into their shoes stepped those chosen from a new generation to whom the Labor party was an inheritance, not an achievement. These new men were, and are, tremendously able, but if they have any one characteristic in common, it is political *style*. As public figures they are dispassionate, unemotional, even austere. Could one visualize Hugh Gaitskell screaming bitterly at a Party Conference, as Bevin did in 1947, that R. H. S. Crossman had stabbed him in the back?

This lack of emotional militance has led to the accusation of insincerity, to the charge that since Gaitskell does not display his convictions in an emotional fashion, he has none. Now it is true historically that socialist movements have carried a good deal of demagogic baggage, and I would argue that it is tactically unfortunate that no one of the Gaitskellite group is a good stem-winder, but militancy is not proof of, or substitute for, conviction. Nor are the more militant (in this emotional sense) necessarily of greater virtue than the less ostentatious or extraverted members of society. It is easy for radicals, nostalgic for the good old days when the lines were clear and the trumpet compelling, to exaggerate the virtues of the chiliast; they should apply the same criteria to Marx's Witnesses that they do to Jehovah's.

WITH A NEW LEADERSHIP, particularly one faced with the onerous task of salvaging the Party from defeat, came a revival of the so-called "left" opposition. The first manifestation was "Bevanism," built in fact around the aspirations of that brilliant opportunist rather than around any ideological standard. Bevan marshalled the various battalions of the alienated behind his bid for the leadership, but, once decisively defeated, he dumped his crusaders precipitously to accept a consolation prize worthy of his talents.* With Bevan as shadow Foreign Secretary pouring invective on his erstwhile followers for their naivete, the various oppositions retired to their tents to await a new, authentic leader. Gaitskell's "left" flank was secure: Bevan, probably the Labor Party's greatest mass orator since the defection of Ramsay Mac-

* An action which was predictable if one concentrated on the analysis of Bevan rather than "Bevanism": see my "Crisis in British Socialism," *Antioch Review*, Winter 1952-53.

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Donald, could be counted on to prevent any runs around left end.

Two election defeats and the death of Bevan (who *could* possibly have held the line at Scarborough) brought Gaitskell to the 1960 Conference in perilous straits. For this time the disparate oppositions had a common issue and the Party, after three successive defeats each worse than its predecessor, was suffering from bad morale and a natural tendency to make the Leader into a scapegoat. Moreover, Gaitskell himself, apparently on the advice of a non-political friend, had tried to seize the initiative on the ideological level by blaming defeat on antiquated economic notions and asking that Clause 4 of the Party Constitution be amended to eliminate reference to public ownership as the ultimate Labor objective.

This was Gaitskell's worst blunder to date; it is too bad that he never in the course of his education examined carefully the career of Eduard Bernstein. "You don't *say* it Ede, you *do* it!" the highly political Auer told Bernstein when the latter's penchant for clarification and intellectual honesty had brought him to the brink of expulsion. Gaitskell knows better than anyone else the ceremonial status of nationalization in socialist thought and he should have been sagacious enough to let a sleeping dogma lie. No significant segment of the Party really wants to nationalize anything in particular (water supply was, I think, the leading candidate when the matter was last debated). At the same time, few people are prepared to amend the Decalogue simply because they commit adultery; indeed, as an analyst of political behavior I would predict that any pro-Decalogue party would be dominated by uneasy lechers.

Gaitskell's (or was it Crosland's?) proposal to amend the Constitution was butchered in the trade unions and eventually withdrawn, but it did serious damage to the Leader's prestige: he came to Scarbororough with this defeat still fresh and with his enemies for the first time anticipating a possible victory. They had tasted blood and mustered their forces for a real kill. Moreover, the possibility that Gaitskell might really be brought down stimulated a number of previously inert warriors to shine up their daggers and offer their services—as Generals.

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IN EXAMINING WHAT exactly happened at Scarborough, it is essential to analyze the nature of the coalition that handed Gaitskell the first significant defeat any Party Leader has ever received at a Party Conference. The decisive votes for unilateralism came from the trade union side; oddly enough, in view of the reputation of the constituency parties for extremism, it appears that Gaitskell received a majority of the votes in that (small) sector.* Two factors explain this trade union defection from the Executive: first, Frank Cousins's unconcealed hatred for Hugh Gaitskell which moved the Transport and General Workers Union into the unilateralist camp; and, second, the general depoliticali-

* For an illuminating analysis which injects some factual material into a discussion heretofore conducted on a theological level, see Martin Harrison's recent *Trade Union and the Labour Party since 1945*, London, 1960.

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zation of trade union membership which has led to situations in which, as a consequence of apathy and "Telly," a few activists in a union branch determine *political* policy. These activists—with many Communists and pro-Communists among them—have for the past five years concentrated on "Banning the Bomb" and have succeeded in mobilizing behind this slogan a number of important unions.

Combined with these trade union forces were, of course, sincere religious pacifists, the mixed Aldermaston bag of principled and expediential unilateralists, R. H. S. Crossman, who sincerely defines truth as what he says at any particular moment, and a platoon of Iagos from the Parlimentary Labor party who suddenly discovered that their loyalty to their Leader was unjustified. This assemblage was, of course, promptly designated the "left wing" and a great ideological battle was joined between the "Left" and the "Right."

The issue of unilateral British nuclear disarmament provided just the right vehicle for this coalition: the pseudo-Left supplied a pseudo-program. In logical terms, an Englishman could support unilateralism for three reasons: first, because he is a pacifist opposed to *all* weapons; second, because he wants to let the Americans pay the costs of defending Britain; and third, because he hopes that in the event of war the USSR will spare an inoffensive Britain. Each of these is a perfectly legitimate basis for endorsing unilateralism, but not one of them has any relationship to radicalism, to socialist thought. Nor does unilateralism in concrete terms provide a defense program: the inexorable consequence of all three positions in the world of 1960 is 100% reliance on the United States for the defense of Britain. Unilateralism is *not* an answer to the question: What should a Labor Government's defense policy visualize? It is an answer to a different question—How can Labor avoid promulgating a defense policy?—and all answers to this category of question are by definition non-political in essence and conservative in practical impact. One has no more right to call the anti-Gaitskell coalition "radical" then he has to apply this designation to hard-shell, Bible-beating fundamentalists or others who turn to ideological primitivism for solace from the shattering dilemmas of modern life.

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From the Conference at Scarborough the focus has now shifted to Westminster and the Parliamentary Labor party, the organized body of Labor Members of Parliament. Traditionally autonomous *de facto,* the PLP has always *de jure* been subordinate to the Party Conference. The terms of subordination are somewhat ambiguous: there is a provision in the Party Constitution of 1917 which states that for a policy to be incorporated in the Party's legislative program a two-thirds vote is necessary—and the unilateralists had only a simple majority. Thus on *constitutional* grounds it is doubtful whether the Leader of the Opposition and his associates must implement the Scarborough decision.

But the fundamental issue reaches beyond the Party Constitution to the British Constitution and involves a key question in democratic

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theory: Are representatives elected by the people legitimately bound by the decisions of publicly irresponsible bodies? Is a representative, in other words, responsible to any but his official constituents? In unofficial terms, of course, he must be responsive to those who have nominated him and worked for his election, but democratic theory clearly postulates that once elected he is not the servant or the agent of his party but the representative of all those who live in his district—even those who voted against him. (The alternative to this is that form of enlightened brigandage known as the party state.) From this viewpoint, it is immaterial whether the unilateralists got a majority, two-thirds, or nine-tenths of the votes at Scarborough; in no case can a decision of a Party Conference bind the actions of parliamentary representatives. And there has been no suggestion that the British electorate is in any mood to endorse unilateralism: all indices of public sentiment indicate the opposite, that nuclear disarmament is an electoral liability.

To demand that the PLP adopt unilateralism is therefore to urge it to commit hari-kari on Macmillan's doorstep. It is highly doubtful whether the millions who voted Labor in the hope of putting their people in power and ending Tory rule would appreciate this act of self-destruction, and they were only marginally and accidentally involved in the decision at Scarborough. I am not for a moment suggesting that the action *at* the Conference was undemocratic, but I submit that it would be an act of cowardice for the PLP to accept Conference dictation.

Gaitskell made it clear that he would fight the decision, and his enemies have also been clearing for action. As soon as Parliament met, Anthony Greenwood was proposed to run against Gaitskell for the job of Leader. Greenwood had the virtue of being an outspoken unilateralist, but the so-called "Left" perhaps felt this was pushing principles a bit hard. At any rate, Greenwood declined in favor of Harold Wilson, who is not a unilateralist but has been around a long time, was a minister in the Labor Government, and presumably was thought to have more stature in the PLP than Greenwood. Wilson lost by two-to-one (166 to 81), a Gaitskellite, George Brown, was elected Deputy Leader, and the Gaitskell group won ten of the twelve slots in the Parliamentary Committee (Shadow Cabinet). In short, the Labor Members of Parliament gave Gaitskell a resounding vote of confidence. Institutionally speaking he is well placed to launch the counterattack.

IN PRAGMATIC TERMS he has two alternative courses of action: first, to refurbish the two-thirds rule in the Party Constitution and on that basis deny the binding character of the Scarborough vote; second, to proclaim once and for all the freedom of the PLP from Conference dictation. While the first has a certain tactical attractiveness, particularly in papering over the cracks, it would in the long run weaken Gaitskell's position both in the nation and in the PLP. The opposition is not really united by its dedication to unilateralism—its basic bond is a common quest for Gaitskell's head. Wilson's candidacy demonstrates that and it is probably not unfair to say that Frank Cousins would en-

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dorse Zen if he thought it would contribute to Gaitskell's destruction.

Gaitskell then must not be deluded into thinking that these fissures can be verbally bridged. In essence a group within the Party is making a (perfectly legitimate) bid for power and they will be satisfied with nothing less than his elimination and the replacement of his colleagues. He has the power to choose the battleground and establish the framework of dispute: he should strike to the heart of the issue, and strike fast. This imbroglio, after all, is not taking place in a soundproof room and the Tories would like nothing better than to spring an election on Labor at the nadir of its quarrel. The practical consequence is that the PLP has at the outside three years to set its house in order, probably less.

If Gaitskell takes the firm line that the PLP is responsible to the national electorate, certain consequences are predictable. The opposition to Gaitskell is composed of highly fissionable material and includes several Messiahs who will probably split before they accept discipline—their departure from the Party should be reluctantly expedited. The damage they can do outside of the Party is nothing compared with the problems they create within it—and it is at least possible that outside some of it will hurt the Tories. If they are prepared to stand the key test of democratic society and run for Parliament, one can predict that they will be defeated in safe Labor seats and possibly put the Tory in where the seat is marginal. A few seats lost in this manner would be a small price to pay for the restoration of unity of purpose in the PLP. But the number of bolters would be small: few of Gaitskell's opponents are ideologues; most are men who can be convinced to rise above principle in the interests of unity and their own political futures.

This brings me back to the point from which I began. Obviously I fail to see any division of principle, any "left"—"right" split, in the current battle within the Labor Party. In precise terms, I do not consider R. H. S. Crossman, Frank Cousins, Michael Foot, Barbara Castle, Harold Wilson, or Anthony Greenwood as morally or philosophically superior to Hugh Gaitskell, Denis Healey, Anthony Crosland, James Callaghan, George Brown, or Roy Jenkins. On the contrary, the latter group seems to me to be more experimental, more willing to question the received truths of Victorian socialism, more concerned with the future of democratic socialism—in a word, more radical—than the *ad hoc* aggregation that confronts them. And finally, when I ask the vital question, or at least the question that must be vital to those who seek the implementation of the socialist dream in this world we never made, *Who Can Beat the Tories?*, there is only one possible answer. Those dominated by the paralysis of perfectionism may say this is an unimportant question, but they can only deny its relevance by *ultimately* opting either for other-worldliness and inner purity or for the dictatorship of an enlightened vanguard.

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SOCIALISM AND APATHY

Lewis Coser

The British Labor movement has always been favored, or goaded, by a left wing which felt that Labor lacked full socialist consciousness; in the last decade or two this left wing found popular expression through the oratory of Nye Bevan and the agitation of the weekly *Tribune*. Even those who might sympathize with the general outlook of this left wing had to admit, however, that it was often characterized by an impoverishment of thought cloaked as an intransigence of belief. It reminded one but too often of Carlyle's remark about the Benthamite Party being "so far in the rear of others as to fancy itself the van." Recently, by contrast, there has arisen a new left wing—it calls itself the New Left —*which is more thoughtful and alert.*

The New Left stems from two main sources: first a group of young students and teachers who several years ago began publishing *Universities and Left Review* (*ULR*) and second, a group of intellectuals who broke from the British Communist Party after the Hungarian revolution to begin publishing *The New Reasoner*. Some months ago the two journals were merged, to form *New Left Review*.

Of the two component tendencies, by far the least valuable was the second one. Though morally in revulsion from Stalinism and breaking significantly from crucial Leninist dogma, the editors of *The New Reasoner* seemed still caught in a web of old half-emotional half-ideological attachments; their straining toward a redefinition of socialist politics seemed inhibited by residual piety with respect to the form, though not always the content, of their earlier beliefs. As one watched them expressing sympathy for the east European "revisionists" while anxiously searching for evidence of "progressivism" in the Communist world, one felt that they had not yet made the decisive step of questioning some of the basic assumptions of their earlier politics.

Whatever is most vital in the New Left came from the young intellectuals editing *ULR*. In its few years this magazine brought a remarkable freshness and animation to the socialist criticism of English Welfare State society. The *ULR* people had no tradition of system-building or habits of sectarian polemics to shake off; they were not weary from old battles lost; they spoke in revolt against the status quo, but in their speech one felt the force of personal experience, the force of young people who had known intimately both the benefits and the stultifying effects of the Welfare State. Their most notable contribution was a kind of impressionistic sociology. When one read the early issues of *ULR* it was really possible to gain some awareness of the quality of contemporary English life: the way young people feel about work and leisure,

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the problems of workers uprooted from traditional neighborhoods, the growth of a new "American-style" mass culture, etc., etc. They made useful and interesting suggestions both on the problem of city-planning and with regard to controlling advertising and the mass media. They showed that city-planning and mass culture were essentially *political* questions, that cultural problems belonged in the very center of political debate.

By contrast, the weakness of *ULR* was in politics. Here, because they were no more successful than other socialists in working out a new program and because they were functioning in a milieu where the need for such a program was both pressing and immediate, they often fell back on the slogans of sectarian Marxism, though with a winning lack of conviction.

SINCE THE MERGER of the two journals into *New Left Review* it has been somewhat difficult to tell what the relationship would be between the inherited strength and weakness of the two groups. One source of encouragement has been the participation of such sophisticated and nondoctrinal radical writers as Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart. And it should also be said that the very existence of this journal has helped bring sharpness and healthy anger to the discussions within the Labor Party and on its intellectual fringes. The moral fervor with which the *NLR* writers have responded to the crisis of socialism contrasts favorably with the passionless practicality of most of the right wing.

Out of Apathy,* which recently appeared in England, is the first in a series of New Left books. It has for its editor and major contributor E. P. Thompson, one of the editors of the defunct *New Reasoner*. Its main theme is an analysis of the political-social apathy which seems to characterize England today, and a variety of proposals for overcoming that apathy by a resurgent socialism. Its contributors include Stuart Hall and Ralph Samuel, the gifted young former editors of *ULR*, both of whom are now active on *New Left Review;* Kenneth Alexander, Vice Chairman of the North Angus and Mearns Labour Party; and two other radical intellectuals, one of them a Trotskyist and the other of the *New Reasoner* outlook.

The general orientation of the book is appealing in many ways. Most of the authors conduct their criticism of British society in terms of moral and esthetic, rather than economic, criteria. They attempt to combat the heritage of Webbsian manipulation in British socialism by reemphasizing the humanist tradition of William Morris. This is most welcome. The authors' concern is above all with the impoverished quality of life in modern Britain, the lack of a common culture, the decline of community, the dehumanizing effects of the mass media. They appear to grant that under the Welfare State the battle for material improvement has been partly won. This is why they stress that British socialism must now press forward with a "moral revolution" built, in Kenneth Alexander's words, "upon a moral revulsion with existing values." The success of reformism, Alexander argues, has greatly increased the number of people capable of criticizing the values of the society in which they live by spreading more widely the benefits of education, leisure and material security.

**Out of Apathy*. Edited by E. P. Thompson. New Left Books. Stevens & Sons. 308 pp. 15 shillings.

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Yet while workers have thus become more independent, their interest and participation in traditional working class activity has decreased. Political apathy is linked to a process of "privatization," a withdrawal from the public scene. "Private ambitions," says E. P. Thompson, "have displaced social aspirations." This the authors see rightly as a central problem of modern socialism.

While apathy has grown below, the "insiders" of Bastard Capitalism (see the reprint of Ralph Samuel's essay in the last issue of DISSENT) penetrate areas of social life previously barred to them. Capitalism has been limited and circumscribed, yet business values pervade the national conscience. Human priorities are pushed aside as the values and rituals of salesmanship assume dominance. A fetishism of commodities, more powerful than even a Marx could visualize, corrupts the taste of the individual and leads to the atrophy of a common culture. In a climate in which acquisitive propensities are maximized, public capacity declines. And with it disappears the sense of rebelliousness which characterized the earlier socialist movement. When things are in the saddle human nature gets distorted; when only private gains are seen as worth striving for, the public weal decays. Men then lose their will to shape society and become creatures of irrational impulse.

WHILE I AM MOVED by much of the descriptive side of this critique, and while I find the diagnosis, though sometimes over-simplified, pointed and sharply drawn, I am less impressed by the authors' efforts to think of viable alternatives or to devise strategies for reaching socialist goals. How *do* we move out of apathy?

Whenever they go beyond their vivid characterization of the shortcomings of present-day British society they tend to fall back on clichés. And when rhetoric takes over, clarity of intellectual orientation is bound to suffer. Thus E. P. Thompson argues that, "Contemporary British society gives as much reason for outrage as the society of the 1880s or the 1930s," yet he also polemicizes against Marxist dogmatists who claim that no progress has been made since the last century. This political uncertainty is perhaps best exemplified by the ambiguities with which the various authors handle the term "revolution." Alasdair MacIntyre urges that we have to choose between "Keynes with his peerage, and Trotsky with an ice-pick in his skull." E. P. Thompson does not indulge in such appalling romantic non sequiturs, yet his own more controlled reasoning also involves him in basic inconsistencies. He argues for the necessity of "revolution," but this seems in places to mean no more than the advocacy of non-violent gradual change culminating ultimately in a qualitative transformation of the character of society. At other points, however, Thompson argues against piecemeal changes. Others say that "reformism is near the end of the road." Elsewhere Thompson contends that "we need no longer think of disaster as a prelude to advance" and polemicizes against "cataclysmic" versions of revolution, yet he ends his contribution with a surrealist fantasy about popular protest winning "sufficient strength to force our country out of NATO" and economic hardship then disclosing to people "the possibility of the socialist alternative."

It would almost seem as if the majority of these authors were com-

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mitted to a new kind of reformism predicated on the gradual encroachment from below upon the powers above, upon the gradual whittling away by workers and outsiders of the decision-making powers of the "insiders" and managers. But they do not dare say so for fear, perhaps, of losing revolutionary purity.

One feels that many of the writers here attempt to overcome underlying doubts by verbal violence against right wingers, NATO, and the like. Such whistling in the dark will get us nowhere. It is no longer sufficient to affirm that the way out is "a society of equals, a cooperative community." Nor is it sufficient to harp upon "the replacement of production for profit by production for use," while heaping scorn upon Gaitskell, Crossland, and Strachey. We can no longer afford to ignore the question whether "common ownership" will in fact make a difference in actual control. What warranty do we have that the quality of human relations in the factory will necessarily change when common ownership replaces private property? The authors are right to emphasize, in Alexander's phrase, that "the enthusiasm of workers must be awakened again and encouraged to action: without this there can be no socialism." But they never envisage what might happen if Britain were to attain common ownership while perpetuating the regime of managerial control over "privatized," docile and prosperous workers. They do not face the totalitarian menace, that peculiar hell of the Twentieth Century. (This also accounts for the appalling insularity of their comments on the foreign scene. Here they indulge in cliché-ridden verbiage of the neutralist variety. They lack understanding of the dynamics of totalitarian power, and it is disappointing to note that these humanist socialists, while failing even to mention Sweden or Norway, consider authoritarian states like Yugoslavia and Indonesia to be in their camp.)

Oswald Spengler was wont to use the term "pseudomorphosis," which he had borrowed from the mineralogists, to designate those historical cases "in which an older alien Culture lies so massively over the land that a young Culture, born in this land, cannot get its breath and fails not only to achieve pure and specific expression forms, but even to develop fully its own self-consciousness. All that wells up from the depth of the young soul is cast in the old molds, young feelings stiffen in senile works, and instead of rearing itself up in its own creative power, it can only hate the distant power with a hate that grows monstrous." This seems to me a most apt characterization of the danger which threatens the New Left. If it is to succeed, it must do more than write a kind of Byzantine gloss on the dominant theme of traditional socialism. If the freshness of its theoretical contribution were to match the freshness of its perceptions of the current scene as well as the vigor of its moral stance, then we might be justified in hoping that a genuinely new departure will be made in the tradition of socialism. Meanwhile we are deeply in the debt of the *NLR* for what is without doubt the most brilliant radical attack on modern mass society which has come out of England in many years. It is just because they have already done so much in so short a span of time that one is entitled to criticize their shortcomings and to hope for what is still to come.

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In the summer of 1960 Stanley Plastrik, a member of the DISSENT *editorial board, took an extended tour of India, as a guest of that country's Praja Socialist Party. The first part of his report on India appears below; a final installment will be printed in the Spring 1961 issue.* — EDITORS

RETURN TO INDIA—1960

Stanley Plastrik

New Delhi — early July:

It isn't easy to return to India after a twenty-year absence. So much has happened and so much changed. There is a whole new generation that has known freedom since 1947. What will it be like? Will one find the spirit of national sacrifice and struggle, so striking to a young socialist in 1940, still alive in the country?

And one's old friends? What will they have to say of this new India? Will the inevitable disappointments of 13 years of independence have left its mark upon them?

Flying all day over the enormous stretch of barren land extending from Turkey up to the western borders of India only adds to these apprehensions. It is a relief to reach the airport near Delhi. The warm, humid air of the monsoon evening is familiar. Clouds, mist and fog swirl about as we pass from plane to airport in the pitch blackness of the Indian night. During the next two months there will be barely a glimpse of the sun during the day; fortunately, since the monsoon days range between 90 and 100 degrees even without sun.

Friends, Indian socialists, have come to meet me with the warm welcome extended everywhere in this country. Before long, at the home of P., we are in our first discussion: questions, news, arrangements for my trip. Remarks are dropped which indicate a certain air of disenchantment with both country and government; but then Indians are well known for their skeptical outlook on things in general; I will wait and see. On the apartment balcony facing New Delhi's Connaught Circus I watch a breathtaking sight—Indians on the move, going constantly from place to place no matter what the hour—on foot, in buses, on bicycles or motorcycles, taxis and large motorcycle-drawn carriages, or even *tongas* pulled by horses. One is overwhelmed by the sheer sense of people.

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ON THIS VISIT I plan to spend as much time as possible in the

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countryside. Despite uncontrolled movement into the cities, close to 80 per cent of the population still lives as agriculturists on the land or tied down to a village occupation. Thanks to the efforts of our friends, arrangements have been made to tour villages under the government's Community Development Project. But I plan also to visit villages developing independently under the cooperative *bhoodan* or *gramdan* program of Vinoba Bhave, disciple of Gandhi, and Jayaprakash Narayan, former socialist leader. After two days of New Delhi, armed with a bedroll and food, I leave by train for Jaipur, main city of the newly formed state of Rajasthan made up by piecing together many backward princely and petty territories. Leave-takings from Indian stations were always dramatic events; this is no exception. The old city of Delhi where the station is located is a packed shambles of humanity; we plow through the streets clinging to a motorcycle cab. The station, no matter the hour, reflects the condition of the masses who live in the old city. Thousands fill its platforms and crevices, sprawled on covers, preparing evening meals even on the railway tracks between platforms. I notice for the first time the complete absence of foreigners, Europeans, whites; not an English soldier, official or policeman. This is the most striking and immediate evidence of independence. Away from New Delhi and its Embassy Row only once do I come across a white foreigner—a sad and harmless official of the U. S. Information Service known to his Indian friends as the "awkward American."

Small groups of soldiers are idling about the platforms. They have been called down from the Himalayan frontiers to bolster the government's hard stand against a threatened strike of central government employees, mostly railroad personnel and workers. The unions involved are largely socialist-led and there is danger of my being stranded by the strike. The soldiers are handsome men, clean and in excellent shape, clearly still drawn from the so-called martial groups. The Indian Army is a carryover from the British trained forces of pre-independence: aloof, elitist, removed from the people. Some carry rifles, others have long, stout clubs tipped at both ends with lead—the *lathi* of British days. They have occupied the station and patrol the tracks.

It is to be an all-night ride, reaching Jaipur at 6 A.M. The train will leave on time, but certainly arrive hours late. An hour before we leave the cars are packed. I squeeze my way into a second-class car (one per train). Later in the night someone will offer me his "berth," the baggage rack high above the seats. I spend the night trying not to fall asleep for fear of slipping off and crashing down on the heads below. The endurance test of train travel in India has not changed; the train bumps slowly along over a wornout roadbed.

Jaipur, Rajasthan — Community Development Block

In India 295,004,251 people, forming 82.7 per cent of the country's population, are village dwellers. They live in about 558,000 scattered village settlements. Out of a total population of 357 million, according

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> *to the 1951 census, 249 million fall into "agricultural classes," and of these, 240 million or 96 per cent live in villages. . . . Agriculture in the country is mostly subsistence farming; 83.5 per cent of all agricultural production being foodstuffs. Besides the agricultural classes, the rest of the village population consists mainly of artisan and occupational castes whose economy and lives are largely integrated with the economic and socio-religious life of the peasant communities.*
>
> *In general, the village presents a picture of poverty, malnutrition, poor standards of public health, and illiteracy.**

The train is two hours behind time, but the telegram arranging my visit has not yet arrived! At the government tourist hotel I endure the awkwardness of breakfast alone in a dining room with five mustached and turbaned "bearers" serving. Summer is an off-tourist season, yet employees must be kept on for lack of work elsewhere. The totally unemployed are said to still run close to the 40 million mark; the seasonally and underemployed run into many millions more. Mr. U., Deputy Development Commissioner, arrives; he is to take me to the outlying areas around the city of Jaipur.

The Community Development Program, launched in 1952 under India's first Five Year Plan, is the government's chosen instrument of rural advance through self-help plus government aid and direction. Its formal aims are to increase substantially the country's agricultural production, particularly in foodstuffs, to improve rural communications, health and hygiene as well as village education. Its long-range aim is no less than a social and economic transformation of the villages. By 1956, the Community Development Program covered one-fourth of India; by the end of 1959, one-half; and by the end of October, 1963 the entire country will be covered, according to the just-adopted Third Five Year Plan.**

By making the former collector of each district its chief development officer, by carrying the program to each village through the training of local workers, it was hoped that a vast number of rural communities would improve their techniques, create village leadership, foster cooperatives for services, mobilize local labor and, in general, revitalize village life. From my observations and from other reports I conclude that, despite some successes, the results have been extremely uneven and spotty.

In Jaipur district, maize, *bajera* (for the making of unleavened pancake bread), and winter wheat sown in October, are raised. There are two yearly crops; irrigation—we are close to desert regions here—is employed, with widespread use of canals, and tanks for holding water. The land must be worked hard; dry and lumpy, it is not particularly friendly to agriculture. I jeep to the village of B., headquarters village for the Block, population approximately 4,000. Out of the city the roads become narrow, rutted, with the once metallic surfacing

* *India's Changing Villages*, S. C. Dube, page 7, an excellent work on basic problems of Indian agriculture.

** *Third Five Year Plan*, A Draft Outline, Planning Commission, June, 1960, page 153.

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worn off. Thus far, what I have seen of North India's railroad, road and communication infrastructure is not encouraging; the improvement during the last 20 years seems negligible. Gunnar Myrdal, on a recent visit to India, wrote that India's basic infrastructure was still weak and far removed from that of a modern industrial state.

ON THE WAY TO THE VILLAGE I make several stops. Here a special Block Development school is in progress; I watch a meeting of top representatives from village *panchyats* (councils). These stops are hasty, permitting only an exchange of greetings and a few questions. Several women, it is worth noting, are at both meetings, sitting quietly, with heads bowed and partly covered. Several lower caste representatives are also present, sitting slightly apart. The bulk of the men present are clearly picked members of the better-off farm families, examples of the Indian "middle" farmer. They are tall, intelligent in appearance, and energetic. Both school and meeting appear to be effectively run by the Development officials, men of experience, special knowledge and training. The atmosphere is friendly, serious and good-humored. The government relies upon these farmers; both state and central government subsidize them and they are to form the backbone of India's progressive, land-holding, market crop-producing peasantry. Receptive and shrewd, these men are far removed from the militant, revolutionary peasant leaders of 1940. Their lessons and discussions deal with improved farming practices, the growing Jaipur market, profit-making and not the struggle for land. The village I am to visit is theirs.

Like villages in most peasant lands, B. has one main street which winds off into the distance. By Indian standards, it is a large and well-organized village. Only its fringes are unkempt and disorderly. At the *panchyat* building, which also serves as the revenue collecting office, the village cooperative and the village school, the village head recites the benefits of the Community Development program: in agriculture, better arrangements for procuring seed and farm instruments; advice from experts; facilities for irrigation under local control; increase in crop production (almost double in winter wheat, 60 percent in other crops). In regard to relationships within and without the village, he explains how it had formerly "belonged" to a powerful, absentee landlord, the *jagadir,* a feudal agent of the Maharajah of Jaipur. Now this gentleman, along with his rajah, has been retired to the city. The villagers have since begun to run their own affairs; this is true throughout Rajasthan, once a center of absentee landlordism and feudal exploitation. The chief's eyes shine as he tells his oft-repeated story; clearly, this is the major change that has taken place. He claims significant progress in village integration; that is, the raising of the depressed castes, redistribution of lands, changed status of the landless. But here, when asked to be specific, he hedges a little.

For one thing, apart from redistribution of lands confiscated by the state—at goodly prices—from the landowners, no basic change in

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land relationships has come about. As throughout India, the privately-owned, family farm is the basic unit. The story I am told in this "show" village supports government claims for its program: the end of the *zamindari* system of absentee landlordism, the creation of an elective and functioning village *panchyat,* a ban on public untouchability and a limited improvement in farm productivity. But only the worst and most monstrous inequalities in land ownership have been abolished by government action; the *jagadir* has gone, but an explosive inequality remains.

Example: part of the Development program is the organization of village work for construction and repairs. The village rich pay in cash or material contributions; the others do the work. Thus, what could be a useful cooperative work experience appears as a *corvée,* forced upon the poor by the State government.

Example: *Harijans* and other low-caste groups are constitutionally and juridically represented in the network of village, block and district bodies. This is an important legal measure, but what lies behind it? Our village chief does not hesitate to admit that elections to these bodies take place along caste lines, that the villages of his area are caste-dominated villages, that divisions along political lines in conformity with the national parties is unknown.* In the schools, meetings, etc., that I attend there are always representatives of lower caste groups—or women—present. Yet, more often than not, this is due to some legal requirement and the representative sits in an isolated corner head down, eyes cast on the ground, a non-participant.

BEFORE THE VILLAGE LEADER takes me on a tour of his village I question him about possible *gramdan* villages in the area, based upon one or another form of cooperative farming. This is unfamiliar to him; in his area the land is far too fragmented for any kind of redistribution to include the landless. As for cooperative farming

* The problem of caste is far more complex than generally realized. Most progressive Indians will say that caste is "breaking down," that it is less powerful than before; yet they are unable to point to more than an individual instance here and there in their circle of acquaintances (usually, city people). But the true roots of caste, a highly complex and structured entity, lie in the villages. So long as the village social structure remains basically intact (as it has), caste will retain its full potency. In a larger village, such as the one visited here, the structure of the village will even cut across caste and kin, uniting unrelated families within an integrated multicaste (twelve or even up to twenty distinct castes) community. Artisans and other occupational castes will offer to the agriculturist special services; in return the agriculturist offers a share of his crop. "Socio-religious life, especially ceremonials and rituals connected with birth, puberty, marriage, and death, are so organized that they *require* participation by a number of castes at various stages." (S. C. Dube, *idem,* page 30). And, most powerful force of all, the ever-present threat of ritual pollution by contact with those outside one's caste: a psychic mechanism quite different from our racial prejudice of the West. We know of one case where a Women's Welfare worker (an upper caste girl with a university degree) won sympathy and support (and incidentally created a first-class sensation in the villages around her area) by accepting food from untouchables!

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that might involve a pooling of resources, he is not interested. We walk through the village over a newly-built, winding road made of stones fitted together. On either side are small shops; at least 20 temples are scattered throughout the town—some substantial in size, others merely a corner for offerings and an altar. On both sides of the main street are homes, occasionally two-storied, in which people are eating. They are not curious and only a few children follow along; evidently, there have been many visitors here. This village is prosperous, the chief affirms it; most proudly of all, he shows us his new store, a kind of dry-goods store stocked with cloth, cottons, woolens. We talk about the building of the new road—it was accomplished through labor donated by the villages, but the rich again had bought their way out. The Development official admits that this deprives such village projects of their spontaneity and makes them appear in the eyes of the villagers as days given over to forced labor under government supervision. The village leader, of course, is not concerned with this. The vastly improved appearance of his village counts most for him. He feels he has provided energetic leadership, and indeed he has; his reward is both one of status—acknowledged leader of a well-to-do village—and personal affluence, both as a holder of land and a businessman.*

Several hours later it is time to return to Jaipur for a brief round of sightseeing. It is a magnificently attractive city; the Rajput miniature paintings in the city museum are famous. Before taking the late night train back to Delhi I am to meet Dr. R., a top administrator of the Community Development program. Obviously a highly qualified administrator and agricultural expert, he seems little satisfied with the results achieved and uneasy over the program's prospects. He expresses no easy, official optimism; this intelligent official is disturbed by the spottiness of the program, its lack of solid "impact" and its failure to upset old patterns in the countryside. He feels that it lacks drive and momentum and candidly acknowledges its shortcomings. (This was my first experience of the surprising, almost disarming, candor one comes across in talking to most high Indian officials).**

On the night train back to Delhi there is time to think over this first arranged visit and to look through much of the published material describing the Development program. Like all such visits there is a sense of disappointment due partly to haste and insufficient preparation

* Later we shall discuss in more detail the rise of this new, middle, capitalist farming class. For the moment we refer to S. C. Dube's summary of the results of the agricultural extension program thus far: ". . . nearly 70 percent of its benefits went to the *elite* group and to the more affluent and influential agriculturists. The gains to poorer agriculturists were considerably smaller." (*Ibid.*, pp. 82-83)

** A report to the United Nations by a committee of agrarian experts—Caldwell, Read and Dumont, "Community Development Evaluation Mission in India," makes the same point in claiming that "Putting comfort before production was the major error of Community Development in India. It brought about the failure of this movement, animated by noble intentions. It also fought on the side of the social structure, the maintenance of the old forms of exploitation, especially usury and tenant-farming with payment in kind. . . ."

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on my part. I have seen only the surface—and that a comparatively polished surface—of a section of the program. Of the relations between the various committees and bodies set up by the program, of the relations within individual committees (caste, social, economic and political) I have had only some inklings. Tentative conclusions: something has happened—the worst of the old Indian countryside (absentee landlordism, total untouchability, overpowering fear) has been swept away; but much remains that limits the village's productive capacities and energies.

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IN THE EARLY MORNING the atmosphere around the station at Delhi is ominous; the units of soldiers and railway police have been heavily reinforced and mount an active patrol. Over All-India Radio the Prime Minister has delivered a violent, no-compromise speech against government employees who plan to strike. At socialist headquarters, where by chance I meet some of the leading officials of the employees unions, it seems apparent there will be a nationwide strike on the following day. The government's obstinacy has brought the conflict around to the question of "principles"; always a bad strategic basis for strike action. I am advised to continue my trip by plane since strike action will affect the railroads first of all. The atmosphere is tense and strained; the strike leaders patiently answer questions, but they are waiting for the latest radio news bulletin, apparently hoping for some gesture on the part of Nehru which will permit discussions to reopen. None comes and I leave them to their problems. I must hastily revise my plans, complete my visits and talks in Delhi and move on that same night.

Lucknow: — end of July:

Another endless train ride, the third in a row without sleep. Monsoon rains have come down all through the night and the morning is fairly cool. At seven we reach Lucknow station in the midst of a downpour. Fields surrounding the city and the station are flooded with four to six inches of water. While breakfasting, shoeless and sockless, in the flooded restaurant of the railway station, I learn that the railroad and communications strike has begun that same night and that wholesale arrests of strike leaders are under way.

We are to look up Dr. Krishna N., an expert in women's work in the villages, who is attached to the famous agricultural pilot project initiated by the American, Albert Mayer. The Etawah Project has great importance because it gave birth to the Community Project program throughout India.

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THE HIGH SPOT of Lucknow is a lengthy visit to Dr. Krishna N., attached to the Etawah Project. This exceptional woman, vital and peppery after long years in the nationalist struggle, would be rare enough in any country. A supporter of Albert Mayer, she feels strongly

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that his concept of self-motivation and participation by the village masses has now been largely abandoned, even in Etawah. Bureaucratism and overcentralization are the twin evils she rails against. At the end of our talk, Dr. N., speaking to the young socialist students who have come with me, puts her finger on the weakness of their movement: its loss of contact with people, particularly village people; its loss of a sense of concrete issues, problems and projects to be undertaken. Alive and alert in every part of her being, she scolds them, not to emphasize the past glories of nationalist India but to point out the magnitude of present problems. This woman is a rebel in her every fiber.

From this moment on until the end of our trip, the general strike of about 250,000 government employees in railroad, communication and civil service is to take hold of everything. The strike itself lasts only a week or so, but its effects are far-reaching. Transportation is thoroughly interrupted, railway schedules become meaningless, telegrams and letters pointless. About 15,000 strikers are arrested and thrown into jail, including a good proportion of the people I planned to see. There are riots, shootings and sabotage; a grim struggle between the strikers and the government as well as between political groups with varying interests in the strike. The strike's effectiveness varies from place to place, but it is enough to force me to travel by plane, a non-struck government-run service. At the Lucknow socialist headquarters, where I meet the state party leader, C., and his colleagues of the PSP, all are deeply involved in the strike, and all expect momentary arrest. In India a strike leader goes to jail as a matter of course. Nor does he expect to be bailed out; he stays there. Anything else would not be understood by the striking workers. In this country the duty of a leader is to sacrifice—this is the heritage of Gandhi.

I am placed in the hands of Dr. T. S., socialist leader in the legislative assembly of Uttar Pradesh. He belongs to the diminishing number of original Gandhians, close to the people, thoroughly familiar with the workings of village life, devoted to political and socialist activity.

THE STREETS, particularly in the railroad area, are heavily patrolled. All trains, we learn, have stopped. On the following day, my first visit in the early morning is with the Congress party leader and head of state. The rains have stopped and the city is quiet, but little traffic is moving about. The Chief Minister of U.P. (a much more powerful figure than the governor of an American state) is heavy-set, swarthy, mustached, and much preoccupied by the burden of office. The telephone constantly interrupts our vague conversation. From whispered instructions it seems clear he is ordering the arrest—among others—of those who had arranged my appointment with him on the day before! A coincidence, of course, but characteristic of how most things that are important in Indian political life take place within a rather small "family" circle.

We exchange a few remarks on the subject of American philosophy, but his manner is remote, brusque and even rude. Only when I point

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inquiringly to a photo on the wall does he come to life. It is his *guru*. Has he consulted him on today's activities? Ah, but a *guru* is concerned only with spiritual and religious advice.

In Lucknow, thanks to the strike which has again upset my plans, there is time for a visit to Lucknow University, one of the most turbulent in India. It seems terribly overcrowded, rundown and inadequate. A widespread struggle over curriculum—classic, traditional and modern—is going on. One of the most interesting developments is the beginning of independent work in sociology (as distinct from the earlier Indian obsession for training social workers). All the important universities have begun efforts along these lines; it is considered the ultimate in modernizing.

That within the space of a few days one can establish such firm and comradely relations with such a variety of people is the deepest pleasure of all. Reluctantly, I leave for the city of Patna, in Bihar state, where I shall see Jayaprakash Narayan and visit a *gramdan* village.

Patna, Bihar State:

The plane trip to Patna has been hot, humid, tiring. Since planes must fly under the monsoon clouds, we have had a close look at the spread of the Ganges plain and river valley, observing the endlessly fragmented fields and paddy lands extending miles in all directions, the network of canals, streams, irrigation ditches, tanks and wells, the thousands of villages that dot the plains.

In the struggle over federal funds for state development projects, Bihar belongs to the group of states that come off second best. This is reflected in its capital, Patna, an old, dirty provincial city that sprawls for miles in all directions. My appointment with Narayan is for the following day; I go out to find the Praja Socialist headquarters, but it is hardly the time for visiting. The important leaders are in jail or flight, the atmosphere is gloomy. One of the young socialists—he is an Urdu village poet from the northern part of the state—accompanies me on a visit to the archeological sites and ruins of ancient Patna. As we roll over dirt roads in a rickshaw, he declaims Urdu poetry he has written. His booming voice attracts a crowd. They seem to enjoy it; it sounds revolutionary and sentimental. Later, when we are alone, he recites an English poem he has composed. He is visibly upset by my unresponsiveness and we never meet again. Unsophisticated, provincial, utterly sincere, he is typical of many socialists in India. Such men are unmarried or have cut their family ties; they offer their service to their party wherever it may be. The poet, I learn, left that very night on some difficult mission related to the strike. There is no money, and home is usually the floor of the party headquarters where he happens to be.

In the evening, S., an active organizer in the *Bhoodan* movement, comes to arrange our trip to the remote cooperative village we plan to see. It will take at least three days time and he will be with us constantly. Capable, intelligent, with a touch of skepticism and sufficient

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doubting to make his opinions more valuable than those of the blindly convinced, his help is indispensable.

Jayaprakash Narayan

Since abandoning active leadership in the Indian Socialist movement, Narayan has made his headquarters in Patna, in one of the buildings that belongs to the *Bhoodan* movement whose main center is close by. This complex man, personally known to enormous numbers of people in every corner of India, whose life spans every important happening in the last 25 years of Indian history, is now engaged in an experiment that has taken him far from the road of traditional leftist politics: the *Bhoodan* land distribution movement which appeals to landowners to surrender their holdings voluntarily.

In Gandhi were combined the saint and the politician, the two working together harmoniously. But the same, one feels, cannot be said of Narayan. In him saint and politician struggle endlessly. A man who proposes to dedicate himself to the reconstruction of "village democracy" and to improving the life of the village poor must not only renounce his formal political ties; he must renounce all forms of political action. But for a man like Narayan, this is the most difficult of steps. Hence, there are those who claim his withdrawal from active politics is largely strategic, to place himself in the best position at a critical moment. My own impression is that this claim is either cynical or mistaken; Narayan seems incapable of such manipulation.

Narayan has wrestled long and passionately with the great problems: what road shall his country take, the decline of socialism and Marxism, the rise of nameless authoritarian power. All of this is clear in his manner, his way of talking, his hesitations, his latest writings. His wish is to veer away from power, yet his strong concern with it indicates he has not resolved these problems within himself. In the several hours we spend together we cover a range of topics, but primarily those touching upon agricultural matters in general and the *Bhoodan* movement in particular. He is completely sympathetic, his humor gentle but pointed.

Narayan cannot accept the operation of the Community Development Project. Essentially, he feels, it is an attempt to impose an anti-Indian concept of agriculture upon a weak village base. We discuss in some detail a new aspect of this program, known as the "package program," which is about to be launched under Ford Foundation auspices. It is an attempt to stimulate food production through an elaborate system of incentives, including guaranteed minimum prices, and is, of course, aimed at the middle peasant. But Narayan is more concerned with the landless and the village poor. This leads to a discussion of my visit to one of the *gramdan* cooperative villages Narayan himself has organized and sponsored. He sketches the background of the *Bhoodan* movement, his relations with Vinoba Bhave, its founder, and frankly speaks of its declining prospects. Although the movement had an astounding success in its early phase (asking for and receiving

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donations of land), its subsequent phase (organization and development of the donated land) has met with many difficulties: much of the land proved to be worthless; donations had to be surveyed before redistribution could take place; most important of all, it was hard to find the necessary capital, credits, resources to develop properly the redistributed lands. Narayan's general concern with political power applies as well to village political organization. For him, the greatest successes of *bhoodan* and *gramdan* lie in intangibles—the new spirit of collective living and working it has engendered.

> ***Gramdan Village:***
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> *The* Bhoodan *movement initiated in 1951 by Acharya Vinoba Bhave has grown into the* Gramdan *movement. Under* Bhoodan, *people were requested to donate voluntarily some out of their land for being redistributed to the landless people of the village. Under* Gramdan, *however, in its ideal form, all the people in the village owning land donate all their land into a pool which would then become the property of the community as a whole. Thus,* Gramdan, *today, is the voluntary surrender of individual ownership rights in land in favour of the community. . . . The village community, as a whole, treats itself as a big family. Love and non-violence will be the basis of all acts of the community. Co-operation and equitable sharing together will be its guiding principles.* — From a report published by the Department of Community Development, Government of India, 1951

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The *gramdan* village of Berain is 160 miles from Patna, and ten miles from the nearest railway station. There is no choice but to ride a jeep supplied by the local *Bhoodan* organization and take off for the long drive. We follow a road along the Ganges for some hours, an area still closely linked to the city of Patna—the towns even have electricity. But once we turn inland, the true Indian countryside asserts itself. Though there are few cars on the road we move slowly, blocked by the constant passage of cattle into the fields. On all sides are the endless paddy fields; the road runs through the fields on a built-up embankment or *bund.* While we are close to the Ganges there are many funeral processions—a stretcher borne aloft on which the body is carried, covered with a red cloth, head uncovered. Musicians beating gongs lead the way; no women are permitted among the mourners as they move toward the burning *ghats.* Within two hours we are in the heart of village India: huts, poverty, nakedness, dirt, misery in every conceivable form, yet borne with dignity.

The next day, we cross a hilly and lightly forested area before coming back to the plain on which is located the *gramdan* village. In this small, wooded area live a primitive, aboriginal people, among the most ancient of Indians. In the early morning their women trot along the roadside, bearing bundles of firewood on their head for sale in the villages. It is the main occupation of these tribal people. Within a short time we pass through the last village of any size, but here the jeep becomes hopelessly mired in mud. We must walk the remaining five miles.

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The sun is out; it is impossible to even see the village in the distance. It is necessary to struggle on over roads deep in mud and water and find our way across the paddy fields by balancing ourselves on the slippery embankments surrounding each field. At the end of an exhausting two hours, we hear the sound of gongs and conch horns; men from the village are coming out to greet us and bring us in. On the last half mile we are transported on the sturdy back of a village peasant. Hundreds of villagers receive us; it seems I am not only the first American to come, but the first white-skinned foreigner their children have ever seen.

THE VILLAGE of Berain lies not far from an area inhabited by a primitive people. It consists of 83 families (population, 429), most lower caste. They grow some wheat, but have mainly rice paddies. They have been under *gramdan* for two years and consider it successful; they talk of a "collective spirit." Before *gramdan,* the people of this village were notorious thieves who lived by robbing neighboring villages. They worked for property-owning peasants when they were not busy thieving. Of the 83 families, 73 were landless. When they accepted *gramdan,* it signified that those who owned land donated it to the entire village; this, plus land they have been able to rent, constitute their pitifully small acreage under cultivation.

Given their previous economic and social degradation, it is easy to understand the powerful appeal *gramdan* has for them. When Jayaprakash Narayan came to their village some years back, it was in effect to offer them a new way of life. These people cultivate their lands in common and pool both resources and income. Those who work the land receive wages from a common fund in the hands of the cooperative society which runs the village economic life. As a result, not only has agricultural yield risen, but many typically village industries have been started. The average per capita income has risen from 54 rupees per year to 77 rupees.

I learn all this from the leading men of the village who proudly pour out the story of their accomplishments. They now have work for the entire year. Their rice production per acre—using Japanese methods—has increased from 13 to 22 *maunds* (a *maund* = 82 lbs.). They have built a small school for children; over 100 people of the village now can read and write; drinking and smoking are prohibited; robberies have stopped entirely. Their enthusiasm is matched only by their eagerness to show us everything.

The appearance of the village is poor. Mud huts, with walls almost a foot thick, thatched roofs, dark interiors. No electricity, no village radio. But one of the major projects is to reconstruct all the homes out of brick; in fact, bricks are being accumulated for this, much as a child hoards pennies. We move out to the fields which encircle the village on all sides. This is the season to transplant the rice plant into the paddies where it will remain immersed in water for some time. As is the practice throughout Asia the village women ranged in a

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row across the field are advancing the length of the paddy, pushing the rice seedlings into the mud as they move along. In other fields belonging to the village, teams of bullocks are plowing; this is the first time we have seen collective plowing in India. There is much singing, good-natured joking and staring at the white foreigner. I attend a meeting of the village *gram sabha* or council; it is planning the program of the following week, practical, constructive, aimed at the fulfillment of simple tasks. In the school that has been built, primary education is offered to the children by day, to their parents at night. They sing, dance and recite their lessons for us; I, in turn, am called upon to make a little speech. All words sound banal and inadequate here.

The westerner coming from the lowest sector of European or American society lives in affluence as compared with these people. There are three to four thousand *gramdan* villages throughout India—sufficient in number for state governments to have passed legislation providing them some help—but compared to the total number of villages, they are insignificant. Even if a village like Berain succeeds by dint of enormous effort in accumulating some means, how can it expect to compete in the open market place with the more efficient villages dominated by the middle peasant with his credits, superior technique, government support and—Ford Foundation? Yet, so low and bare is the starting point for such a *gramdan* village that for a time it cannot help but make important progress. A landless peasant now able to purchase a kerosene lamp for his mud hut feels he has advanced into another world; by that lamp he can read.

That night, standing out alone in the humid darkness, listening to the sounds of the village and the surrounding fields, I grasp—insofar as a westerner can—what the meaning of impoverishment is to tens of millions. Yet these people want no pity or sympathy; on the contrary, *gramdan* has given them hope. Surely Narayan's argument that the Indian countryside can accept many forms of organization and many ways of life is borne out here.

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On the following day we return to Patna; a bullock cart takes us over the flooded roads to the jeep, then the long ride back. The strike is still on, many thousands more are under arrest. I leave that day by plane for Calcutta.

The Land Problem

The land problem is recognized as the key to the new social and economic order now being evolved. Accordingly, land reforms are under way, though methods vary and results are not easily assessed. In some countries, agrarian reform has been ruthless. In others, the approach has been administrative.

In India, we have adopted the unique combination of lofty ideals, confused thinking, vague promises and a bias for spiritual force in planning and enforcing land reform. The result is that we have not even scratched the surface of the land problem in the country. We are still

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In the midst of indecision and confusion. We lack a clear-cut program based on accurate data and we have not evolved any practical line of action. The program is still bogged down at all levels.—From an editorial in *The Indian Express*

In summarizing a few observations of the Indian countryside, I do so not as an "expert." I am simply relying on these and other visits, and above all on the views of those knowledgeable Indians—there are many—with whom I spoke. But first it must be understood that this is still an open question and future patterns are by no means set. As *The Economist* notes, ". . . in India there are no communes or forced labor brigades on communist lines to apply the stick—and it is not always easy at first to discern the carrot."*

Food is still the most urgent problem. The annual expenditure to make up the food deficit through imports is entirely too great. But the *real* food shortage is many times more. As Professor Desai has said, *"There are millions of have-nots in the country who have no means to produce or buy food. If there is a general shortage of food, the real sufferer will be that class which is most down-trodden in society—the class of landless and agricultural laborers many of whom live on leaves and roots some months in a year. If these sections are to be fed, the total requirements of food will increase and with it the food shortage."***

Has there then been so little progress in the annual growth in grain production? It is calculated that 3 per cent per annum is the rate since 1952. The new Five Year Plan requires an additional 25 million tons of grain or a yearly increase of at least 5 per cent. Although, theoretically, a sharp rise was possible because of the low productivity of most Indian farms, the obstacles have proven formidable. To break up the encrusted accumulation of ancient ways and customs and to release productive forces required a leadership not yet forthcoming in India.

The Community Development Program was the government's answer to the problem of too many people and too little land. Yields were to be improved through irrigation, better farming techniques, seed, fertilizers, and equipment. The size of farms could be regulated by abolishing absentee landlordism and encouraging some redistribution while preventing undue fragmentation. The net result is that the farmer holding 25 to 30 acres of land has become the dominant citizen in the village hierarchy. Below him are the poorer farmers, some owners, some tenants, some with holdings split into scattered trips—50 per cent of *all* holdings in India are less than 5 acres, many less than one. At the bottom of the peasant scale are more than 10 million families who have no land, agricultural laborers who work for one rupee a day. Most of them are also untouchables, excluded from rising in the caste-ridden villages. For them, the only hope is to get away into the cities.

* *The Economist*, March 26, 1960.
** *Janata*, August 21, 1960.

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We have seen that the government plans to build up the middle peasant before all others. The principle behind this is that the farm unit must be of a certain size to achieve an economic productivity. The latest "package program" technique recommended by the Ford Foundation is an effort to push the development of the capitalist-middle farmer forward by another notch. This is accompanied by efforts to create farmers' cooperatives (credit cooperatives, above all) which will drive out the middleman who, in India, is frequently also the *bania* or moneylender.

The Congress Party, still overwhelmingly the country's ruling party, adopted a resolution at its Nagpur session (January, 1959) proposing joint, cooperative farming. We quote the central passage:

> The future agrarian pattern should be that of cooperative joint farming, in which the land will be pooled for joint cultivation, the farmers continuing to retain their property rights, and getting a share from the net produce in proportion to their land. Further, those who actually work on the land, whether they own the land or not, will get a share in proportion to the work put in by them on the joint farm.

The Nagpur resolution finally seemed to offer proposals of a far-reaching nature. Prior to instituting joint farming, service cooperatives (pooling credits, fertilizers, machinery etc.) were to be organized within three years as a preliminary training ground. So violent, however, was the reaction—organized and unorganized—to the Nagpur resolution that it has remained a dead letter. But India cannot forever evade the issue of what to do with its countryside. In the words of Professor Desai,

> Our nation must realise that to fight starvation our first task will be to change the map of our unjust land distribution. Even after 13 years of freedom 45 percent of our agricultural population is landless or almost landless. In our country 5 percent of the landholders own 33 percent of total lands. Our food problem is basically a land problem.
>
> The roots of revolution in Asia lie hidden in the explosive situation created by the monstrous inequalities in land ownership.

Community Development Program, *bhoodan* and *gramdan,* joint cooperative farming, encouragement of the capitalist farmer—all these have a place in the pluralistically-patterned society of agrarian India. But, separately and together, all will be ineffectual without the selfless and coherent leadership that is still lacking.

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THE ADDICT AND THE LAW

Edwin M. Schur

More and more the drug addict is becoming both an avant-garde hero and modern scapegoat. The writing of Jack Gelber, William Burroughs, Alexander Trocchi and others has stimulated interest in the lives of "junkies." Hipsters, according to Norman Mailer, may even view the use of opiates as part of a "new radicalism"—inspired by their belief in the current futility of strictly political dissent. (This really is "the end of ideology" with a vengeance!) At the same time, we continue to be bombarded with inflammatory press accounts vilifying the addict as public-enemy-number one; often these diatribes emanate from the very officials who are supposed to be seeking solutions to the addiction problem. While racial and religious scapegoating are now out of date, to condemn the addict remains respectable (and this, in turn, may well explain the glorification of the junkie in bohemian circles). Both of these views are unfortunate, because they obscure the basic facts about our failure to formulate a sane addiction policy.

Through research in various fields we now know a good deal about the nature of addiction, and what we know suggests that the addict, *as such,* tends to be neither hero nor menace. We know that the truly addictive opiate-type drugs (heroin, morphine, etc.) slow a person down rather than pep him up; hence it just isn't true that addicts are violent criminals and sex fiends. We know that the person who takes opiates over a substantial period of time develops a tolerance to his drug (he needs more and more, at first to achieve the desired effect and later just to stay normal) and finally an actual physical dependence (that is, when deprived of the drug he experiences an excruciating physical illness referred to as the "abstinence syndrome" or "withdrawal illness"). We know that the depressant effects of opiates may imperil job efficiency (as well as sexual activity)—though there have been notable cases of creative production and competence on the part of long-time addicts. And finally, we know that there is no simple medical "cure" for addiction. While we have developed relatively painless ways of gradually withdrawing the addict from drugs, this is no real solution. There is no sure way of erasing from the treated addict's mind the knowledge that at one time narcotics solved certain problems for him or offered him distinct satisfactions. Further studies into the causes of addiction reveal, not surprisingly, divergent theories which reflect the professional orientations of the persons doing the research. The

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psychiatrist attributes addiction to underlying mental disturbance, while other researchers stress situational factors and subcultural influences. Some sociologists feel that rather than seeking to isolate the recurring "causes" in individual cases of addiction, we should concentrate on the general process by which all these individuals "learn" to become addicts. Unfortunately this mass of research findings will not help us much in our effort to control addiction. This is so because most of the anti-social behavior associated with the narcotics problem is only secondarily related to the phenomenon of addiction as such. Indeed it is not too far-fetched to suggest that we have ourselves, by our policies toward the addict, created a large part of the problem.

IN 1914 CONGRESS passed the Harrison Act, designed to control the domestic sale, use and transfer of narcotics. By requiring registration of all legitimate handlers of drugs, and by requiring the payment of a special tax in connection with drug transactions, the Act enabled the Treasury Department to establish a licensing system for the control of all legitimate drug traffic. The Act was not intended to control or punish addicts. As legal expert Rufus King has noted, "Narcotics-users were 'sufferers' or 'patients' in those days; they could and did get relief from any reputable medical practitioner, and there is not the slightest suggestion that Congress intended to change this—beyond cutting off the disreputable 'pushers' who were thriving outside the medical profession. . . ." As a regulatory tax measure, the Harrison Act has been extremely successful. Its transformation into an anti-addict measure, however, helped breed our current addiction problem. In an early case under the Act (*Webb v. U.S.*, 1919) the facts showed flagrant abuse of the law (Dr. Webb had sold thousands of narcotics prescriptions indiscriminately, for fifty cents apiece). Yet the Government presented the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:

> If a practicing and registered physician issues an order for morphine to an habitual user thereof, the order not being issued by him in the course of professional treatment in the attempted cure of the habit, but being issued for the purpose of providing the user with morphine sufficient to keep him comfortable by maintaining his customary use, is such order a physician's prescription [under a specific exemption provided by the Act]?

Accepting this restrictive definition of professional treatment, the court stated that "to call such an order for the use of morphine a physician's prescription would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion of the subject is required." Three years later, there came before the Court another case (*U.S. v. Behrman*) involving obvious abuse of the Act (here the doctor had given to an addict, at one time, a hugh quantity of narcotics for use as he saw fit). But the Government (in what Rufus King terms a "trick indictment") glossed over the quite evident bad faith of the doctor, acted as though the drugs were provided in good faith for the purpose of treating the addict, and obtained a ruling to the effect that *all* "ambulatory treatment" of addicts by doctors (in good faith or not) violated the law. This decision was

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eagerly grasped by the Narcotics Division of the Treasury Department (the predecessor of the current Federal Bureau of Narcotics) as a mandate to proclaim all-out war against addicts and against any doctors who attempted to treat or relieve addicts through ambulatory (i.e., outpatient) methods. The result has been described as a "reign of terror" under which medical practitioners withdrew almost completely from the treatment of addiction.

To this very day the Narcotics Bureau quotes with approval the *Webb* and *Behrman* decisions, yet no mention is made of an interesting 1925 ruling (in the case of *Lindner v. U.S.*) which would seem to challenge and severely limit these earlier holdings. Here the Government prosecuted (under a *Behrman*-type indictment) a well-established Spokane physician who had prescribed a small amount of narcotics for a Narcotics Division stool-pigeon. (According to Dr. Lindner the stool-pigeon had said she was in great pain from a stomach ailment and that her regular physician was out of town; she claimed she had said she was an addict.) In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Dr. Lindner's conviction, stating:

> The enactment under consideration . . . says nothing of "addicts" and does not undertake to prescribe methods for their medical treatment. They are diseased and proper subjects for such treatment, and we cannot possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other than medical purpose solely because he has dispensed to one of them, in the ordinary course, and in good faith, four small tablets of morphine or cocaine for relief of conditions incident to addiction.

The Court also specifically stated that the *Webb* and *Behrman* rulings should not be extended beyond the facts in those particular cases. But by 1925 the medical profession already had been intimidated into rejecting addicts as patients; Dr. Lindner's victory remained personal.

Over the years periodic outbursts of public concern about the "dope menace" have served only to elicit increasingly repressive legislation. In the wake of the Kefauver investigations of interstate crime, the Boggs Act of 1951 provided severe mandatory sentences for all narcotics violations. Many observers (including prominent jurists) condemned this law, particularly its failure to distinguish sufficiently between the non-addict peddler and the addict. Nonetheless a similar yet even more drastic anti-addict measure was enacted in 1956. This law (described by Judge John M. Murtagh as "unimaginably cruel legislation") raises previous minimum sentences, and permits the death penalty (even for a first offender) for sale of narcotics to a person under eighteen. In addition to the federal statutes, many states now have their own anti-narcotics laws—some of which make addiction itself a crime.

WHAT HAVE THESE POLICIES accomplished? Although enforcement officers claim that addiction is being kept under control (sometimes they even assert that the current rate represents an "irreducible minimum"), most disinterested observers think otherwise. Official estimates that there are only between 45,000 and 60,000 addicts are held

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strongly suspect in almost all non-governmental circles. But leaving aside the question of prevalence, one result of these policies is quite evident—they have driven the addict straight from the doctor into the hands of the drug peddler and into a life of crime.

Given the compelling demand of the addict for his drug, the shutting off of legitimate channels of supply opened the way for a tremendous illicit traffic in drugs. Since the addict must have his drugs, narcotics which cost the "importer" virtually nothing bring enormous profits in the black market. Few addicts can afford black market prices; as a result most American addicts take to stealing, prostitution or drug-pushing to foot the bill. At the same time the profit motive serves as an incentive to the peddlers to recruit new customers, and the black market network spreads wider and wider. Police authorities and narcotics agents are unable to make any appreciable dent in this underworld apparatus. They can only hope that occasional "crash programs" and exposés will create the impression that they are doing their job. The futility of their task inclines them to an unusual bitterness toward the addict and to the use of highly unsavory police methods. A major source of evidence in narcotics cases is the addict-stool pigeon—euphemistically labelled a "confidential informant." Though the addict-informer faces grave dangers of underworld reprisal, eagerness to stay out of jail (and avoid the "cold turkey" of sudden withdrawal from drugs) impels many addicts to "stool." As well as relying on stool pigeons for leads, the narcotics agent himself often must attempt to obtain drugs from a suspected supplier. Of this highly questionable procedure (so much like the well known vice squad technique) one report states: "There is some element of entrapment in many drug arrests, and the officer is forced to distinguish the fine line which the courts have drawn to separate legal deception. Decoys, for example, are acceptable; but if there is evidence that the final act was planned by an enforcement agent . . . it becomes entrapment."

In the war against the addict, virtually anything goes. As sociologist Alfred Lindesmith points out, "To the addict, . . . the presumption of innocence and other provisions of the Constitution are meaningless. For him the police state is already in being." Not only is the perpetual hounding of the addict inhumane, but the lengths to which agents often must go to make narcotics arrests represent an unwarranted drain on the taxpayers' money. (In a case last year, five detectives spent a month in Greenwich Village disguised as beatniks—one is reported even to have achieved a slight reputation as a poet. According to a news account the entire New York police narcotics squad, 140 men and women, participated in the resulting arrests.) If such efforts resulted in the conviction of higher-ups in the black market, they might be worthwhile. But even prosecuters admit that current enforcement efforts ensnare minor violators much more often than major drug traffickers. One United States Attorney stated, in Congressional testimony:

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> To convict the big operator is a difficult task and we fully appreciate that we are nowhere near the big operator when we arrest the pusher who sells to the addict. Even when the pusher tells all he knows, we only reach the dealer—merely one step up the ladder. The ladder may have several steps before it reaches the big importer. . . .

Most anti-narcotics activity involves continual and repeated arrests of lower-level pushers—who often themselves are addicts. (And it may be worth noting that these addicts and pushers are mainly Negro while the big-shots of the narcotics racket, whose positions seem relatively secure, are largely white.) Furthermore it is the addict who feels the full impact of the recently-increased penalties. As Judge Murtagh has pointed out, "the sick, driven addicts, are the only ones who are ever arrested as repeated offenders. They are the only ones who sell to teen-agers. They can't help themselves."

How can the Government condone such senseless policies? Why do we treat the addict as a criminal, when clearly he is a person in need of help? Although our current policies may be attributable to a number of factors, an important part of the story lies in the philosophy espoused by the nation's top anti-addict law-enforcer, U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger. While no one has contested Anslinger's expertise as a policeman, many feel that his ability to influence national addiction policy has proved disastrous. At the core of Anslinger's outlook is a belief that basically the addict is a wrongdoer. He has referred to the addict as a parasite, a hoodlum, an immoral vicious social leper. The addict, according to him, is a "tremendous burden on the community" (characteristically, there is no comprehension of the fact that addiction is a responsibility *of* the community). Contrary to all non-governmental evidence, Anslinger contends that three-quarters of the addicts are criminals before they become addicted; he places no credence in the widely accepted findings that most addict-crime is of the money-producing variety and is impelled by a necessity to finance drug habits in the illegal market. Faced with criticism from judges, lawyers, doctors and social scientists, he and his cronies have designated all such critics "simpletons," "pseudo-experts," "dewy-eyed, impractical, self-styled social reformers." Confronted with the argument that providing addicts with low-cost drugs would remove the profit incentive and thus paralyze the illicit traffic, Anslinger has replied that he could very easily see where this might lead: "to the state setting aside a building where on the first floor there would be a bar for alcoholics, on the second floor licensed prostitutes, with the third floor set aside for sexual deviates, and crowning them all, on the top floor a drug-dispensing station for addicts."

Anslinger insists that any non-punitive approach to addiction would "elevate a most despicable trade to the avowed status of an honorable business, nay, to the status of a time-honored profession; and drug addicts would multiply unrestrained, to the irrevocable impairment of the moral fiber and physical welfare of the American

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people." Anslinger is fond of pointing out that the root of the problem really lies with the Communist Chinese, who by careful policy are promoting the flow of illicit drugs to the United States (presumably to undermine our "moral fiber" and "physical welfare"). In similar vein, critics who point to the success of the British approach to addiction (see below) are sternly reminded that of course their "unfortunate narcotic situation" is a reflection of "socialized medicine."

A SECOND MAJOR TENET of the Anslinger approach is that the key step in dealing with addiction is the compulsory confinement of all addicts (presumably for treatment—but one can hardly help questioning his motives here, given his stated views about addicts). In *The Traffic in Narcotics* (with W. F. Tompkins), the Commissioner states:

> From the practical standpoint it is fundamental that a business, legal or illegal, would be bound to fail if deprived of customers, and the peddler of narcotic drugs is no exception. If the peddler were deprived of a market for his illegal wares, he would cease to exist. As long as the addict is at liberty to come and go, the peddler has a steady customer. When the addict is institutionalized he not only loses his value to the peddler but he is also thereby prevented from contaminating others.

This stress on the efficacy of confinement was blandly accepted by the Daniel committee (Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in the Federal Criminal Code, chaired by then Senator Price Daniel) which recommended the deplorable 1956 Federal anti-narcotics law. Supporters of harsh anti-addict measures often claim that confinement of the addict is necessary for proper treatment. Thus Commissioner Anslinger, in an advisory pamphlet for doctors, asserts: "Medical authorities agree that the treatment of addiction, with a view to effecting a cure, which makes no provision for confinement while the drug is being withdrawn, is a failure, except in a relatively small number of cases. . . ." While this statement has a certain basis in medical fact, it may well constitute an oversimplification. For example, in Great Britain addicts are not confined in special institutions, but are treated in a variety of institutional and ambulatory ways; while there are available no statistics regarding British success in curing addicts, there is no reason to believe that their attempts are any less successful than our own.

A recent report of the Narcotic Addiction Research Project in New York (under the direction of Dr. Marie Nyswander, who has wide experience in the treatment of addiction), also casts doubt on the assertion that ambulatory treatment of addicts cannot work. During its first year of operation, the project was voluntarily contacted by seventy addicts, forty-seven of whom indicated a willingness to undergo psychotherapy, and thirty-five of whom actually made an initial contact with the staff therapists. (Given the distrustfulness of most addicts, this testifies to the strong desires of many to rid themselves of addiction.) Thirteen of these patients underwent a full year of treatment, by the end of which time ten had ceased to use drugs, two had decreased their habit and one took drugs only occasionally. The report notes that many of the

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popular beliefs about the impossibility of dealing with addicts as voluntary patients were not substantiated. It was found that with medical advice most patients were able to undergo withdrawal in their own homes assisted by their families; hot baths, tranquilizers and barbiturates (and in a few cases methadone) were used to ease withdrawal difficulties. Considering that this project attempts to employ procedures to which the Narcotics Bureau is unalterably opposed, and that it received little cooperation from New York hospitals (when such help was requested), its degree of success seems very impressive.

QUITE APART from the question of institutional vs. ambulatory treatment, is the question of whether we can really hope for addiction "cures" at all. A point continually stressed by Anslinger, and repeated by the Congressional committees which seem so strongly under his influence, is that non-punitive approaches to addiction amount to surrender in the battle to cure addicts. In the 1956 Daniel committee hearings, New York Attorney General Javits said (of the New York Academy of Medicine's plan for federal clinics to dispense free drugs to addicts): "I think it is fair to say that it sort of represents throwing in the sponge." Similarly, Senator J. M. Butler stated, "It would seem to me that was a defeatist attitude. You just throw up your hands and give up on the problem." In its reports, the Daniel committee quoted with approval Dr. James Lowry, medical director of the Lexington, Kentucky, USPHS hospital for addicts, who asserted that "my function as a physician is to treat people, not to maintain them in a state of disease. . . ." The committee itself had little difficulty in deciding that:

> . . . it would be absolutely immoral to give in to drug addiction and help perpetuate such pitiful conditions for the individual human being. We subscribe wholly to the belief that we should do everything possible to treat and rehabilitate narcotic addicts and that we should not adopt any program to give the drug addict "sustaining" doses of narcotics which would maintain him in a state of disease.

At first glance, it may seem quite gratifying that such busy men as Senators Daniel, O'Mahoney, Eastland, Welker and Butler should have taken time to draft or approve this highly moral and humanitarian credo. The only trouble is it just doesn't make sense. In the first place American addicts receive their "sustaining" doses anyway—from the peddler, at a tremendous cost to the community. At the same time, it means little to speak of "giving up" on the problem of curing addiction when there is no evidence that our current efforts at cure are (or indeed that any efforts at cure might be) a significant success. The simple fact is that invariably addicts fall back on drugs at some point following completion of withdrawal treatment. Even the Lexington doctors have recognized that the withdrawal process is "the least important step in the treatment of narcotic addiction." Indeed the relapse rate among treated addicts is so high as to call into question the whole Federal treatment program (the one positive feature of the Government's policy). Dr. Herbert Berger testified before the Daniel committee:

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> It is quite probable that the individual who stays for a full course of treatment might well cost the United States Government $2000 to $4000. I am sure these are minimal figures. . . . No one knows the exact rate of relapse. It has been estimated, and I emphasize these are estimates, as being anywhere between 70 to 95 percent. If the rate approaches 90 percent, and most addicts seem to think it exceeds that figure, then that $4000 that we spend for the treatment of one patient becomes $40,000 for cure. Now this is an astronomical figure.
>
> We in medicine do not accept with equanimity any treatment that fails to achieve cure in even 5 percent of the cases of any specific disease. Yet the United States Government is committed to a plan of action which fails more than 90 percent of the time.

It is true that the failures of the confinement approach might be overcome by a policy of *permanent* confinement of all refractory addicts. Apart from the tremendous cost and difficulty of administering such a scheme, it seems unlikely that public opinion would support such extreme measures. But surely this is where the reasoning behind the Anslinger philosophy leads. The Daniel committee even went so far as to recommend "an indeterminate quarantine-type of confinement at a suitable narcotics farm" for addicts who relapse more than three times. The committee accepted the view that "both in his interest and in the interest of community protection the chronic drug addict must be 'quarantined' or otherwise confined for long periods of time or permanently if relapses continue after releases from isolation or confinement." The addict concentration camp may not be far off!

How is one to eliminate this three-pronged terror of condemnation, confinement and "cure"? Many feel as Judge Murtagh does, that "There is only one way to start reform—retire Commissioner Anslinger and replace him with a distinguished public health administrator of vision and perception and, above all, heart." But Anslinger himself is not the only stumbling block in the way of reform. For one thing, he has built up a powerful organization of hard-hitting operatives who think just the way he does. Furthermore, at the present time the Anslinger philosophy probably has wide support among the general public (largely through the failure of critics to make known their opposition). Many people still accept what Alfred Lindesmith has termed the " 'dope fiend' mythology"—the familiar complex of mistaken views about addiction and addicts. At least two American surveys of attitudes toward various crimes (surveys in other countries might obtain quite different results) have revealed extremely strong feelings about offenses involving narcotics. (In one of these studies narcotic peddling was more strongly condemned than armed robbery, rape, felonious assault, and burglary!) While this might seem to suggest that our current drug laws have the support of "public opinion," it must be kept in mind that that very opinion has itself been strongly shaped by those policies, through the continual denunciation of the addict by enforcement officers and others. It is likely, too, that few members of the "public" fully realize the utter failure of our current laws, and the harshness

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of measures taken to curb the activities of addicts. The public may hear a good deal about the efforts to cure addicts at Lexington; it learns relatively little about the uses of decoys and agents wired-for-sound, or about the use of stomach pumps to extract evidence and the threat of cold-turkey to induce stooling. As long as Anslinger and his associates can convince people that this is "no field in which to experiment with unproven ideas, fanciful suggestions, or curbstone opinions," the "proven" ideas of hate, violence and corruption will hold sway.

But, one may ask, what about the serious expressions of concern so often voiced by local and state officials? Unfortunately these officials seem mesmerized by what might be called the addiction-problem rhetoric (an adjunct of the Anslinger philosophy). They call for conferences, more research, more hospital beds for addicts, new types of therapy, increased after-care. Typical was Governor Rockefeller's announcement (in November 1959) of the establishment of a "special task force" on addiction and an "experimental research center" in a state mental hospital. The Governor cited research as the "central need in this hitherto unsolvable problem," stating that "so long as there is no established cure for the type of addiction which represents 87 per cent of the problem, everything else that we do is at best a temporary palliative and does not go to the core of the problem." Nobody can quarrel with the short-run desirability of such measures, but neither "task forces" nor "research centers" (nor even hospital beds and therapy) can come to grips with the "core" of our present problem. What well-meaning observers often overlook is that the battle to completely eliminate addiction may well be a hopeless one. Quite probably no single personality or personal-background "factor" can supply the key to addiction—assuming even that certain people are more susceptible to drugs than others. At the same time, addiction can hardly be attributed to any one kind of socio-economic system (a recent report revealed the presence of a narcotics ring in the Soviet Union, of all places). Not even a radical reconstruction of American society is likely to eliminate all the situations in which Americans might be drawn to drug-taking. The only sane approach to this problem would therefore seem to require a pronounced change in our attitude toward the addict, and a radical revision of addiction policies. Perhaps we must be prepared to accept the existence of a certain amount of addiction in any society; since this form of deviance need not constitute any real threat to the social order, such toleration should be possible. Basic to it would be the formulation of a policy to eliminate or reduce the anti-social behavior now associated with addiction.

Such a policy is in operation in Great Britain where, within broad limits, doctors are permitted to provide addicts with necessary drugs—at practically no cost through the National Health Service. Under this program, the rate of addiction has remained extremely low, and virtually no illicit trafficking or addict-crime has arisen. This approach is now attracting increased interest among medical and legal experts in the United States. The Bureau of Narcotics also knows about it of

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course, but as I have suggested elsewhere (*Commentary*, September 1960) most of the official American statements about British drug policies are highly misleading. It is quite true that we have no assurance that such a policy would work in this country (where different conditions, and especially a tremendously larger addiction problem, exist). But the British approach makes sense. And virtually all disinterested experts agree that our present policies are doomed to failure. We know only too well, from the disaster of prohibition, from the booming abortion racket, and from other examples which might be given, that when a strong public demand is blocked by repressive law, an organized illicit apparatus will step forward to satisfy that demand. With an assured inflow of high profits, this apparatus further entrenches its position and provides for its own protection. It becomes big business, and many individuals have vested interests in its survival. If these interests are extensive and strong enough, it can withstand "crusades" almost indefinitely. One must also recognize that the interests of our special narcotics law-enforcers in some ways complement (rather than oppose) these business interests; our present anti-addict laws provide their raison d'être.

Addiction is a political hot potato, and one can hardly expect any politician to include a drugs-for-addicts plank in his platform. Legislators will continue to swallow the Anslinger philosophy unless strong pressure is brought in the opposite direction. The best possibilities for promoting reform would seem to lie with the medical profession. In 1924 the American Medical Association passed a resolution (never explicitly repealed, and still cited by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics) opposing ambulatory treatment of addiction and supporting Government efforts to shut down the municipal clinics—which, between 1912 and 1925, dispensed low-cost drugs to addicts in many American cities. Recent reports issued by several AMA committees suggest that the profession is seriously re-thinking its stand on the treatment of addiction. Real pressure by the AMA for the repudiation of the punitive approach to addiction could well turn the tide. Admittedly a new policy modeled on that of Britain would not be a panacea. It would not, in the first instance, reduce the amount of addiction, though it might well curb its spread. But it could materially reduce addict-crime and eliminate most of the illicit drug trade. It would return to the addict his human dignity, and this might even encourage addicts to undergo treatment and to remain abstinent once treated. From a policy standpoint it seems somewhat useless to debate the question whether the addict is "immoral," "sick," or merely a rebel against a "sick society." The key point is that we have forced him into a life of crime and degradation—the blame for this cannot be shifted to the effects of narcotics or the nature of the addict himself. Taking addicts out of the "care" of policemen would be a major step toward decency.

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The events in Cuba have naturally aroused the most intense interest among U.S. radicals. They have also aroused considerable disagreements of estimate. We are pleased to present an analysis and report by two young students who have visited Cuba recently and have kept in close touch with the events there. Readers may be interested in comparing their views with those expressed by Daniel Friedenberg in DISSENT, *Spring 1959.*—EDITORS

THE TWO SIDES OF CASTRO'S CUBA

Edward Friedman and Richard Kraus

The nineteenth-century Cuban struggle for independence was long and bloody. Repeatedly the Cuban rebels asked the U.S. government to grant them belligerent status against Spain, but at no time, neither in the Ten Years' War (1868-1878), nor in the War for Independence (1895-1898), did the U.S. acknowledge the legitimacy of the rebellion. Almost up to the moment of the Spanish-American War the U.S. supported the Spaniards. In the final years of the struggle, the rebels pleaded for recognition, material aid and troops to be used as auxiliaries under the Cuban commander-in-chief. They got none of these, but thanks to the "Yellow Press," "Manifest Destiny," and the "Maine," Cuba was invaded by the U.S. army. The invasion was followed by a four-year military occupation, during which the revolutionaries were either ignored or insulted, and the government turned over to the "better classes." This was the period during which the South was forging the segregation system and the U.S. was convincing itself of white supremacy. One of the reasons the leaders of the occupation could not deal with the rebel army was that it consisted in large measure of mulattoes and Negroes.

Before the military occupation ended, the Platt Amendment was imposed on Cuba. The U.S. took Guantanamo and claimed the right of intervention in domestic politics—a right exercised in 1906-09, in 1916 and again in the early 1920s. While U.S. troops were busily occupying and unoccupying Cuba, U.S. investments grew and the one-crop (sugar) economy took on the form it would have until 1959.

In the late twenties "order" came to Cuba. Dictator Machado took power and ruled in violation of every principle of political democracy. He was, however, on the best of terms with U.S. business, and was regarded as a friend by U.S. governments. While Machado was jailing and killing, President Coolidge claimed that the Cubans were "independent, free, prosperous, peace-loving and enjoying the advantages of self-government."

In spite of U.S. support, the Ma-

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chado regime fell in 1933. The pro-U.S. Cespedes government which followed was forced out almost immediately and then Dr. Grau San Martin came to power with a program of social legislation and agrarian reform. His government opposed the influence of U.S. business in Cuba, and, after a fight over utility rates, nationalized the U.S.-owned utility companies. Such a government—it had also defaulted on Cuba's debts to the U.S.—was, in the eyes of the U.S., profoundly suspect and sometimes said to be Communist. In fact, the Communists were bitter enemies of the social reformers. Without U.S. recognition and under the shadow of U.S. naval guns, the San Martin regime survived only four months. The succeeding Mendieta regime, drawn from the old oligarchy, was recognized by the State Department within five days.

Cuba was again "safe" for U.S. business. U.S. control of the Cuban economy grew; sugar flourished and Cuban politicians grew fat on bribes; order was restored and crooked elections held. With Batista's coup in 1952, corruption became more systematic, political suppression more complete and U.S. business more secure. When after seven years of official U.S. support—and praise from U.S. Ambassadors—Batista fell, his regime had been responsible for 20,000 Cuban deaths. On January 1, 1959, U.S. business held overwhelming controlling interests in the Cuban sugar industry, cattle and oil industries and public utilities. The Cuban government believed that to maintain its political independence while carrying out social reform, and to escape the fate of the 1954 Arbenz government in Guatemala and the Grau San Martin regimes, it would have to break the stranglehold of U.S. business on the Cuban economy.

II

In 1933, along with the State Department and the Catholic Church, the Cuban Communists helped defeat the social reformers. They were following the same ultra-left line ("social-fascism") which helped Hitler gain power in Germany. In 1938 the Moscow-directed party, continuing its adherence to international orders now supported Batista, describing him not as "the center of reaction," but, in the name of Popular Frontism, as "the defender of democracy." At various times in their long association with and support for Batista, the Communists were rewarded with a newspaper, a radio station, control of a ministry and of the labor unions. A later estrangement with the dictator was patched up by the mid-fifties, so that when Castro was leading guerrillas in the hills, the Communists condemned him as a "bourgeois romantic," and continued to seek alliances with Batista. Thus when Fidel called for a general strike in April 1958 to bring down the Batista regime, it was largely the opposition of the Communist-controlled unions which helped defeat that strike.

Once in power, the Fidelistas quickly ousted the Communists from their union positions and prevented them from taking over a second newspaper. Anti-Communist fronts were formed in the unions and, in May 1959, after *Revolucion*, the government newspaper, had charged the Communists with seeking to undermine the regime, a mob demonstrated outside the offices of *Hoy*, the official CP publication. Meanwhile the Moscow line changed again and Communist parties throughout Latin America tried to link up with Fidelista-type groups. Though the Cuban CP cried that it was all for the revolution and would sub-

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ordinate itself to Castro, it was apparently much too late. The previous alliance with Batista and opposition to the Castro revolution seemed to have doomed the Communists to impotence.

The Catholic Church came to terms more quickly with the social revolutionaries. Fidel, by all indications a sincere Catholic, proclaimed that to be anti-Christian was to be counter-revolutionary. This may largely be due to the intelligent efforts of one man, an Italian Jesuit named Lombardi, who years ago obtained permission to hand-pick young Jesuits from the underdeveloped world, to bring them to his school in Rome and to train them in advanced social philosophy. Castro was educated by men taught by Lombardi, and both the leader of the opposition against Trujillo and the leader of the Paraguayan insurrection against Stroessner are young, Lombardi-trained Jesuits.

In contrast to this vigorous Jesuit action, the State Department went out of its way to remain "patient," to make no move to ease Cuba's course. But this policy of watchful waiting was in reality no policy at all. Why the Eisenhower Administration refused to aid the revolution in early 1959 is not yet clear, but that there was some important support for such a move seems certain.

Adam Clayton Powell visited Cuba in January 1959 and returned advocating 200 million dollars in economic aid. A Cuban despatched to the U.S. to negotiate economic aid returned empty-handed. CARE sent packages and some Catholic groups organized relief, but that was not enough. Late in February, Rep. Charles Porter gave assurances of large scale aid, but nothing materialized. Fidel came to the USA in April 1959, hoping, though refusing to beg, for a loan to finance part of his economic reforms.

This was the great opportunity for the United States. In spite of over one hundred years of history which gave him no reason to expect help from the U.S., Fidel went to Washington looking for both encouragement and support. The State Department faced a crucial decision. As Rep. Porter's statement would seem to indicate, there was some Department support for aiding the Cubans. To have given aid to Castro—even on a much smaller scale than the U.S. had already granted the authoritarian Rhee and Chiang regimes—would have advanced the possibility of social progress in a democratic context in Cuba, and perhaps all Latin America. Not to have given support could only have meant continuation of the policy of buttressing almost any regime which continued the traditional U.S. economic relationships in Cuba and the rest of Latin America. The decision, as we now know, was no support.

NEVERTHELESS, with or without credits, the land reform, the center of Fidel's program, had to be pushed through; the revolutionaries had committed themselves at least that far. The mere parcelling-out of land from big holdings was regarded as of dubious economic value. Learning from the experience of the Mexican Revolution, the Cubans believed that individual small holdings would not only prove less efficient than the already existing large estates, but that unless the peasants were given aid and taught modern methods of agriculture they would end up deeply in debt and would lose their land. Therefore cooperatives were set up with men from the National Institute of Agrarian Reform in charge and new seed, crops and programs

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were brought to the countryside. According to the land reform laws, the land reverts to the peasants when they are capable of running the cooperatives themselves. Although it seems more likely that the INRA men will become entrenched in their positions, the Cuban peasants who have been given deeds to the land by the government do seem to believe that the land is theirs and peasants, in general, want very much to get on cooperatives.

Castro, who had already ousted the corrupt Batista bureaucracy and seen the Batista henchmen earlier escape with a great deal of money, was now facing a social revolution virtually without capital, without technical assistance and with much less faith in the U.S. and all it stands for—including democracy. He turned to Japan and almost any Western country that would offer help, for technicians. This shortage of trained technicians and administrators, some of whom were already abandoning the regime, was aggravated by the decision to carry out rapid land reform, so that the government apparently felt that it could no longer turn down the repeated offers of the Cuban Communists to help. By the end of June 1959, the attacks on the Communists, in the press and unions, were brought to a halt and a number of sincere Fidelistas soon began to leave Cuba complaining of Communist infiltration.

The results of the land reform thus turned out to be more drastic than the government had expected. Without U.S. support and with Communist involvement, few landowners, especially U.S. landowners, had faith in government bonds. The regime began to rely on people who, to say the least, were unsympathetic with the landowners and the landowners knew it. Without U.S. aid, capital had to come from elsewhere, and eventually it did, from ever-widening nationalization of U.S. businesses and finally from the Sino-Soviet bloc.

With the help of the government, Communists returned to the unions and moved into powerful positions in the universities. Purges in both institutions followed, ostensibly to remove Batista men, though the latter had actually been thrown out immediately after Fidel came to power.

Once the government decided on rapid land reform and collaboration with the Communists in the middle of 1959, Castro began to lose support among middle and upper class Cubans. Five cabinet ministers resigned and a second emigration began among those groups which had provided much of Castro's strength and had supported the bid for U.S. aid and democracy in Cuba.

These events were strongly influenced by growing anti-Fidelista sentiment in the U.S. Once the mass military trials began, within a few days of Fidel's entering Havana, the U.S. press started denouncing the regime. Even Raoul Castro refused to attend some of these trials which he said, rightly enough, were like Roman gladiatorial contests; yet is was by no means true that Cuba was in the grip of a reign of terror as the U.S. press reported—thereby causing a swift drop in the tourist trade and immediate economic hardships in Cuba. The prospect of nationalization and the falling behind on debts led not only to bitter attacks from the U.S., but also to economic sanctions. The U.S. withdrew its few technical advisers and imposed credit restrictions, as a result of which the Cuban countryside now contains U.S. farm machinery standing idle for lack of parts.

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IN PART because U.S. hostility has made anti-Castro forces bolder, the Fidelista regime considers the counterrevolution a serious threat. Although it firmly believes it has the support of the overwhelming majority of the people, the regime began from the very outset to organize this majority into a popular militia. This is not simply a move against armed exiles or internal opposition, but is mainly a reaction to the U.S.-assisted overthow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954.

The losers in that 1954 "liberation" claim that a prime reason for their defeat was their failure to arm the people, a failure that made them dependent on the professional army, which the State Department and CIA were able successfully to influence. Aware of how far the U.S. had gone to defeat social reform in the past, and aware of the U.S. opposition to the Fidelistas, the Cubans have been preparing to defend themselves. In the past the U.S. has shown a willingness to help counterrevolutionaries with money, arms, military leaders and military training, bases from which to launch attacks and the aid of the CIA. Posters in Cuba which cry *No encontraran aqui su Guatemala!* express a deep and sincere fear.

From the outset—in sharp contrast to Great Britain's sale of arms to the Kassim regime in Iraq—the State Department refused to sell arms to Cuba and tried to keep its European allies from doing so. During 1959, for example, Cuba, in seeking to break its economic dependence on the U.S., doubled its trade with Great Britain. Then, at the request of the U.S. government, Britain cancelled an agreement to sell Cuba some jet planes. Since the cancellation, Anglo Cuban trade has fallen off rapidly. The Cuban regime concluded that trade with the U.S.S.R. was necessary if the revolution was to survive, and in February 1960 Mikoyan visited Cuba and signed the first trade agreement. The U.S. cutting of the sugar quota and the more recent embargo has only confirmed Cuban fears and increased Cuban dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc. Thus today, the Communists who had no right to even hope for such a thing, are an integral part of the revolutionary government.

III

Fidel came to power very much concerned with political means. While attacking the Batista regime, he had always proclaimed his belief in political freedom, using the language of, in fact quoting, such western political thinkers as Aquinas, Milton and Locke. Once in power he permitted Batista papers to denounce him and argued that if the government prosecuted one man for his political beliefs, then none could feel safe. He promised that if he could not carry out a "clean" revolution he would leave the government, for he was as much opposed to oppression and coercion as to the social evils of Cuba. The military trials of Batista-men were concluded within the first six months; elections were promised within two years, and former President Prio talked of organizing political parties. And Fidel's proclaimed policy was to avoid or minimize conflict with opposing political tendencies in order to carry out the social and economic reforms as quickly as possible.

By the end of July 1959, however, new forces were at work in Cuba. Given the increasing U.S. pressure, the erosion of middle class support, and the growing power of the Communist party, new men came to the

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fore in Castro's movement—men willing to move quickly, to take shortcuts, to suppress opposition. Symptomatically, Prio retired from politics and President Urrutia was ousted and humiliated. Nevertheless, in late 1959 and early 1960 there were still halting steps in the other direction. For a few weeks the government restored habeas corpus, only to drop it and reestablish the military courts. Opposition newspapers, though now denounced by Castro, remained largely free until February 1960. Two independent newspapers, one in English and one in Spanish, published in Havana until late in 1960. "Two years until elections" became "four" and then "not until the reforms are established." The acclaim of the mob in mass meetings became more important than votes, and later the ballot box was replaced by voting "with machetes aloft." By May 1960, to advocate elections was to be counterrevolutionary.

The problem is not that elections will not be held tomorrow or within a fixed and short period of time; it is that an atmosphere in which free elections can ever be held is not being created. Fidel is now denouncing democracy as "old fashioned electoral farces." People are arrested on suspicion and held until cleared; secret denunciations are encouraged. The jails have filled with political prisoners, and the government insists that people be "clear," that is, one hundred per cent for everything it does. Since reservations about various policies exist among a significant minority, silence and suspicion have spread.

Because of his unique status among the millions of Cubans who never had anything, not even hope, before he took power, Fidel's denunciations of political democracy as "phony" may well make future democracy impossible in Cuba. To these people Fidel *is* the revolution. His picture hangs in their homes next to Christ's. If one asks a Cuban why something is so, the answer often given is that "Fidel said it is a good thing."

If the revolution has changed, it is in large part because Fidel has changed. The experience of the revolution is part of him: the disappointment with the U.S., the help from the Sino-Soviet bloc, the moderates leaving the government, the Communists coming in. Now he insists there is no possibility for compromise, that, as he puts it, either Cuba advances one hundred years or it sinks back into the past. In the eyes of the Castro leadership, the social revolution has become everything and the means are largely beside the point. This changed commitment, with its increasing willingness to suppress all opposition, has distorted the revolution.

THE HISTORY OF CUBA, as of most of Latin America, has consisted of a pattern of oligarchy, dictatorship, and then again oligarchy, while the conditions making for this pattern remained the same. Fidel tried to change this by integrating the great majority of the people into the body politic, by destroying illiteracy, by bringing political education to the people and by decentralizing the government. The 26th of July Movement was to be made into an effective political organ with roots throughout the nation. But as things have developed, the Castro government did not transform the 26th of July Movement into a stable political organization, and the Communist party, however small, is the only group within the governing circles

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which can possibly be called a significant political organization. Nevertheless one thing is certain: the basis for the old pattern has been destroyed, and the basis for any of the modern political forms—desirable or undesirable—has been created.

With speed as the byword, the government has spread in an almost amorphous fashion. If the Fidelistas are able to maintain power long enough, there will be a strong tendency for those in office to harden into a privileged group, since no means of orderly political change has been developed. The Cuban government seems concerned about this possibility, and partly as a consequence of its hate for the privilege and corruption of Batista's regime, it has enforced a rigid equalitarianism: low salaries, plain clothes, all children in public schools, officials living in projects with everyone else. But what father will not wangle to get his son the scarce university opening, his wife the clothes she wants, himself the scarce repair part? The cumulative corruptive effect may be tremendous as men become entrenched in their positions. Even with uninhibited criticism and orderly change, the dangers of bureaucracy in a government-run economy are great; without them, the dangers are far greater.

Fidel should be educating the people in the values of democracy. In the cooperatives, for example, where the revolution has overwhelming support, democratic forms could be worked out in the near future. Instead, a kind of benevolent, revolutionary paternalism seems to be developing. Whether the dynamism and ideology of the revolution can be sustained without active political life, without independent political organization, is doubtful. Right now, far too much depends on the maximum leader.

IV

In order to understand what is happening in Cuba it is necessary not only to focus on the problem of Communism and political freedom, but also to try to understand the nature of the overwhelming and enthusiastic support of the Cuban people for the Castro government.

A great paradox of the revolution is that, despite the suppression of political opposition, Cuban society is more open, more relaxed than it has been in a long time. The urban workers and the peasants undoubtedly enjoy a new sense of freedom—a freedom from day-to-day oppression and degradation. Instead of cowering in total fear of the police as they did under Batista, Cubans can *and do* argue with the police, because they no longer see the police and military uniforms as representing terror and torture. Instead they point with pride to the fact that soldiers now spend most of their time working alongside other laborers. Cubans proudly show that "Even the sergeants work!" It is important to these people that a fellow can now safely take his girl to the beach, or go for a walk late in the evening, and that a girl no longer need fear that a man with money will be likely to proposition her. The many Negroes no longer face the insults of racial segregation. Protestants, in this Catholic country, can for the first time preach and organize without hindrance.

Along with these new freedoms has come a new dignity and pride. Millions of Cubans (especially the landless, nameless *guajiros* for whom so few have ever expressed any real con-

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cern, for whom so little has been done in the past) are now firmly convinced that Castro and his men care about them. This conviction is of the utmost importance. As they see it, they have for the first time been given the chance to exchange an animal existence for human life. Today the government is offering these people the opportunity to build for themselves new cement homes to replace their grass, dirt-floored shacks; the possibility of year-round employment in the countryside to replace chronic unemployment and long lay offs; schools where there were none, and medicine, doctors, and shoes to replace a condition in which there was no medical care for the poor and in which parasitosis was endemic. This is a major undertaking. That it has already achieved a significant amount of success in spite of all the economic hardship is amazing. In September 1960 Cuba was a mass of construction. The vast bulk of it was homes and schools. But how long can a regime that is economically so hard pressed keep on building for those who can't pay and who must have and are being given 20-30 year low-interest loans? Some say success is impossible. But the question of possibility aside, these beginnings and the faith they have aroused are stirring something in the Cuban people.

All these changes—and comparisons must always be made with the Batista years—have produced in Cuba an extraordinary warmth and friendship. Even the "well-staged" mass rallies have a holiday mood of gaiety. There is singing and laughter; vendors hawk their wares. There is little of that discipline and forced enthusiasm that revolutions have produced in other countries. Girls, including the militia women with their sub-machine guns, come to the rallies in a fiesta mood, wearing lipstick and earrings, deliberately sexy. People leave when they are bored or when they have found someone of the opposite sex to leave with.

V

Political freedom is lost and repression is likely to increase. Still, you can find almost any kind of book in the bookstores—fascist, conservative, liberal, Communist—all shadings of the political spectrum (and the Communist literature is more expensive than in the U.S.). You can find pro-U.S. books, such as Ike's "Crusade in Europe" and "The Bataan Death March," as well as many works on FDR and Lincoln. "The Rape of Hungary" is another prominent title. We do not argue that what is, will be. Matters will probably deteriorate. It would be foolish to make predictions because Cuba is a little country and too much depends on international forces beyond her control. At the same time there is little point in mistakingly calling Cuba Communist, or in ignoring the great good being done, or wishfully conjuring up a significant anti-Castro group that will bring social reform and democracy. If the State Department succeeds in bringing down the Castro government, it will also probably have succeeded in losing all Latin America, and in insuring that the next American social revolution will be from the beginning openly anti-Yankee and pro-Soviet.

There was, and is, great hope in Cuba—hope on the part of Cuba's peasant millions for a chance to exchange existence for life. Thanks in large part to the inability of the U.S. government and people to understand that hope, it is now being corrupted by hate, but not by despair. Fidel

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still dreams, and the people continue to believe in the value and the power of that dream. For us to scoff, to analyze, to despair, or to show great patience is not enough. If the U.S. really cares about democracy it should be working *with* the revolutionary government, trying to encourage any democratic tendencies, trying to make democracy a possibility within the context of social revolution. The Cubans believe that they are doing something new, important, human and essential. Perhaps they will fail. Perhaps the Cuban Revolution has already failed. If so, we are among the principle culprits, and we are all the losers.

"LISTEN YANKEE!"—A REVIEW

Daniel M. Friedenberg

In 1956, Juan José Arévalo, revolutionary and President of Guatemala from 1945-1950, published a book with the title *Fable of the Shark and the Sardines.* Into the book, written after the subversion of the left-wing government of Guatemala by American-armed invaders, was poured all the bile and frustration of the Guatemalan patriot. The thesis was simple. The United States was a Shark and all the Latin American countries were Sardines. The sardines existed for the pleasure of being eaten by the shark. And the shark had three faces, Wall Street, the Department of State and the Pentagon, "three distinct aspects and one true personality."*

The book, which to the knowledge of this reviewer has not yet been translated into English (which is of itself revealing), swept the student body of Latin America by storm. It had certain magnificent advantages. It tied into one neat package the filthiest aspects of American imperialist and monopolist practice, always seen more clearly from the outside by the injured party. It was a clear description of what had happened in Guatemala. And it presented a common enemy to unite against. The fact that it made general a particular case, that it presented only some of the facts and many of these wildly distorted, and that it freed Latin Americans from responsibility in their own delinquencies, while objective weaknesses, only made the book more appealing.

Guatemala faded into history and Cuba erupted. And now the chickens have come home to roost. For C. Wright Mills,** taking his keynote from Juan José Arévalo, has reasserted the doctrine of the Shark and the Sardines, softened at certain points too obnoxious for the American *amour propre* but retaining its basic theme. The mirror is held up and we are

* Actually, as a Fable, it is more subtle than this. But the reviewer summarizes the meaning, not the story.

** *Listen, Yankee!,* by C. Wright Mills. McGraw-Hill.

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obliged to look at ourselves as others see us. The fact that the mirror is in a crazy house, sometimes making the squat tall and the fat lean, even has oblique advantages. For the world today is a crazy house and even distortion mirrors are forms of communication. "Know thyself" is incomplete doctrine in a world creaking with hydrogen bombs; it is also necessary to know thyself as others see thee.

IN HIS BOOK, C. Wright Mills does not pretend to give "an objective appraisal of the Cuban revolution"; he is, in the old phrase, a camera taking pictures of the Cuban revolutionary mind. The mind may be so distorted that it can no longer see reality, as is the contention of the reviewer. Yet it *is* a mind, and one that reflects attitudes common throughout the world, and it is valid and even scientific for a sociologist to examine its workings. But for Professor Mills to state, as he does in the Introduction, that this mind has a "reasonable tone" is something else again.

Since a book review is a small auditorium, it is impossible to go specifically into the many falsities, half-truths and wrong interpretations which are gravely stated as self-evident facts. The reviewer has three pages of notes enumerating these. Other reviews have already pointed them out. By the form used, a series of letters from Cuban revolutionaries, C. Wright Mills cannot even be held personally responsible for errors, since he is merely—though of course fictively—acting as amanuensis for others. But some attempt should be made to fit the argument to frame.

Cuban history, we are told, is a series of miseries perpetrated on the Cuban people by the United States which, failing in its attempt to annex the island physically, used the guise of the Cuban war of independence against Spain to annex the island politically and economically. Since the unique aim of this annexation was to squeeze profits, the country was developed only in relation to the needs of foreign interest and the government was deliberately manipulated to thwart the self-development of the Cuban people.

But, the argument continues, the brutality and venality of Batista was too great even for the most resigned peons, and a revolution led by Fidel Castro, whose backing was a coalition of intellectuals and the landless farmers, succeeded in overthrowing the dictator.

Fidel Castro, our revolutionary relates, was a student from a middle-class family whose aim was to establish a progressive social democracy. To do this it was necessary to institute certain important and overdue reforms, particularly those relating to the inequitable land ownership and the milling control of sugar.

Here it was that Fidel Castro, who commanded the respect and assent of the overwhelming mass of Cubans, met the factor which altered his whole political attitude. For he discovered that the Cuban land and the Cuban sugar mills were owned to the large extent by Americans who had no intention of relinquishing their absentee control. And the more vigorously Fidel asserted the right of Cubans to control the property and destiny of Cuba, the more rigid became the reaction of America toward the Revolution: until the revolutionaries realized that Juan José Arévalo had been right and that Wall Street, the Department of State and the Pentagon were in reality three aspects of the same personality.

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But Fidel, unlike the pusillanimous politicians and the cowards of other Latin American countries, decided he would not be eaten by the shark, that one sardine would stand up and fight even to the bitter end. Because he knew there was a new structure in the world picture: in sum, another shark, though a more benevolent one. And he reasoned that between two sharks, as in between the tall trees of the forest grow flowers, a sardine could still swim and make its own life; and that, merely by succeeding to do so the sardine could give courage to other sardines and demonstrate that the life of a sardine has equal grace and perhaps more validity than the life of a shark.

To sum up the arguments presented by C. Wright Mills in more common terms, the United States forced Castro into his present position and made him choose Russia in order to survive.

LET US AGREE the argument has great merits though many facts have to have their legs and arms chopped off to accord. Let us for the sake of generality—which by definition means more right than wrong—agree with Professor Mills. But at this point a new note jars the discussion, the note of ecstasy in the classic and real sense of a trance supposed to accompany prophetic inspiration. The familiar landscape of power politics, economic analysis and political necessity dissolves and in its place looms grandiose visions, trumpetings of doom, oracular voices.

We are informed—by simple fiat—that Cuba already has "well in hand" her immediate objectives: to increase and diversify production and consumption; to increase and diversify her export markets and sources of supply; and to industrialize the island at the same time as improving the standard of living. Statistics are always treacherous, but the facts available indicate that twice as many pesos are circulating on the island as last year, in competition for fewer goods—and the effect of the sugar embargo has barely been felt. We are told that the Communists are few and of no importance, that Cuba's way is unique and a new path for the world. On December 10th, speaking in Moscow, Ché Guevara said: "The people of Cuba trust in the strength of progressive humanity, in the strength of the socialist camp led by the U.S.S.R. . . ." And he continued, Cuba "in her peaceful construction wants to tread the way of the Soviet Union." We are furthermore told by C. Wright Mills, speaking in his own voice this time: "Any party that campaigned in Cuba today against the revolution and against the present government's management of it would probably be set upon by the majority of the people of Cuba. So I think it must be faced up to: a real election in Cuba today is an impossible and meaningless idea"—this from a man who avows never having taken an interest in Cuba before, does not speak Spanish, and spent one month there entirely in the company of the highest officials of the regime. We are now travelling with Simone de Beauvoir through China and can readily interchange books without damage to the thesis.

We thus must embrace faith at a certain point, having transcended mere politics. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with Fidel, and the Word was Fidel.

INASMUCH as religion is for many more interesting than politics, the chapter entitled "Communism and Cuba" has a certain originality. For

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it openly reflects the stirrings of something still concealed to Western theoreticians: a new feeling that Russian Communism is old hat, dead end, barely radical, and that the Communists following Moscow are not really left.

This is partly but not wholly a reflection of the Moscow-Peking rift. It goes deeper. Kierkegaard at one point maintained that the only Christians were the disciples who knew Christ and who had shared in the Moment. Every one after that merely surmised, read, imitated Christian behavior.

There is a new element in Communist thinking which approaches this. Mao Tse-tung is a "true" Communist because he attended the Moment, he is the contemporary disciple. Khrushchev merely inherited the agony and the ecstasy and the message; he is a disciple at second hand, an epigone, a Church member rather than a Christian in the terms of Kierkegaard.

And not Mao alone. Every leader who bears witness to the Moment is more entitled to be a real Communist than the second-hand disciples, the bureaucrats. A Fidel Castro or a Sekou Touré, the contemporary disciples, are more revolutionary, more left, put the old pure wine in new bottles—and scorn the peace-seeking Communist leaders who have replaced the revolutionary spirit with the machine-for-machine's sake. Those Communists are old fashioned! "They are too much like some 'Society of Friends of the Soviet Union,' and they won't even go into 'the Chinese question' when you raise it; and the Chinese in Latin America, they don't fool around at all with the Communist parties here. They go directly to the left-wing element!" states C. Wright Mills through the mouth of his letters. We get a hint of violent undercurrents in the so-called monolithic Communist world. And what many people might consider mere obscure distinctions, for those of faith weigh most heavily: religions have been torn asunder on matters of less substance.

Professor Mills—in his truths and distortions, possibly even most in the gross distortions—reflects the view of Latin American intelligentsia today, a group twisted by the economic facts of a rapidly rising population whose standard of living is a victim of plummeting prices for raw materials and rising prices for industrial goods. As the old oligarchic order, frenzied by discontent with the status quo, tries to adjust its rule through adopting the old military control to a newer control of a liberal democracy beholden to the military for survival, the intellectuals are pushed to more appealing and ever more radical "solutions." Since the kind of revolts they desire are no longer boxed in by a modern *cordon sanitaire* (imagine what China could do today with a Carlos Prestes in Brazil!), the voice of Mills tells us more than can be attacked on a purely factual level; it is the voice and the new faith of the underground mind, idealism tied to phantasy, the will exerting itself despite and possibly because of its surface tensions and conflicts with pragmatic reason.

That this voice and new faith are not isolated but represent the typical student mind of Latin America outside Catholic education, can be seen by the most superficial scrutiny of the daily news. Mexico, Peru, Venezuela: it is not peasant agitation nor union strife that screams the phrases of Castro so much as the middle-class university student. Salvador de Madariaga, the leading Spanish liberal

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thinker and a man of encyclopedic knowledge, recently stated that the student body of Latin America was Communizoid in drive. And not only the students. The reviewer happened to spend several days in Portugal with the head of the department of Philosophy of the oldest university in South America. Scion of a distinguished family that was sent to Peru by the Hapsburg kings as administrators in the 16th century, this Professor had just returned from a free junket through China and Russia. He was filled with what he had seen and dismissed all my objections as hypocritical and lacking historical perspective. What he said—and undoubtedly tells his worshipping students—was what C. Wright Mills tries to portray.

THE BASIC QUESTION, consequently, is not whether *Listen, Yankee* is wrong or right, but whether it represents the future and what can still be done to influence that future. A doctrine is not necessarily unpopular because it is false; and the converse is more likely when its message inspires hope where hope does not exist among the hungry. We are all familiar with the history of a doctrine that swept the Western world two millennia ago because it gave people hope. A rational and factual criticism would have revealed its phantasy nature; but people in a time of crisis turned to it and believed to the extent that even its seeming absurdities became strength—*credo quia absurdum*. It is this type of underlying appeal that C. Wright Mills projects and we, who do not believe because it is absurd, must take steps to permit a more rational and equally appealing doctrine to take root. If we abandon *our* hope, namely that economic advance can come with some degree of unhindered personal liberty, the new tyranny will become indeed a New Order. And, taking the part of charity, this is what I believe Professor Mills may be attempting to state.

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LANGUAGE AND TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Herbert Marcuse

This article is taken from a forthcoming book dealing with the ideology of advanced industrial society, to be published by Beacon Press.

Communication in and about daily performances, relationships, arrangements is ordinarily "non-controversial": it takes things for granted. The world is established, and one has to put up with it; the common projects and aspirations do not essentially question it and do not go beyond it; they aim at rearrangements within it; the apophantic* function of language is reactivated only in emergency situations, when the normal state of affairs breaks or is being broken. But the extent to which the apophantic function remains alive in the every-day universe of discourse is perhaps a token of the actual extent to which freedom of thought prevails in a given society. Freedom of thought is freedom of speech also in the sense that the speaker is capable of expressing and communicating ideas which contradict and transcend the established meaning, and do so not by virtue of some poetic or personal connotation, but by virtue of a soberly realistic and realizable content. Such non-conformist expression and communication presuppose an *open* universe of discourse, in which the meaning of the key terms is not preempted by their reference to a specific set of conditions, events, and relations. For example, "freedom of thought and speech" must be understood to mean, not only the constitutional guarantee and the actual exercise of this liberty, but also the possibility and ability to think independently, the consciousness and the conscience of the difference between individual and social needs and interests, between the human and the national purpose—in other words, the term must be understandable as containing the negation of its given content.

The apophantic function of communication manifests itself in the ability of language to convey, in its current usage, notions and images qualitatively different from those designating established conditions and opportunities, to discover not only that which is but also the presence of that which is not, to reveal the negativity of the positive. In the one-

* The term denotes a feature of an essentially pre-technological consciousness which is discussed in a preceding chapter of the book. The world is experienced not as the neutral stuff of transformation and domination but as cosmos in its own truth and its own right. The modes of thought expressing this consciousness reveal and demonstrate truth and falsehood, right and wrong as *ontological* conditions.

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dimensionality of advanced technological civilization, this apophantic function declines, and with the decline of the apophantic function, language tends to be appropriated by and adapted to the requirements of the status quo. Language is literally made by corporate and national Business, by hired researchers, entertainers, press agents, etc. The more blatantly production for profit demands manipulation of needs, the more obviously it depends on mass hypnosis and autosuggestion, the more vanishes the difference between the "ethics" of business and those of the racket, between selling and cheating, between promoting and poisoning, between truth and lie, sense and non-sense. As the rising expenditures for expanding and insuring business enter into the very structure of the economy, they—together with their moronic features and consequences—become beneficial and rational. They help to procure the comforts and luxuries, material and cultural, they embellish the life of the whole. The economist justly comes to their defense:

> . . . much of the criticism of the vast activity of selling and advertising in the American economy—that which concerns economics rather than taste or the devastation of the countryside by billboards—has missed the point. . . . Our proliferation of selling activity is the counterpart of comparative opulence. Much of it is inevitable with high levels of well-being. It may be waste but it is waste that exists because the community is too well off to care.*

And the more the growing productivity of industrial civilization seems to be capable of dispensing with this sort of rationality, the more vital for the status quo becomes its retention. Hegel's formula, which was at least partly ironical when it was stated, now finds its adequate reformulation:

> Was unvernünftig ist, das ist wirklich;
> Und was wirklich ist, das ist unvernünftig.

THE EVERY-DAY LANGUAGE of this state of affairs is of an infinite richness and vitality. Slang and the colloquial have rarely been so creative—as if the common man (or his anonymous spokesman) would in this speech assert his humanity against the powers that be, as if the rejection and the revolt, subdued in the political sphere, would burst out in the vocabulary that calls things by their names: headshrinker and egghead, beat it and dig it, you are cooked and you are gone, etc. On the other side of the fence, ordinary language still is haunted by the big words of higher culture: by the dignity of the individual and the inalienable rights and the philosophy of democracy, etc. However, the defense laboratories and the executive offices, the time keepers and managers, the efficiency experts and the political beauty parlors (which provide the leaders with the appropriate make up) speak a different language, and for the time being they seem to have the last word. And from these centers of organization and manipulation, the word is transmitted and incorporated into the common universe of discourse and behavior. The word thus transmitted is the word which orders and

* John K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism*, p. 96.

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organizes, which induces people to do and to buy and to accept what is offered, to identify themselves with the function they perform in the established society, to release all frustration in the (equally organized and controlled) realm of leisure and relaxation. As a consequence, whole dimensions of communication atrophy, or they are ritualized. This language closes and seals the meaning of words, it fixes not only their value but also their function within a narrow framework of behavior, shutting off all transcendence. The elements of autonomy, discovery, evaluation recede before designation, imitation, repetition, acceptance; and communication is permeated with magic, authoritarian, and ritual elements. I shall presently try to indicate some of them and to show their interconnection. Common to them seems a trend toward functionalization of language—it may serve as a starting point for the discussion.

Functionalization of language is germane to the technological-scientific discourse. There, it means the rationalization of the vocabulary through functional or operational terms. This is Stanley Gerr's formulation of one of the "main features of our evolving scientific language";* Gerr derives his conception from the principle that "an operation is acceptable to technological science only when a device (tool, mechanism, instrument, apparatus) exists for carrying it out, and a process or physical property only when it can be measured; which is to say, only when a device exists for measuring it."** It follows that a tool or instrument is "identical" with its partcular function, and that "no operation can be conceived apart from the mechanism with which it is executed." Gerr sees the effect of this attitude on the language of science and technology in the "tendency to identify things and their functions," or, linguistically, "to consider the names of things as being indicative at the same time of their manner of functioning, and the name of properties and processes as symbolical of the apparatus used to detect or produce them."†

THE QUESTION whether this extreme linguistic operationalism is characteristic of the contemporary language of science is of no relevance in my context; I use Gerr's exposition only in order to illustrate the decline of apophantic communication in the publicized language of our day. It is one of its features that words and concepts tend to coincide, or rather the concept tends to be absorbed by the word: the former has no other content than that designated by the word in the publicized and standardized usage, and the word is expected to have no other response than the publicized and standardized behavior (reaction). The word becomes *cliché* and, as cliché, governs the speech or the writing; the communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning. To be sure, any language contains innumerable terms which do not require development of their meaning, such as the terms

* "Language and Science" in *Philosophy of Science*, April 1942, p. 151.
** loc. cit., p. 156.
† loc. cit.

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designating the objects and implements of daily life, visible nature, vital needs and wants. These terms are generally understood so that their mere appearance produces a response (linguistic or operational) adequate to the pragmatic context in which they are spoken.

The situation is very different with respect to terms which denote contents beyond this non-controversial context. The self-validating, strictly analytical propositions, which appear as the nodal points in the public universe of discourse, have their strictly non-analytic, political connotation: they are like magic-ritual formulas which, hammered and re-hammered into the recipient's mind, produce the appropriate effect of enclosing it within the circle of established conditions. East and West show the same tendencies. Thus, "freedom," "equality," "democracy," "peace" imply, analytically, a specific set of predicates or attributes which occur invariably when the noun is spoken or written. In the West, the appropriate predication is in such terms as free enterprise, public opinion, adequate deterrents, popular elections, the individual; in the East, it is in terms of rule by the workers and peasants, socialism, abolition of hostile classes, etc. On either side, transgression beyond the closed analytical structure is incorrect or propaganda, although the means of enforcing the truth and the degree of punishment are very different.

In this universe of public discourse, speech moves in synonyms and tautologies, actually, it never moves toward the qualitative difference. The analytic structure insulates the governing nouns from the negation which their concept in the synthetic proposition involves, for example, the negation of peace by the prevailing mode of peace, the negation of the individual by the prevailing mode of individuality, etc. In this sphere, to identify things with their function is to identify them with their function in their society, and if this identification affects the animate things, men, it may be a highly restrictive and even destructive procedure: although it may have the merit of certainty, it may also succeed in arresting thought.

THE ANALYTIC and functional structure of public discourse points up the new role of the *cliché*. As such, the cliché is one of the oldest ingredients of public, and, especially, of political language. The transformation of concepts into cliché spreads with the weakening of the political opposition in advanced industrial society: as alternative realizations are being defeated or abandoned, the remaining realization is being stabilized and made immune against qualitative change. And the weakening of the opposition, which is not the result of terroristic regimes, constitutes the novel element. The great liberal ideas of the modern era have come to fruition in the improved conditions and expectations of life—the rest belongs to the past. As the material ground for the further and alternative realization of these ideas is cut off by their present realization, as the political representation of qualitative change succumbs, they lose the "excess" of meaning, the non-analytical element which would enable them to appear in *synthetic* propositions

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and judgments. The ideas congeal to "self-sufficient" nouns, the concreteness of which (their "functional" meaning) is the very token of their petrification.

The prototype of this language is, of course, the *advertisement.* Here, the syntactical form of the proposition is the tautology *per dictum:* the advertised object is by definition the best, the most powerful, the cheapest. Since the validation is the sale (and not the use), we are this side of logic. The terms are slogans, and the speech is propaganda—devoid of all apophantic function. In the last analysis, Business provides the closed operational context in which things (and persons) are identified with their functions—the instruments of destruction as well as of production. One learns the meaning (= function) of a new "nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-firing submarine" when one hears that this almost "ultimate weapon," which is "opening the door on a new era in national power, national power [sic!] for peace," "carries a price tag of $120,000,000" (*New York Times,* Dec. 31, 1959; and radio broadcast of the same date). Novel are not the facts (including the identification of peace with the function of producing for war) but their total commercialization and their total effectiveness and acceptance.

FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE here reveals its *magic* element, which is also its essentially political element. In politics as well as in business, it is methodically used for "establishing an image" which sticks to the mind and to the product and helps to sell the men and the goods that offer themselves. Speech and writing are grouped around "impact lines" and "audience rousers" which convey the image. This image may be "freedom" or "peace," or the nice "guy" or the "communist" or "Miss Rheingold," the reader or listener is expected to associate (and does associate) with them a fixated structure of institutions, attitudes, aspirations and to react in a fixated, specific manner. This may not be explicitly indicated in writing or talking—the result is the same. Such language is at one and the same time "intimidation and glorification";* propositions tend to assume the form of suggestive commands; they are evocative rather than demonstrative; predication becomes prescription—the whole communication has a hypnotic character. It shows forth most clearly in the personalized language, which presents generally superimposed and standardized things and performances as "especially for you."** It is *your* Congressman, *your* favorite stretch of highway, *your* favorite drug store, *your* car dealer, *your* newspaper; it is "brought to you," "made for you"; it invites you, etc. The powerless individuals are constantly called upon to identify themselves with the goods, and the politicians incessantly summon them to meet a challenge and to face an issue which is not theirs.

* Roland Barthes, *Le Degré zéro de L'écriture,* Paris, éditions du Seuil, 1953, p. 33.
** See Leo Loewenthal, in *Radio Research,* ed. Lazarsfeld and Stanton, New York, 1944, p. 543f.

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In the most advanced sectors of functional and manipulating communication, language expresses in truly striking constructions the totalitarian identification of person and function. *Time* magazine may serve as an extreme example of this trend. Its use of the inflectional genitive makes individuals appear as mere appendices or properties of their place, their job, their employer or enterprise. They are introduced as Virginia's Byrd, U.S. Steel's Bough, Egypt's Nasser. A hyphenated attributive construction creates a fixed syndrome:

> Georgia's high-handed, low-browed governor . . . had the stage all set for one of his wild political rallies last week.

The governor, his function, his physical features, and his political practices are fused together into one indivisible and immutable structure which, in its natural innocence and immediacy, overwhelms the reader's mind. The structure leaves no space for distinction, development, differentiation of meaning: it moves and lives only as a whole. If we would dissolve the structure into a series of narrative and demonstrative predications, we would have to describe the governor, relate his career and his policy, follow the preparations for the rally; then, the equivocal identification of physical and political features would only be the result of preceding syntheses. In doing so, however, we would not only require more time and space (which is expensive), but also change the intent of the statement, by making room for other connotations. Thus, a sentence like "the governor is a high-handed, low-browed politician . . ." would link the individual features of the subject with the general features of the class to which he belongs—it would point to a universal which is suppressed in the abridged construct.

Use of the hyphenized abridgment is widespread. For example, "brush-browed" Teller, the "father of the H-bomb," "bull-shouldered missileman von Braun," "science-military dinner"* and the "nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-firing" submarine. Such constructions are, perhaps not accidentally, frequent in the "military-political" sphere. Terms designating quite different spheres or qualities are forced together into a solid, unchangeable whole which literally sticks in the mind. The effect is again a magic and hypnotic one: the abridgment of elaboration, the freezing of qualitative differences produces slogans well suited to cause the desirable effect: reconciliation of opposites, harmony of contradictions. Thus the loved and feared Father, the spender of life, generates the H-bomb for the annihilation of life; "science-military" joins the efforts to reduce anxiety and suffering with the job of creating anxiety and suffering. Or, without hyphen, the Freedom Academy of cold war specialists,** and the "clean bomb"—uniting irreconcilable opposites in a harmony of terror. People who speak and accept such language seem to be immune to everything—and susceptible to everything.

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* The last three items quoted in *The Nation*, Feb. 22, 1958.
** A suggestion of *Life* magazine, as quoted in *The Nation*, August 20, 1960.

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THIS STYLE is of an overwhelming *concreteness*. The "thing identified with its function" is more real than the thing distinguished from its function, and the linguistic expression of this identification (in the functional substantive, and the abridged fusion of the substantive with its attributes) creates a concrete vocabulary which counteracts development of abstraction. Compared with these constructions, the non-functional substantive, the noun-subject, and the demonstrative and narrative predication are rather abstract forms; they express the transcending universality of the concept, the "excess" of its intent over the term (word) in current usage; thus they retain the tension between the particular and the genus, which is greatly attenuated in the functional construction.

According to the old philosophy of grammar, the noun is something that "can enter into certain relationships,"* but is not identical with these relationships. Moreover, it rather remains what it is in and "against" these relationships; it is their "universal" subject and center: the propositional synthesis links the action (or state) with the subject in such a manner that the subject remains the actor (or bearer) and thus remains distinguished from the state or function in which it happens to be. In saying: "lightning strikes," one "thinks not merely of the striking lightning, but of the lightning itself which strikes," there is a subject which "passed into action."** The grammatical form thus retains the dialectical distinction between the subject and its functions; the proposition contains the negation of the given fact: it links that which is happening to the conditions which made it happen, and allows the reader or listener to follow and reconstruct the development.

THE PETRIFIED CONCRETENESS which pervades the manipulated universe of discourse may also be called a "misplaced concreteness"—misplaced in so far as it is achieved at the expense of repressing the past (and surpassed) factors which once made men and things what they are here and now, and which circumscribe the alternative possibilities of human existence. To be sure, the effective and magical images may well evoke the past (as a candidate for office may evoke the grinding of good hamburgers in his father's little grocery shop, or the Founding Fathers, or, on the other side, Marx and Lenin), but such evocations amount to a suppression of history because they serve to obliterate the decisive difference: the boy who ground the hamburgers in his father's little shop now wants to rule one of the two most powerful countries of the world, and neither Marx nor Lenin is the determining historical antecedent of Khrushchev.

Functional language is an *unhistorical* language: the tendency to identify things with their function destroys the meta-physical grammar which had linked noun-subject-substance-essence, linked in such a man-

* W. v. Humboldt, *Uber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues*, reprint Berlin 1936, p. 254.
** loc cit., p. 252.

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ner that the essence was the permanent First Principle, Ground, and Reason of the entire structure. This metaphysics offended against the formalization of logic and grammar, not least by introducing into these disciplines the dimension of Time: the "essence" appeared not only as the permanent structural but also as the permanent historical a priori of the subject.

In contrast, technological rationality is unhistorical rationality, and as such it may well serve the interests of manipulation, especially in a society which has been made aware of the subversive content of released memory, and of the technique of rationalizing these contents. It may not be altogether fantastic to associate the repression of development in the functionalized universe of discourse with social repression. With its abridgments and closures of meaning, with its efficient reifications, this universe joins the great social struggle against the dangers of Remembrance:

> Das "Schreckbild einer Menschheit ohne Erinnerung . . . ist kein blosses Verfallsprodukt . . . sondern es ist mit der Fortschrittlichkeit des bürgerlichen Prinzips notwendig verknüpft." [Industrial production can increasingly dispense with accumulated experience]: "Oekonomen und Soziologen wie Werner Sombart und Max Weber haben das Prinzip des Traditionalismus den feudalen Gesellschaftsformen zugeordnet und das der Rationalität den bürgerlichen. Das sagt aber nicht weniger, als dass Erinnerung, Zeit Gedächtnis von der fortschreitenden bürgerlichen Gesellschaft selber als eine Art irrationaler Rest liquidiert wird. . . ."*

THE PRECEDING DISCUSSION aimed at identifying some of the ways in which the social and political controls characteristic of advanced technological civilization are translated into language. The latter not only reflects these controls but becomes itself an instrument of control even where (and precisely where) it does not transmit orders but information, where it demands, not obedience but choice, not submission but freedom. This language controls by reducing the linguistic forms and symbols of reflection, abstraction, development, contradiction; it denies or absorbs the transcendent vocabulary which evokes a qualitatively different dimension of thought and qualitatively different possibilities of action. Thus the closed universe of discourse tends to paralyze the expression of the political negation, which demands an apophantic language in the strictest sense, truly a "langage de la connaissance" (Roland Barthes): demonstration, insight into the process of mediation in which facts are made what they are, distinction between the thing and its function, between the subject and its realization—in

* Th. W. Adorno, "Was bedeutet Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?," in Bericht über die Erzieherkonferenz am 6. und 7. November in Wiesbaden; Frankfurt 1960, p. 14: The spectre of mankind without memory . . . is not a mere product of decadence . . . but is necessarily connected with the progressive development of the bourgeois principle. Industrial production can increasingly dispense with accumulated experience. Economists and sociologists such as Werner Sombart and Max Weber have attributed the principle of traditionalism to feudal society while reserving the principle of rationality to bourgeois society. This, however, implies nothing less than that progressing bourgeois society itself liquidates as an irrational remnant the faculties of recollection, time and memory.

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short, the open universe of discourse in which the historical possibilities become explicable, in which the contradiction can find its adequate linguistic and mental representation.

This political language reflects most conspicuously the closing of a political universe. For example, a linguistic comparison between the speeches of Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln on the one side, and their contemporary successors or would-be successors on the other, could show the petrification of concepts to clichés, of demonstrative to hypnotic propositions; the substitution of magic-ritual images for synthetic development, etc. Since the substance is not in alternative issues which would make a qualitative difference, it comes to rest in the alternative techniques of manipulation. This change is progress: the technological reality cancels politics as a separate and independent function—political problems become technical problems. But the perversion of the capabilities of technological reality reveals itself in the fact that the function of politics is joined with that of the entertainment and beauty parlor industry—a fatally premature juncture. When a candidate for the highest political office appears in the television show of a popular comedian, he re-enacts the satyr-play after the ancient tragedy. *Finis tragoediae*—but it is not so much the hero as the people who would make the ritual sacrifice.

The transformation of an open into a closed political universe also characterizes the development of communist discourse from Marx to Stalin. The Marxian language is a highly cognitive language even in the manifestos: it argues, demonstrates, examines alternatives. In contrast, the Stalinist language is no longer "discourse" at all—it is self-validating enunciation. The explicatory function of discourse disappears, or rather, the syntactical form of explication serves to communicate (and veil) dictum, decision, command. Traditionally neutral terms (such as internationalism, cosmopolitanism) are made into tokens of unquestionable rights or wrongs, and the definition becomes separation of Good from Evil. "There is no more any respite between denotation and judgment, and the closure of the language is complete since, in the last analysis, a value is given as explication of another value." The discourse thus moves in tautologies. It is no longer concerned with explaining facts but with "presenting the real in prejudged form," with pronouncing condemnations. For example, the objective content of the term "deviationist" is "of a penal order." This kind of discourse functions "like a good conscience and serves to establish a fraudulous coincidence between the origin of the fact and its most remote manifestation."* It seems that these characteristics of the "Stalinist language" are not confined to terroristic communication; they appear also in the free areas of advanced industrial society which tend toward total coordination.**

* Roland Barthes, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-40.

** For West Germany, a similar tendency is revealed by the intensive studies undertaken in 1950-1951 by the Institut für Sozialforschung, Frankfurt/Main. See *Gruppen Experiment*, ed. F. Pollock, especially the summary of "Aspekte der Sprache," p. 545 f.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Ideology and the Beau Geste

Daniel Bell

I agree with much of what Dennis Wrong says in his "Reflections on the End of Ideology," in the Summer 1960 issue of DISSENT. Mr. Wrong writes that the "end of ideology" is a fear of the "destructive mass emotions that ideology has proved capable of unleashing. The cruelty and fanaticism of organized masses is seen as a possibility inherent in modern industrial society and all social movements are anxiously scrutinized for their vulnerability to the totalitarian spirit."

This, I think, fairly summarizes the concerns of my book. The end of ideology is not a fashion, but an experience; and one need not recapitulate the grisly events of the last twenty-five years to underline that point.

I agree too—and this I take to be the burden of Mr. Wrong's concerns—that the end of ideology must not be the end of utopia as well. If anything, one can begin anew the discussion of utopia only by being always aware of the trap of ideology. One passage in Mr. Wrong's essay provides, I think, the necessary confrontation. Mr. Wrong cites me as saying that Marx, Lenin and their followers "sought to win millions of people for the idea of a new society without the slightest thought about the shape of that future society and its problems," and then goes on to comment, "In other words, there is a sense in which the Marxists were not visionary enough. . . ."

I would say just the opposite: they were not *concrete* enough. They did not spell out what they wanted; they did not think through the consequences of what "the Revolution" would mean. With their myopic rationalism, they assumed that "History" or "the Future" would settle all problems. One has only to read Lenin's *State and Revolution*, or the more revealing essay, *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* written on the eve of October, to be astounded by the simplicities of thought and the ingenuousness of the promises.

THE POINT IS THAT IDEOLOGISTS are "terrible simplifiers." Ideology makes it unnecessary for people to confront individual issues on their individual merits. One simply turns to the ideological vending machine, and out come the prepared formulae. When these beliefs are suffused by apocalyptic fervor, ideas become weapons, and with dreadful results.

There is now, more than ever, some need for utopia, in the sense that men need—as they have always needed—some vision of their potential, some way of fusing passion and intelligence. But the ladder to the City of Heaven can no longer be a "faith ladder," but an empirical one: a utopia has to specify *where* one wants to go, *how* to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for, *who* is to pay.

The end of ideology closes the book, intellectually speaking, on an era, the

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one of easy formulae for social change. But to close a book is not to turn one's back upon it. This is all the more important now, for a "new Left," with few memories of the past, is emerging. It has passion and energy, but little definition of the future. Its outriders exult that it is "on the move." But where it is going, what it means by Socialism, how to guard against bureaucratization, what one means by democratic planning or workers' control—any of the questions that require hard thought are answered by bravura phrases. ("Two images . . . between them they show the alternative paths for the intellectuals," writes Alasdair MacIntyre, in an essay in *Out of Apathy,* the recent testament of the "new Left." "The one is of J. M. Keynes, the other of Leon Trotsky. . . . I think of them at the end, Keynes with his peerage, Trotsky with an ice-pick in his skull. They are the twin lives between which intellectual choice in our society lies.")

It is in attitudes toward Cuba and the new States in Africa that the meaning of intellectual maturity, and of the end of ideology, will be tested. For among the "new Left" there is an alarming readiness to create a *tabula rasa,* to accept the word "Revolution" as an absolution *for* outrages, to justify the suppression of opposition and civil rights—in short, to erase the lessons of the last forty years with an emotional alacrity that is astounding.

The fact that these social movements were justified in their demands for freedom, for the right to control their own political and economic destinies, does not mean they have a right to a blank check for everything they choose to do. Nor does the fact that such movements take power in the name of freedom guarantee that they will not turn out to be as imperialist, in demanding their turn on the stage of History, as the states they have displaced. (In Ghana, Nkrumah has announced, in imitation of the old masters, that persons persisting in political opposition to him may be flogged. And in Cuba, as George Sherman, the correspondent for the London *Observer* reports: "The Revolution is law today although nobody has said clearly what that law is. You are expected to be simply for or against it and judge and be judged accordingly. Hatred and intolerance are wiping out whatever middle ground may have existed.")

IF THE END OF IDEOLOGY has any meaning, it is to ask for the end of rhetoric, and of rhetoricians, of "revolution," of the day when the word "Revolution" excused all. Eighty years ago, when a French radical threw a bomb into the Chamber of Deputies, killing some people, his act was defended by some Symbolist poets on the ground that, "So what if a few persons were killed. It was a *beau geste*!" A beau geste that ended, one might say, in a mirthless jest.

To return to Mr. Wrong's strictures: the problems which confront us, at home and in the world, "are resistant to the old terms of ideological debate between left and right," and, "if 'ideology' is by now, and perhaps with good reason, an irretrievably fallen word," it is *not* necessary that " 'utopia' suffer the same fate." But it may, if those who now call loudest for utopia begin to justify degrading *means,* in the name of some Utopian or revolutionary *end,* and forget the simple lesson that if the old debates are meaningless, some old verities are not—the verities of free speech, free press, the right of opposition and of free inquiry. These can hardly be well defended at home once one

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begins to justify their suppression abroad—whether it be in Cuba, Ghana, Indonesia, or any other rising star of Revolution and "direct democracy."

Dennis Wrong replies:

Daniel Bell and I differ largely in what we choose to emphasize. I agree with most of what he says in his letter, and his assertion that "the end of ideology is not a fashion but an experience" admirably sums up what I wished to convey in the opening paragraphs of my article.

But I am not persuaded that Mr. Bell is saying something that vitally needs to be said to Americans, and more specifically to American intellectuals, at the present time. Mr. Bell gets around a good deal more than I do and his examples suggest that he has the English "New Left" in mind when he insists on the importance of not forgetting the lessons of the recent past and the "old verities" they confirm. I am as depressed as he is by the quotation from Alasdair MacIntyre—must we go through all *that* again? The young British leftists too often give me an uncomfortable sense of *deja vu,* but perhaps they reflect a continuing British insularity about politics that is not found on this side of the Atlantic or on the European continent. Certainly, neither the young leaders and supporters of the Southern sit-down movement nor the apolitical Beats appear to be attracted by the kind of revolutionary romanticism that predictably finds its hero and martyr in Trotsky.

Referring to my remarks on Utopia, Mr. Bell wants a "concrete" view which, he claims, is "just the opposite" of a "visionary" one. But what is more concrete than a vision—literally something seen with the eyes rather than conceived by the mind? Nor do I agree that the idea of Utopia is either valueless or potentially totalitarian if it fails to include specifications about how to get there and what the costs will be. This is, of course, necessary if we intend immediately to create a political movement to "realize" our Utopia, but I specifically denied that a program of political action in the ordinary sense was a prerequisite for creative Utopian thought. One can and should imaginatively explore ends in their own terms independently of any consideration of means, degrading or otherwise. What troubles me about Mr. Bell's outlook is the indication that he has learned his lessons from Marx and Dewey so well that he refuses to see any value in sheer protest (e.g. against mass culture) or Utopian speculation when these activities lack any immediate political relevance. This accounts, I think, for the occasional tone of complacent determinism he adopts and for his readiness to patronize those who continue to be moved to strong protest against much in our lives as naifs or romantics committed to dissent for its own sake. I hasten to add that this tone is by no means always manifest—Mr. Bell is frequently critical and even Utopian himself, but it is what I had in mind in complaining that he and Seymour Lipset remain "political men" to an excessive degree.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me add that if a defense of Utopia is not a proposal for revolution, or even for milder political action, neither should it be understood as a counsel of complete withdrawal from politics. My article also criticized the effects on practical politics of the "end of ideology" when it is invoked to justify a "moderation" that exalts the legal forms and technical skills of political bargaining over the content of political issues.

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THE NATURE AND THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM

David Spitz

I

In logic, as in common sense, we understand that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time. No man can meet himself coming around a corner; nor can he serve, much as it might amuse him to do so, as a pallbearer at his own funeral. The law of contradiction imposes an unavoidable, if regrettable, limitation on human life. But in language, especially the language of politics, words often seem to defy this simple law.

In language, words are used not merely to communicate but to veil or distort meanings. Thus the term "freedom" is employed to mean both the absence of restraint (Hobbes) and submission to restraint (Rousseau); to describe actions taken in the silence, or even defiance, of the law (Bentham and Thoreau) as well as actions taken in obedience to law (Montesquieu and Hegel); to account for a way of life (President Eisenhower, who in his first Inaugural Address declared that the conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is one in which "Freedom is pitted against slavery") and to condemn the denial of certain political rights (Patrick Henry, who, though he had the freedom to proclaim his alleged unfreedom, nevertheless demanded "liberty or death"). Theologians like Jacques Maritain and Bishop Fulton J. Sheen apply freedom only to acts that constitute "right" choices, i.e., acts that conform to the good, or the truth, or God's will (all of which, in this conception, amount to the same thing); while democratic theorists like John Stuart Mill and R. M. MacIver apply the term without regard to the ethical quality of the action chosen. To compound this confusion, psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm tell us that positive freedom, as distinct from negative freedom, "consists in the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality," thereby excluding from the term, we must presume, actions taken as a consequence of considered judgment or by neurotic or maladjusted men; while Soviet apologists insist that writers in the Communist world are free to say whatever they think, provided only that they first think the right things.

Most of these (and many other) definitions of freedom are incompatible with each other. As a result, we can no longer know what a man means when he speaks of freedom; for a plea for freedom made by X may in fact be nothing less than a call for the exercise of coercion

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over Y, as Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor made plain when he observed that men "will only become free when they renounce their freedom to us and submit to us." This is what led George Orwell to compose a grammar of doubletalk called "Newspeak" and to coin as a slogan of the new totalitarianism: "Freedom is Slavery."

It would take us too far afield to enter into the reasons for this curious diversity of meanings. History and tradition would contribute part of the explanation; deliberate distortion so as to enlist people's sympathies in a cause they might otherwise reject would also be included; and we would have to consider the honest but misguided efforts of those who seek to identify the things they believe to be good with words commonly accepted as good, on the principle that noble causes merit honorific names.

It is the virtue of the books considered here* that the term "freedom" (or "liberty") is unambiguously employed. Both writers know what they mean when they use the word, and they say what they mean —without cant or humbug or recourse to esoteric terminology. It would be excessive, and in one case misleading, to say they are also both original resolutions of the problems and paradoxes of freedom; but since few works can make such a claim, we must be grateful for what we have: a pair of serious explorations into the nature and limits of freedom.

II

Two Concepts of Liberty is Isaiah Berlin's inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. His central thesis had already been set forth and admirably argued by Dorothy Fosdick some twenty years before in her book *What Is Liberty?* Berlin, I am bound to report, adds nothing of consequence that is new; and much of what he does add raises as many problems as it resolves. But he is a superb craftsman: he is in command of the issues, at home in the language, and very much aware that he is writing in the shadow of Mill's celebrated essay *On Liberty,* published just a century ago. Consequently, though he covers familiar ground, he does not always do so in familiar ways.

By negative freedom—the first of his two concepts of liberty—Berlin means, at the outset, no more than the absence of human restraint. "I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no human being interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can do what he wants." Coercion then is not one's incapacity to attain his goal but "the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I wish to act." From this it follows that the wider the area of non-interference, the wider the area of my freedom. Carried to its logical limits, this proposition implies one or both of two things: (a) that the free man is one who lives alone, for when he lives in society he inevitably collides and thus interferes with

* *Two Concepts of Liberty,* by Isaiah Berlin. The Clarendon Press. 5d ($.70). *The Limits of Freedom,* by David Fellman. Rutgers University Press. $2.75.

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other men; or (b) that the free man is one who can interfere as much as he might like with other men, for the principle of non-interference would prohibit the imposition of any restraints even upon one who would hinder the activities of another. In this latter case only the strong of course can hope to be free, and then only until the emergence of a stronger; which is hardly a desirable situation.

To avert the ensuing chaos or rule of the strongest, it is necessary therefore that some liberties be curtailed—either in the service of other goals (e.g., security, happiness, varying degrees of equality) or in the cause of certain freedoms deemed to be more valuable than others. To be free to do some things, legal or social, restraints must be imposed on those who would otherwise prevent others from doing the things men ought to be free to do. Thus we have the first and greatest paradox of freedom: *restraints restrict freedom, but without restraints there can be little or no effective freedom, at least not for most men.* The problem then is to determine which combination of liberties and restraints best assures the attainment of the good life. From the standpoint of the negative idea of liberty, we need to define at least the minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated. We must draw a line between the area of private life and that of public authority, for only in this way can we give scope to man's quest for self-realization.

But the quest for self-realization, it is often argued, is not the same thing as its achievement. For this one needs not simply freedom of choice but the wisdom to choose "rightly." Man needs knowledge both of his "self" and of the means appropriate to its realization. He needs, too, the will to act in accordance with this knowledge. But such knowledge and will, it is contended, are possessed by only a few men, not by the masses of mankind, who are too blind to see and too weak to do what is "right." If these latter are to realize their "true" selves, they must consequently be guided by those better than themselves. If necessary, they must be "forced to be free." Such coercion, since it compels them to do only what they would themselves choose to do if they were more enlightened than they are, is not "really" coercion but freedom; for it alone makes possible the achievement of their "true" selves, their "true" desires. In this sense "real" or positive freedom, far from being opposed to authority, is submission to authority. It is obedience to the right precepts, to law.

NOW THIS ARGUMENT, as Berlin properly points out, confuses two things: the proposition that I may be coerced for my own good which I am allegedly too blind to see; and the proposition that if it is my good, I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not. Because of this confusion, or manipulation of terms, it is possible for the philosophers of positive freedom to argue that a man is free even while his poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject the act of coercion, and struggle desperately against those who

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seek to impose it. It is possible to treat men as objects without wills of their own, "to use them as means for my, not their own, independently conceived ends," and by thus treating them as sub-human creatures to degrade them, to deny them their human essence. It is possible, ultimately, to assert even the barbarous doctrine that despotism, or slavery, is freedom.

But despotism, even if paternalistic, is still despotism. In fact, paternalistic despotism, as Mill and Kant rightly argued, is more oppressive than naked tyranny; for by ignoring the reason that resides in even the ordinary man, and by denying his conception of himself as a human being, as a man seeking to make his own life in accordance with his own purposes, whether these are rational or "right" or otherwise, it treats him as less than a fully independent human being. It regards him only as an instrument to another's purpose, not as an end in himself.

Because he values and would respect each man's humanity, Berlin rejects this idea of positive freedom and returns to the notion of negative freedom as an area within which no man can impose his will on another. "If I wish to preserve my liberty," he writes, "I must establish a society in which there must be some frontiers of freedom which nobody should ever be permitted to cross." "There are frontiers," he believes, "not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable"; and he defines these frontiers in terms similar to those set forth in Erich Kahler's *The Tower and the Abyss* and Erich Fromm's *The Sane Society:* as "rules so long and widely accepted that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is to be a normal human being, and, therefore, also of what it is to act inhumanly or insanely." Unlike the advocates of positive freedom, who would place authority in their own hands, Berlin argues for negative freedom, for the curbing of authority as such. He insists on the recognition of "the moral validity—irrespective of the laws—of some absolute barriers to the imposition of one man's will on another." And he asserts that "the freedom of a society, or a class or a group, in this sense of freedom, is measured by the strength of these barriers, and the number and importance of the paths which they keep open for their members—if not for all, for at any rate a great number of them."

In thus opting for a pluralism of goals, Berlin repudiates the belief in a single final solution. He holds that human values and human ideals are not all compatible, nor do they even entail one another. Consequently, the fulfilment of some of our ideals may well make impossible the fulfilment of others. "The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others." This is why such immense value is properly placed on the freedom to choose, why negative liberty is "a truer and more humane ideal" than the authoritarian structures of positive freedom. It is truer, Berlin argues, because it builds on the

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fact that human goals are many and in perpetual rivalry with one another, and since often incommensurable they cannot be graded according to some mathematical scale. It is more humane because it does not deprive men of what is indispensable to their lives as human beings. To respect the fundamental needs of men, we must learn, with Kant, "the truth that out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made." To ignore this truth is but to manifest one's moral and political immaturity.

No one can gainsay the sincerity, even nobility, of Berlin's plea for individual freedom. With Mill, he seeks to establish the permissible limits of social and political coercion over a person or group of persons. But unlike Mill, he seeks to draw the line not at the point where the activities of one man directly or significantly hinder or affect the activities of another; for he concedes that everything that one does may have results which will harm other human beings. He draws the line, instead, at that point where the denial of privacy, or of personal rights, is calculated to prevent the individual from living as a man, as an autonomous human being.

This is persuasive doctrine, and much can be said in its defense. But it is not altogether convincing, for Berlin concedes, too, that no man can be completely autonomous, and that "no society literally suppresses all the liberties of its members." If this is so, the issue is not properly posed as a conflict between the negative and positive concepts of liberty, between an area of freedom and an area of constraint. Human life and human activities are not divisible in such compartmentalized terms. It must rather be stated as the determination of which complex of particular liberties and concomitant restraints is most likely to promote those values that, in Berlin's theory, are distinctively human. But since men differ as much in their conception of what constitutes human nature as Berlin admits they differ in their conception of human goals, it requires too a determination of the nature of man that transcends what he calls "long and widely accepted" rules.

Moreover, to say that there are frontiers of freedom "not artificially drawn" is but another way of saying that there are "natural" limits to social and political regulation. But it is precisely these "natural" limits that need to be demonstrated. In fact, by eschewing the doctrine of natural right and arguing instead for the relative as against the absolute validity of his convictions, Berlin must ultimately fall back on a concept of humanism and on a defense of freedom essentially akin to Mill's. This is not, of course, a bad place on which to rest one's argument, but it is considerably short of Berlin's pretensions. It leaves open, too, the crucial questions: who is to determine the proper limits of the exercise of public authority—the individual himself or society or a dominant group (be it majority or minority) within that society? And if such limits are not to be determined by the individual, what is he to do when in his (or Berlin's) judgment the legitimate frontiers of his freedom are violated?

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III

To the first of these questions Professor David Fellman of the University of Wisconsin addresses himself in his brief but sensible book, *The Limits of Freedom*. Fellman is concerned not with philosophic speculation about the many and diverse ideas of freedom, for he recognizes at the outset that liberties in society necessarily jostle each other and thus require choices to be made. He deals, more narrowly but not less importantly, with political principles and legal practices in the American democracy, which is constitutionally committed to the preservation of at least *some* freedoms. Among these are three which he makes the focus of his discussion: religious freedom, the freedom to communicate, and the freedom to talk politics. In each case Fellman carefully shows that despite the constitutional wording surrounding these freedoms, wording which would seem to throw a blanket protection against legislative infringement on any of them, the realities of political life have compelled a more or less rather than an either/or approach to their practical implementation. This, he holds, is not only inevitable; it is also desirable, "for the only freedom we can possibly live with is one in which an equilibrium is found between competing interests, all of which carry great validity taken singly." But once it is recognized that no freedoms are absolute, that even those freedoms essential to democracy can and indeed must be limited to some degree, we require a standard in terms of which that determination is properly to be made. The quest for this standard, Fellman shows, carries us away from the Constitution to that body which, in the American system of government, has the decisive say as to what the Constitution means—the Supreme Court. Thus his study of the limits of freedom, and of the principles appropriate to their determination, is a study of democratic theory and judicial practice, and of their interrelatedness.

With respect to democratic theory, Fellman says little that is new; but the few pages devoted to this subject constitute as admirable a statement of the meaning and free speech implications of democracy as can be found in the literature. He correctly reminds us that "democracy is not so much concerned with correct answers as it is with a methodology for reaching essentially tentative decisions in a workaday world." He dwells appropriately on the importance to this method of the freedom to differ—in thought, in speech, and in political activity. And he emphasizes above all the often neglected fact that a free society is inescapably a noisy and disorderly one, and hence psychically disquieting to those "to whom relaxation is man's supreme achievement." But if the right to be disagreeable, to bicker, and to be contentious is one of the hallmarks of a democratic state, by what standard may this right be limited? Here Fellman reverts to the work of the Court, for it is the business of the judiciary to apply general principles to concrete situations. And what is most striking is the fact that the standard of the Court is not a precise formula, nor the words employed to translate the Court's judgment into an opinion, but what Fellman calls

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"the judicial feel for a situation" and the "necessarily vague" rule of reason. What governs the judges, he believes, is their reaction to the concrete facts of each particular situation, their "feeling" that Congress has or has not acted unreasonably, or that there is or is not a clear and present danger to the safety of the state sufficiently acute and urgent to justify a restriction on speech. But the rationale supporting their decision, he thinks, is both a product of and an appeal to reason. Moreover, the judges are deeply conditioned by membership in an institution bound by traditions and committed to constitutional principles. Hence, he concludes, the standard of reasonableness, which in any case cannot be defined in the abstract with any precision, is not as arbitrary as it might otherwise seem.

It is unfair, perhaps, to demand of an author that he deal with issues he has not himself posed in his book; yet, without a consideration of certain relevant and pressing questions, Fellman's study is of limited value. It remains but an exposition of contemporary American constitutional law and not what the perceptiveness of the author might lead us to expect: an exposition as preliminary to serious theoretical inquiry. It is clear, for example, that Fellman values democratic principles and wants the law to adhere to them. But he does not confront the question whether the law as it has been and now is, does in fact conform to those principles. If it does, no change is signified or called for. But if it does not, we need to know what changes are required and how these are likely to be achieved.

It is clear, too, that while Fellman recognizes the fallibility of the judges, he values the role of the Court in our political system. But in his account of the evolution of our constitutional law he does not ask why the Court has acted as it variously, and not always consistently, did. He does not inquire into the economic and political interests represented, or at least reflected, by individual judges. Has it made no difference to the content of liberty, for example, that the vast bulk of our Supreme Court justices between the Civil War and the New Deal came from the ranks of corporation lawyers? Nor, again, does Fellman face up to the old but still decisive query: is the American practice of judicial review consistent with the principle of democracy? Does the Court not in fact constitute an aristocracy of the robe, performing a legislative function, yet without responsibility to the people? And if this is so, why should the Court have the final say as to what is reasonable or not? It is one thing to argue that this is the way things are, and that they are not likely to be altered soon. But if it is truly the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into or perpetuating error, and not the reverse, we ought never to ignore, or cease to protest against, so important an institutional obstacle to the performance of this democratic function.

IV

A final word may be permitted me on the general debate over the nature and limits of freedom. As one surveys the literature,

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the most striking single fact that emerges is that men mean by freedom a variety of things. Hence the conflict between them is often, though not of course always, more verbal than real. They talk past each other rather than to each other. They exchange soliloquies rather than ideas. If men are to debate the problems of freedom seriously, they need therefore to agree first on a common meaning of the term. But despite the regularity with which such a plea is made, they persist in a refusal to do so. For most commonly, they want not merely a definition of freedom but a definition that will identify freedom with other things, things they conceive to be good—e.g., reason or duty or power. They thereby confuse the actual issue, which in the real world always arises from the fact that different men want not freedom as such but different and sometimes conflicting freedoms.

Where it is possible for men to pursue or to practice different things or beliefs in such a way that the practice of one does not militate against the practice of another, we have, in general, a prima facie case for allowing them to do so. But since this is not always possible, especially for example in the economic sphere, the issue of freedom becomes the reconciliation or accommodation of these different claims to particular freedoms. Moreover, not all freedoms are equally desired, and some men desire some things even more than they desire freedom. We need, therefore, in addition to a meaningful definition of freedom, a standard of value in terms of which we can order and adjust these conflicting claims. But there is no more agreement on such a standard than there is on the meaning of freedom itself. For Berlin, this standard is the idea of a common human identity. For Fellman, it is the principle of democracy. For others it is God's will, or nature, or tradition, or some other subjective or allegedly objective criterion. We are thus driven back from the issue of freedom to the question of *how* we are to decide the issue of freedom. And here again we find a division, most broadly between those who look to democracy as the proper mechanism for the negotiation and resolution of this conflict and those who prefer some aristocratic or authoritarian alternative.

From all this it follows that the idea of freedom will continue to evoke, and to provoke, disagreement. This is why freedom is disturbing to some men and appealing to others. What distinguishes the essays we have examined here is their recognition of this vital fact and their willingness, despite their own clear commitments, to tolerate, even to encourage, the free competition of ideas, including the idea of freedom itself.

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FRANCE: A NATION IN AGONY

Paul Parisot

The French Left has finally returned to political action. On October 27, 1960, summoned by the National Union of French Students and joined by the independent unions—*Force Ouvrière,* the French Confederation of Christian Workers and the autonomous teachers unions—20,000 to 25,000 Parisians demonstrated for Algerian peace and the defense of civil liberties.

In size it was not an imposing affair. However, a completely novel event occurred in the *Salle de la Mutualité* at the edge of the Latin Quarter: for the first time the Gaullist government was forced to allow a leftist demonstration against its policies. The Communists tried to take over; then, realizing that they could not do so, boycotted the demonstration. The police began by banning the meeting and then, when the organizers threatened to hold it anyway, finally authorized a meeting in a hall seating scarcely 3,000 people.

First to ban, then to permit: that is typical of the Gaullist government which gives ground whenever it encounters a force determined to resist it. But this was the first time since the existence of the Fifth Republic that the regime drew back before the Left.

The hall was packed. Outside, an immense crowd milled about peaceably. At least three-fourths of those present were of the younger generation of French intellectuals. The speeches had little in common with traditional French rhetoric: no ready-made formulas, no lyric flights, no pathos. A dryness, a purposefulness, an exactness which were a revelation to one who has long been active in French politics.

THIS NEW SITUATION was set off by a manifesto which by now would already have been forgotten if the government had not decided to prosecute its signers. One hundred and twenty-one intellectuals asserted that they "respected and took to be justified: 1) the refusal to bear arms against the Algerians; 2) the conduct of those French who believe it their duty to aid and protect the oppressed Algerians in the name of the French people." They added, "The cause of the Algerian people, which contributes decisively to the ruin of the colonial system, is the cause of all free men." This statement cannot be understood unless one recalls that it was drafted in September, just after the opening of the trial of a "network aiding the FLN," directed by Francis Jeanson, a disciple of Jean-Paul Sartre and a refugee first in Switzerland, then in Italy, who was sentenced in absentia to ten years.

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This demonstration of sympathy toward the accused in the Jeanson trial was the work of a small number of intellectuals. They hoped for the victory of the FLN, although not all of them accept the politics of the FLN. In the case of several signers there was a distinct bravado toward the government. With others, there was a feeling that if certain repressive French agencies in Algeria could enjoy impunity for their terroristic crimes, then other Frenchmen should be free to refuse service in the war.

An example of this last attitude is that of Professor Laurent Schwartz, a foremost French mathematician, professor at the *École Polytechnique,* and in a fair way to becoming in France what Robert Oppenheimer has become in America. In his letter to the Minister of the Armed Forces, who had deprived him of his post at the *Polytechnique* (the highest French military school), he wrote: "If I have signed the Declaration of the 121, it is partly because, for several years now, I have seen torture go unpunished and torturers rewarded. My student Maurice Audin was murdered in June 1957; and it is you, sir, who signed the promotion of Captain Charbonnier to Officer of the Legion of Honor as an exceptional case, and that of Commandant Faulques to Commander of the Legion of Honor (I repeat: honor)." The *Comité Maurice Audin* considers these two officers to be responsible for the death of the young mathematician.

There is another issue in regard to this statement: the solidarity it expressed with Francis Jeanson and the few Frenchmen who have taken up the cause of the FLN. Jean-Paul Sartre expressed this attitude in a letter addressed to the tribunal judging the "Jeanson network": "The Algerian War has corrupted the nation. The progressive whittling down of freedom, the disappearance of political life, the increasing spread of torture, the permanent insurrection of military power against civil rule, mark an evolution which can without exaggeration be termed fascist. The Left is powerless in the face of this evolution, and it will remain so if it does not decide to unite its efforts behind the sole force which truly struggles today against the common enemy of Algerian and French liberty. That force is the FLN."

Some French intellectuals have thus become convinced that, in Sartre's words, "the French who help the FLN . . . work for the restoration of true democracy in France." But is not this position an expression of political despair? For it is clear that even an FLN victory in Algeria provides no assurance of the health of French democracy. The view of Sartre and his friends reflects a feeling of powerlessness in the French Left, especially as concerns the Algerian problem. And for that matter, the measures taken by the government against the signers of the manifesto also reflect a feeling that there is no way out of the Algerian impasse.

IT WAS A SIGN OF PANIC when the government decided to accuse several of the best-known French intellectuals of "instigating military disobedience." Some punitive measures were soon taken. About ten professors have been suspended and dismissed. Those of the "121" who have radio and television licenses (entirely under state control) had them revoked. No actor can play in a subsidized theater (and they are numerous) if he is among the new excommunicants. An even more farcical decision: neither radio nor

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television may now mention the name of Sartre or the other heretics, unless it be in connection with reports of the trial. Let us note, for the record, that one of the ministers who signed these decrees, André Malraux, finds his own daughter, Florence Malraux, and his first wife, the novelist Clara Malraux, among the signers of the "manifesto of the 121."

No sooner were these repressions begun, than the government retreated. It decided to limit the accusations to the "authors" of the manifesto; for some mysterious reason those who had simply signed were no longer culpable. Reinstatements of teachers were also announced. The Government dropped the idea of striking the heretics' names off the rolls of the Order of the Legion of Honor, for then it would have been necessary to degrade certain men whose decorations had been earned by illustrious activity during the Resistance. And then, even Pierre Lazareff, director of the Association of Television Producers and head of *France-Soir*, France's largest newspaper, had to visit the Minister of Information to explain that it was impossible to present interesting programs and still comply with the government's actions!

Most important of all, however, the episode has awakened the intellectuals, the students and the liberal Left. It now seems possible to revitalize the Left, on the basis of two fundamental issues: peace in Algeria and the defense of freedom at home.

These issues are closely related. If the Algerian War continues, the Left will have to fight to keep the Gaullist regime from taking on a more and more reactionary form. And Gaullism itself will run the risk of being overthrown by a military plot.

The internal French situation is decaying—the repression directed against the intellectuals is a sypmtom of this decay. And one reason is that de Gaulle has not followed up his victory over the mob in Algiers by forcing the Army to carry out his policy summed up in the slogan of "self-determination." Ever since de Gaulle put forward this formula, the French Army's mission in Algeria has in effect been terminated. There is only one problem left: arranging a peace.

AT THIS POINT, it seems, de Gaulle committed an error of judgment. At first, he probably believed that he need merely promise self-determination. Were not the nationalists fighting to obtain this very right? It was granted them. From that day on, the war fought in the mountains by the guerrillas became in his view useless, illogical, senseless; its continuation could only be the act of some fanatics or agents of foreign powers.

Unfortunately, this reasoning takes no account of the experience of all those who have chosen to rebel, or even that of almost all the Algerian Moslems who hope that their country can be freed without the domination of the FLN. All have had the experience of oppression: the daily experience of racist contempt, the experience of never having had free elections in Algeria. Each Moslem believes that no matter what else happens, he will be tricked and persecuted if he must continue to deal with the civilian or military French.

During November de Gaulle again tried to cope with the insoluble Algerian problem. For the first time he spoke of an "Algerian Republic." He explicitly promised that Algeria will have "its own government, its

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own institutions and its own laws." He announced his intention to "have direct recourse to the country by means of a referendum." He even threatened to make use of the dictatorial powers foreseen in the constitution in case of grave peril.

Thus the president of France reached exactly the same point that the leaders of the Fourth Republic had: a trial of strength with the civil and military supporters of "French Algeria." But the difference between now and Spring 1958 is appreciable. De Gaulle has clearly formulated the objectives of his policy (self-determination, government of Algeria by Algerians); he also disposes of constitutional means which the preceding governments lacked.

After his speech of November 4, 1960, one wondered whether de Gaulle, as he had so often done in the past, would be content with having spoken or whether he would act. He *has* begun to act, although one cannot say whether the decisions taken will be negated by future hesitations.

Up to November 4, 1960, de Gaulle offered three possibilities to the Algerians, promising that they could make their own choice.

•*Integration:* that is, the "French Algeria" solution proposed by the *colons.*

•*Association with France:* that is, the "Algerian Algeria" solution supported by de Gaulle.

•*Secession:* the FLN program, and in this case de Gaulle threatened the Algerians with the split of their country, with France continuing to hold a section of it.

The first possibility, integration, has now been eliminated. There remains only a choice between association with France and secession. The problem being posed in this way, there seems no solution for the liberal French Left other than to support de Gaulle, but with two reservations. First, a referendum on a provisional statute will still not settle a thing in Algeria. It will serve only to intimidate the *colons* adventurers. If Algeria is given an autonomy fabricated in France, the leaders of de Gaulle's "Algerian Algeria" will out of necessity have to seek the support of the population and may end up with the very secession they want to avoid. No lasting solution is possible which does not receive the support of the bulk of the Moslem population of Algeria.

Second reservation: if de Gaulle's new program for Algeria constitutes a step forward, the January referendum is nonetheless only a symbolic appeal to the people. For de Gaulle, such a popular consultation serves to confirm the plebiscitary character of his regime. Founded solely upon the General's person, it possesses no legitimate successor. The Gaullist regime appears incapable of carrying out its decisions without having recourse each time to that parody of democracy known as the referendum. This view was formulated more than two years ago by those of the liberal Left who voted "no" to the installation of the Fifth Republic. It has been fully confirmed.

DESPITE THESE RESERVATIONS, it is impossible to lose sight of the real problem. When all is said and done, that problem is not Algeria but France. Algeria will end up independent, and that quite soon. But France runs the risk of losing its freedoms, and succumbing to a military dictatorship or an authoritarian regime based upon the army.

At present, de Gaulle deals with

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the Army as one power with another. He is doing his utmost to convince it to be loyal to him. Now and then he transfers army leaders who seem dangerous and replaces them with others who seem more obedient. But at no point has he used the language of a commander-in-chief toward the Army—apparently because he knows this language will neither be understood nor obeyed. Until it is made to understand and obey, France remains in peril.

Translated by JAMES ATKINSON

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AN EXEMPLARY LIFE

At about 7:30 on the evening of June 27, 1960, in a tiny book-crammed lodging of a workers' suburb of Paris, Pierre Monatte died. He was seventy-nine years old.

Monatte entered the union movement in 1902, having been attracted to it by reading Fernand Pelloutier's *l'Histoire des Bourses du Travail.* The son of a lacemaker and a blacksmith in a small mountain town, he had been a scholarship student at the Brioude *collège.* Reading Hugo's *Les Miserables* had, since adolescence, oriented him toward socialism.

In Paris he met Charles Guiyesse, at that time publisher of the review *Pages Libres,* and in this environment he came to know Pelloutier, Sorel, Merrheim, and Broutcheux. In 1904, he sat on the committee of the *Labor Exchanges,* then at Lens he edited *L'Action Syndicale,* the weekly paper of the newly organized miners' union. He became a proofreader and joined the *Fédération du livre,* remaining a member until his death.

Monatte was well acquainted with prison: during the great miners' strike in March-April 1906 triggered by the catastrophe of Courrières (1200 victims), an enraged government accused him of participation in a fantastic and totally imaginary plot. But the accusation did not stick, and Monatte was freed. The same year he participated in the Congress of Amiens, out of which came the charter for the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT). In 1908 he stayed in Switzerland to escape the prosecution to which he, and all the other directors of the CGT, were subjected for their union activities. 1909 found Monatte editing *La Révolution,* an ephemeral labor daily, which lasted only forty days. Next, he established the *Vie Ouvrière,* his greatest success. This magazine, which he directed until 1921, constitutes a precious source concerning the working-class movement.

When World War I was declared, Pierre Monatte, resigned from the central committee of the CGT, protesting againt the adherence of the top leaders to the *Union Sacrée* (National Unity). This action kept him in the trenches during the whole war, while many "leading" workers, tranquilly set up in government offices, proclaimed their patriotism and their willingness to pursue the total destruction of the enemy. Upon his discharge Monatte participated in all the workers' struggles which followed the armistice; and for this he was again imprisoned during the 1920 railroad workers' strike. Romain Rolland testified at the trial, and took the oportunity to pay Monatte this homage: "I regard Monatte as one of the most honest persons I have ever met," he said. "Completely loyal and absolutely sincere, he is one of those very rare men who act as they speak, and who speak as they think. His mind is deliberate, scrupulous, perfectly balanced; yet it goes to the very end of an idea, never recoiling before the truth." Once again, Monatte was acquitted.

He enthusiastically hailed the Rus-

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sian Revolution, many of whose leaders he had known personally during their years of exile in Paris. But he was one of the first to combat Stalinism, claiming freedom of speech within the party from which he was expelled in 1924. Then, in 1925, he founded *Révolution Prolétarienne* in order to continue his agitation for trade union independence and unity. *Révolution Prolétarienne* still appears, and takes its stand today with the same courage and lucidity.

IT WOULD BE HARD to say too much of the exemplary character of Monatte's life. Up to the age of seventy-one, he worked as a proofreader. A born journalist, he always refused to make a career of journalism. By virtue of his self-effacement, Monatte's life furnishes an extraordinarily valuable model. He was not content to preach his doctrine; he lived it. He exercised an influence over several generations of militants so great that its extent and depth has not yet been finally determined. In our hyperorganized society where gigantic administrations burgeon with headquarters, equipment, and are furnished with secretaries and astronomical budgets, he has shown how a solitary man lacking power could, by virtue of intelligence, honesty and unostentatious devotion to an ideal, act more effectively upon man's spirit than all the mindless machines. The reason is that "direct contagion through contact has much more effect than through a book. You read the book, take it up and put it down, you don't abandon yourself to it. On the other hand, direct human contact takes hold of the spirit and assimilates it." This statement of Blanqui became the principle of Monatte's life during his last years. He was an awakener of vocation. Perhaps because of his profound humanity, his absence of dogmatism, he left behind him something better and greater than his considerable written work: disciples. For he gave to all who approached him the example and presentiment of what human relations could be.

PIERRE AUBERY
Paris

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BOOKS

Thwarting the Young

GROWING UP ABSURD, by Paul Goodman. Random House. 296 pp. $4.50.

In the notices it has received thus far, Paul Goodman's remarkable book, *Growing Up Absurd,* has not been done the decency of a summary. My main intention in this review is to provide, in virtually outline form, a statement of its contents; often, because of the profusion of thought and observation in the book, my outline will be at best a sampling.

At the outset Goodman, with a few abstract strokes, sketches an ideal picture of what the lives of young people should be like, how, in general, they should be growing up. In his words, their behavior ought to be expressive of "force, grace, discrimination, intellect and feeling." Throughout the book, in an unfailing tone of urgency, with lively analyses and abundant examples, Goodman shows why our young often fall disastrously short of this ideal, how our society thwarts their capacities, and causes their increasing disaffection.

He begins with a "simple objective factor which is not much mentioned"—the lack of worthy jobs in our economy, worthy by the criteria of unquestionable utility, exercise of human potentialities, and honor. In this connection, the crucial question Goodman puts is: "What does it mean to grow up in the fact that during one's productive years one will spend eight hours a day doing what is no good?" This question, though it is articulated only by a fraction of the young, must at least be dimly felt by many of them. The significance of it is the extent to which it explains how cynicism, indifference, resignation and disaffection have become the main attitudes of many young persons. While Goodman offers it as only a simple and partial explanation, it helps correct the imbalance of most studies of delinquency and conformity, their absorption in primary and small group psychology.

The first chapter of *Growing Up Absurd* is titled, "Jobs." The second, appropriately, bears the heading, "Being Taken Seriously"; here Goodman examines how public authorities and spokesmen address themselves to the spectacular problem of juvenile delinquency. Of course the public spokesmen blink at gross needs like that of a future which contains the likelihood of a meaningful job. At their best, the authorities are all too similar to academics who in their unwillingness to contemplate a disturbance of the status quo, either endlessly ring variations on the psychology of homes and gangs or exhaust themselves in a genuine but narrow passion over slums and discrimination. At their frequent worst, the public authorities invoke more strenuous policing and jails that are called by various other names.

Growing Up Absurd is chiefly about the diverse ways in which youth's appetites and capacities are balked

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and wasted *throughout* our society. Consequently, it includes essays on the class and status structure of mid-twentieth century America, and the effects of that structure on the aptitude and abilities of the young who grow up within it. The class and status distinctions to be drawn, as Goodman envisages them, are fundamentally both economic and cultural. His classes are: first, a minority poor, second, the organized system, including the three statuses of workers, organization men, and managers, and, finally, a third class of "independents." The third class contains "those who do not properly belong to the system and are not yet submerged into the poor" outside "of society . . ." (I doubt that Goodman's class of independents is a serious sociological category.) The striking general fact that Goodman particularizes is the fostering of *ineptitude* among the young in the several classes and statuses. For both the urban poor and not-so-poor, ". . . concealed technology, family mobility, loss of the country, loss of neighborhood tradition, and eating up of the play space have taken away the real environment," the ground and occasions for the development of aptitude.

Much of this has often been noticed; more rarely observed is the impact of the ignorance and helplessness of adults who grow less acquainted with the machinery and materials they use both at home and at work. Along with the shrinking environment and the lack of examples of skills go the familiar inadequacies of our educational system and the complexity and abstractness of social relationships. As a result, "Who is responsible for what?" and "In what do his responsibilities consist?" become largely mysterious questions. Thus, in Goodman's words, "The sense of initiative, causality, skill has been discouraged." In their stead, in place of the fostering of aptitude, the young of all classes are encouraged in role playing and "belonging."

Goodman's criticisms, some old, some new, of the situations of youth in our society, are invariably expressed with perception and feeling. However, *Growing Up Absurd* is not merely a catalogue of diverse ways in which America fails its young; Goodman's sketches of the predicaments of American youth are parts of a synoptic and deeply critical vision of our society as a whole. The outlines of his comprehensive picture become clear in the chapters of the book which deal with community, sexuality, and the sense of leading a meaningful or justified existence. It is the deprivation and confusion of the young in these regards which, together with the lack of serious vocational opportunities and the discouragement of aptitude, makes their over-all situation one that approaches crisis. The manifestations of that near-crisis are delinquency, the beats, and a conformity both apathetic and cynical.

In the chapters on community, sex, and a meaningful life, Goodman treats of the American lack of morale and of America's problematic mores. In speaking of community, his main concern is the feelings of the young—or the lack thereof—about their nation and communities; his topic is the conditions which discourage their sentiments of pride of place and patriotism. Goodman's reflections on patriotism constitute a notable act of recovery. Appeals to sentiments of place and country have long fallen into desuetude; Goodman's account, utterly without cant or jingoism, of the importance of allegiance for the young is compelling; it goes hand in

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hand with his insistence that we must *deserve* their allegiance.

IN REGARD TO THE PROBLEMS of sexuality and youth, the main thesis Goodman propounds is undeniable: "There are class differences; but through all classes, it is hard to grow up when the general social attitude toward sexuality is inconsistent and unpredictable." Likewise undeniable is his main contention about leading a meaningful life: "Balked, not taken seriously, deprived of great objects and available opportunities, and in an atmosphere that does not encourage service—it is hard to have faith, to feel justified, to have a calling, or win honor." Having drawn the broad outlines of his critical vision of mid-twentieth century American life, Goodman offers as an imaginative representation of it, "An apparently closed room in which there is a large rat race as the dominant center of attention," and goes on to consider the human relations possible in such a place. His rat race model of human relations in our society is avowedly caricature; but like superior caricature, revealing. Among the original observations it puts in bold emphasis is that of the similarity between middle status organization men and the members of delinquent gangs: "Morally, both groups are conformist, one-upping, and cynical, protect their 'masculinity', conceal their worthlessness, and denigrate the earnest boys."

The most detailed discussions in *Growing Up Absurd* are its analysis of the Beat generation and the so-called "juvenile delinquent sub-culture." Only in the chapter on the Beats is there a relaxation of the tone of urgency which pervades the book. Here Goodman examines in a tender and even entertaining—though hardly light—way the sole recent development in the life of the American young that appears to him valuable. He titles the chapter, "The Early Resigned," pointing out that the word "Angry" in "Angry Young Men" is a misnomer for "bitter and waspish," whereas "Beat" is accurate, meaning "defeated and resigned." The gist of what he finds admirable and regrettable about the Beats is expressed in his remark that they ". . . have resigned from the organized system of production and sales and its culture, and yet are too hip to be attracted to independent work." Goodman shows that the Beat sub-culture furnishes evidence for the claim that "People can go it on their own, without resentment, hostility, delinquency, or stupidity, better than when they move in the organized system and are subject to authority." He adds: "To be sure, the Beats were not among the underprivileged to begin with; they had some useful education and their poverty is in part voluntary; but these are not circumstances unavailable to others. The Beats do not go far, they invite degeneration, they seem hard put to assume responsibility; but they do exist interestingly and peacefully."

GOODMAN'S SHORT ESSAY on the origin, values and limitations of the Beat subculture warrants the epithet "definitive" by contrast to Lawrence Lipton's full-length romantic version in *The Holy Barbarians*. The main feature of Beat life of which Goodman is critical is the hipsterism that colors many of the Beat attitudes, pervading their defensive ignorance, their confusion of art and modest creative expression, their attempts at heightening experience, and, of course, their jargon.

To the proliferating literature on

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juvenile delinquency, Goodman makes a salutary addition. Noteworthy is his emphasis on the distinction between "Delinquent Behavior as doing-the-forbidden-and-even-defiant and Delinquent Behavior in-order-to-get-caught." Recognizing, with a number of students of the subject, that the term "juvenile delinquency" is hopelessly confused, Goodman refrains from playing the arbitrary and idle game of determining *a* concept of delinquency. Instead, he proposes ". . . a series of possible punishable relations obtaining between the boy struggling for life and trying to grow up, and the society that he cannot accept and that lacks objective opportunities for him." He then proceeds to analyze six distinct stages in the series. In the more aggravated stages, fatalistic attitudes become prominent; as he says, "The delinquent fatalism is the feeling of no chance in the past, no prospect in the future, no recourse in the present; whence the drive to disaster." For those who may find this description dramatically exaggerated, a study of records of interviews and individual histories will provide sufficient gloomy confirmation.

THE CONCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL chapter of *Growing Up Absurd* is called "The Missing Community"; its thesis is that ". . . the missed revolutions of modern times—the fallings-short and the compromises—add up to the conditions that make it hard for the young to grow up in our society." After assessing the incomplete and lost revolutions, Goodman offers some dozen realizable but difficult proposals for achieving communities and a country in which fewer of the young would grow up askew. Most of his proposals represent, broadly speaking, a rational extension of already instituted welfare provisions—an extension according to humane standards. The proposals should be pondered despite the cost they would entail, an annual expenditure, it may be hazarded, comparable to the portion of the gross national product wagered each year in advertising and gambling, and certainly as recoverable.

I will close by noting what seem to me a few faults in Goodman's extraordinary book. The introduction is marred by a sketchy excursus in philosophical anthropology; the reflections it contains on human nature will only tantalize those seriously interested in the topic and may, to their loss, repel some readers. If only because of their brevity, Goodman's remarks on the question, What is Man?,

Don't Believe Us, Listen to Them!

"As a people we seem to be moving more deeply into a sensate culture. There is an excessive preoccupation with material security at the expense of spiritual well-being. Uniformity of thought and supine loyalty to the organization, whether it be the industrial corporation, the labor union, or the political party, are too often encouraged and rewarded. The organizational man, cloaked in a sort of anonymity, rather than the responsible individual, is favored and advanced. The preparation for this condition is found even in the field of education, where emphasis is placed on adapting oneself to the thinking of the group. This pattern is so prevalent that some psychologists consider juvenile delinquency as a revolt, just for the sake of rebellion, against a stifling uniformity that fails to challenge the individuality of the student."
—Statement of Roman Catholic Bishops of the U.S., November 20, 1960.

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appear dogmatic and unnecessary for what follows them.

In the past, Goodman's writing has sometimes been blotted by self-indulgence; one passage in *Growing Up Absurd* seems to me especially open to this charge, a place where he makes an interesting comparison between the masculinity-proving ideal of Hemingway's heroes, the implicit resignation of Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha, and the idealism of the characters in his own tetralogy, *The Empire City*. The comparison is not enabled by his saying that Hemingway "is a pretty good writer," and reiterating the same words about Faulkner.

Finally, some readers may feel that one or two apt anecdotes Goodman relates, and in which he figures, are sentimentally self-indulgent. I, to the contrary, find them expressive tokens of the authentic passion that animates the book's pages. DAVID SACHS

A Compassionate View

THE BEAT OF LIFE, by Barbara Probst Solomon. Lippincott & Co. 222 pp. $3.95.

With sympathy and honesty, Barbara Probst Solomon has written a book about her own generation. In *The Beat of Life* the "beat" and the "silent" young are not being ruthlessly parodied, or attacked by older intellectuals who have never shared their problems. There are no accusations of apathy and aimlessness here, nor will Mrs. Solomon's contemporaries have to listen with embarrassment as they are blamed for living badly in a rotten world. Instead the conditions of that world, and what they do to two young lives, are set before us in a deliberately uncomplicated story whose purpose is to describe and understand *before* criticizing. This attempt alone would make the novel unique, but the fact that the writer succeeds in understanding and in maintaining a compassionate tone throughout, makes it a great pleasure to read.

Timothy Lanahan and Natasha Thompson, the hero and heroine, live out their hapless love affair almost in hiding, asking nothing of a world so distant from their own concerns that it seems to demand nothing of them. One might say that they are "free"—but only in a totally negative sense of the word. They are free from family life, from parental authority, from traditions of any sort, from material want, perhaps even from moral imperatives. It is the sort of freedom one has when the only life possible is utterly formless. Natasha and Tim seem to live only destructively; their child is efficiently aborted; they avoid getting married; Natasha's suicide is an apallingly thoughtless one; and Tim's endurance of her death is mechanical.

The result of their isolation is that Natasha and Tim no longer seem to possess that desire to involve themselves with other people which forms part of what we call loneliness. They have left home not because they wished to find a more congenial world, but only to hide out in a more neutral one. The Puerto Rican upper West Side is so foreign to them that they never consider participating in

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its life. The life of the poor is exotic, strange, a spectacle rather than a reality. Tim admits that they are vicariously "feeding on" the sadness and the shabbiness of someone else's existence. But the author has subtly shown that not even their vicarious appetites are very avid. Gone is the delight of the middle-class college graduate who escapes from a small town to Greenwich Village or to a Lower East Side slum. These young people are far too conscious that "Neither of [them] has been poor, is poor, or probably ever will be poor."

In fact, Tim thinks that his generation can have the "good things" only by pretending, by imitating something foreign to it. The exciting ages all seem to be past. Everything from jazz to the political enthusiasm of the '30's and the patriotism of World War II belongs to other generations. And Tim feels crushed by a kind of historical isolation from these earlier ages which he envies pitifully.

MRS. SOLOMON HAS MADE this feeling of deprivation fully comprehensible as the result of a long chain of disconnections. And Tim and Natasha have absolutely no sense of the kind of willful effort men can make in order to possess a part of the past, and to create a legitimate sense of continuity between their own experience and other people's. The lack of a world-view (of an ideology, of a politics), dependent as it is upon their personal experience, reflects back upon that experience, eventually destroying life itself.

Why, the older radical may wonder, should we, should the author, sympathize with such fainthearted, energyless young people? The reasons (if one does not instinctively feel them) are all convincingly spelled out in this novel: because they try to be honest with themselves; because they are genuinely bewildered; because they are inexperienced at fighting even bewilderment; and because they fail where those who are more experienced also have failed. And also because the "parent" generation, especially its socialists, owes the young something more than permissiveness and the blame which always follows it; something more generous than an unseeing disgust.

JUDITH B. WALZER

Coming in the Spring:

Some Fallacies About the Unions
by DAVID CARPER (with comments by WILL HERBERG and HERMAN BENSON)

The Economic Development and Political Stability of India
by BERT F. HOSELITZ and MYRON WEINER

Are the Workers Middle Class?
by S. M. MILLER and FRANK RIESSMAN

Return to India—Part II
by STANLEY PLASTRIK

The Culture of the New Suburbia
by JOSEPH BENSMAN and BERNARD ROSENBERG

The Mergers in Publishing
by STEPHEN ZOLL

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Miscellany

California's Death Penalty Fight

Frank Harper

THE RECENT FAILURE to abolish the death penalty in California by initiative petition reveals something about liberal politics today.

In February 1960, there seemed to be an excellent chance of repealing the state's capital punishment law. Governor Edmund Brown had just reprieved Caryl Chessman for sixty days. People all over the world were demanding that Chessman be freed; the question of capital punishment was in the air. Newspapers, magazines and television stations, particularly in California, were carrying discussions about the issue. It was being argued on buses, in the office, over coffee, at luncheons, even at Rotary Club meetings.

In this atmosphere of controversy, George T. Davis, one of Chessman's attorneys, a group of University of California professors, and some prominent abolitionists began consideration of the immensely formidable task of collecting the signatures of 450,000 registered voters on petitions to put the question of the death penalty on the November ballot. Davis set up The People Against Capital Punishment, Inc., and asked the professors to start organizing. But the academic mind is often hesitant and indecisive, and the professors were slow in agreeing to plans of action. By state law, the signatures had to be gotten and validated by June 20 if the issue was to go on the ballot. In light of the pressing time factor, a group of people from the Monterey Peninsula, most of whom had never mixed in politics before, started on their own. They drew up a petition, filed the necessary $200 with the attorney general, printed thousands of petitions at their own expense, and began circulating them.

Under the leadership of Richard Drinnon and Christian Bay, the professors and the Bay Area committee got going in March. They discovered that, according to law, the Monterey petition was the only one allowed in the field and that there were questions about the legality of its wording. However, civil liberties attorney Francis Heisler argued that a judge wouldn't rule against the obvious wishes of 450,000 people who had signed in good faith. The wording, Heisler said in a widely circulated letter, did not misrepresent the intent of the petition and he pointed to previous cases in which judges held petitions legal if there was no misrepresentation.

When I came into the campaign in March at the request of Fritjof Thygeson, a socialist and an A.F. of L. organizer in the Bay Area who two years before had run for the U.S. Senate, there already existed scores of anti-death penalty groups. They seemed to be waiting for us, wanting to do something but not knowing how or what to do. The petition, it appeared, was their answer.

ACTION CAME FAST that first month. In San Diego County, within two weeks, an apartment was donated for use as an office, a sponsor guaranteed that the telephone bill would be paid if we couldn't meet it, we had five mimeograph machines, a printing press and paper at our disposal. We were getting phone calls from fifteen to twenty people a day who wanted

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to help, to circulate petitions, drive cars, do secretarial work. The city's two reactionary dailies were calling us for stories. The local television stations wanted interviews and news shots. Requests for speakers were coming in. The response in other parts of the state was similar, and we were doing it without much money. Stamps and phone bills were paid for mostly by donations of one or two dollars and no one who worked on the campaign received any pay.

Here was a movement in which amateurs, with little or no experience in the political arena, could beat the professionals without resorting to the usual manipulative tactics of billboards, spot commercials and lobbying. The death penalty issue, because it was concerned with the saving of human lives, might transcend conventional politics. Consequently volunteers throughout the state, especially students and housewives, came into the campaign by the hundreds and the most heartening thing was that many of them had always shied away from political involvement of any kind. Here, they felt, was a chance to do something at once idealistic and possible.

In April, however, the strength of the opposition began to be felt and it grew stronger each week. It did not come, as anticipated, from district attorneys' associations or from policemen's associations or from the state's many reactionary newspapers. It came instead from the Democratic Party, from the politicians, from liberal organizations—from individuals and groups who actually favored abolition of the death penalty.

In San Diego, for instance, State Senator Hugo Fisher, an opponent of the death penalty, used his influence to stop his supporters from working on the campaign. He told them that the voters would defeat the abolition measure at the polls. On the other hand, he said, an anti-death penalty bill would probably squeeze out of the senate committee next year, and in "four or five years" it would be passed. Fisher seemed horrified at the idea of the people voting on the matter. He insisted that the Legislature would not touch the issue for years if the people voted abolition down—as he was sure they would. One man, after hearing Fisher's persuasive arguments, burned his petitions and their 150 signatures.

In Los Angeles the Friends Committee on Legislation operated most effectively. The FCL has done much to advance civil rights causes over the years, but it exists basically for the purpose of lobbying and it therefore *must* inherently distrust the idea of the people deciding anything. Petition workers in the Los Angeles area would call potential supporters who had both influence and money. They would receive at least a show of interest, but upon phoning the supporter back would be told that the FCL had contacted them and that they no longer favored the idea. Sometimes the FCL would be the first to get in touch with the potential supporters. And Cole Blease, a lobbyist for the FCL and later for the American Civil Liberties Union, said at a meeting in April that he was sure the people would reject the measure if it came before them. The Los Angeles organization never really got started.

In the Bay Area strong pressures came from the Democratic Party, the FCL, and from individual legislators.

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San Francisco Supervisor Al Zirpoli, head of the northern section of the lobbying Californians Against Capital Punishment, angrily warned a Stiles Hall gathering against the petition, saying that "the people are ridden with superstition and fear." Episcopalian Bishop James A. Pike, who has been outspoken against capital punishment and Chessman's execution, declined to sponsor a later and different kind of petition arguing that since executions had been going on for thousands of years, and in California since 1850, a more judicious approach to abolition wouldn't be out of place.

Many Democrats had taken the cue from their liberal governor. In February, when Brown reprieved Chessman, he said, "I want the people of California, *through the legislature,* to express themselves once more on capital punishment." (Italics mine.) Brown had been hung on a hook by the State Department which had asked for the reprieve for the sole reason that Ike was going to visit South America. If Chessman died, the State Department felt, there might be trouble during the visit. Brown wanted to get off that hook and, knowing the issue would be killed in committee, he tossed the whole business to the Legislature. This allowed him to make the fantastic claim, just before Chessman's extermination, that he'd "done everything possible" and that "my hands are tied." (This was not true, of course. He had the power to recommend clemency to the State Supreme Court which never in California history had refused to concur with such a recommendation; and he had the power to declare another moratorium —as governors of at least three other states have done—on the death penalty.) And Brown told the press a number of times that if the people voted on the issue in November, he thought capital punishment would be retained.

II

The petition movement failed miserably. The amateurs were only able to collect about 35,000 signatures. Whether the voters—as the liberals insisted—would have retained capital punishment is not the question here. The distressing thing is not so much how or why the campaign failed, but what its failure shows about the climate of liberalism. It requires considerable cynicism—or moral weakness—to be afraid of the voters when human lives are in jeopardy. The liberals seemed to see the public as some sort of enormous, snarling animal, capable at best of agreeing to abolition only after years of an intensive "education" effort. They *knew for a certainty* that if the measure went to the people it would be defeated; also, they mystically foresaw, this defeat would set their attempts back ten years. This despite the fact that the most recent Gallup poll showed that only 51 percent of the American public favors the death penalty.

Had the liberal groups worked as hard for the petition as they did against it, California *might* have abolished the death penalty this past November. But they chose the road they knew to be *less* right. Liberals seem to have become afraid to exert imaginative leadership, to make decisions, to live with any degree of consistency for their beliefs.

This fear and indecisiveness breeds cynicism. During the petition campaign, with human lives in question, the liberals' tactics often betrayed a nervous concern that Democratic candidates in this election year would be

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embarrassed—forced into talking about capital punishment publicly—if the measure went to the people.

THE MYTH SAYS the people are cynical and apathetic. If there is such apathy I submit that it comes from and is generated by the liberal leaders. This apathy could very well be an outgrowth of a learned distrust and fear—even a fear of democracy itself. McCarthyism did much to implant this fear and in the early 1950's liberals took shelter and learned to wait, to settle for moderation, caution, restraint. In many cases liberals want disarmament —unilaterally if need be—yet are reluctant or afraid to talk about it. They want to do away with investigating committees yet they leave Representative James Roosevelt addressing a near-empty House when he advocates such a thing. Liberals want an end to loyalty oaths, but not many raise the issue before the public. They want recognition of Red China, they want a seat for that country in the United Nations, yet again they fear open discussion of the issue. In California they want the end of the death penalty, but they want it quietly.

Thirty people sat down in the road to San Quentin the morning of Chessman's gassing, briefly halting traffic as a means of protest. Hundreds more would have joined had there been anything but last-minute preparations. And yet today, in California, Chessman's martyrdom has been pushed into the recesses of many consciences, and the executions go on. The end of California's death penalty appears to be years away unless sit-downs take place on the road to San Quentin (as has been rumored) in large enough numbers to bring about a popular clamor stronger than that which accompanied Chessman to the gas chamber less than a year ago.

He Sure Ought to Know!

In an interview in Naples with Ian Fleming of The Sunday Times *(London), Lucky Luciano, the man popularly believed to have been head of America's prewar narcotics traffic talks about the failure of the U.S. to cope with addiction.*

" 'And do you know what, Mr. Fleming? It's all the fault of the American Government. They are not handling this narcotics problem right, which is why it goes on getting worse every year. Washington is spending billions of dollars every year trying to stamp out the traffic, but that is not the way to stop it. . . . They ought to set up clinics all over the country where you can register as a drug-taker, like you do in England, and go and get your dose for nothing, for free. So every time you go to the clinic . . . you get tapered off a fraction, a very small fraction. So in the end you get cured, see?

" 'The point is, Mr. Fleming, that if you can get your drugs for nothing, you won't have to rob or murder somebody for the money to buy the stuff. So the middleman, the traffickers, will go out of business, and then you have no law-enforcement problem and no smuggling. You see, Mr. Fleming, it's just the way you spend the money—on setting up clinics or on law enforcement that cannot work and only makes the problem worse.' " ("In and Around Brazen Naples," *The Sunday Times,* Aug. 28, 1960)

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LETTERS

Political Prisoners

Editors:

There are now two political prisoners behind bars in New Hampshire. On June 28, Hugo De Gregory was jailed for refusing to answer questions in New Hampshire's "subversive investigation." His imprisonment climaxes six years of persecution by N. H. Attorney General Louis Wyman, who holds the position of one man investigating committee. De Gregory, a 46-year-old factory worker, was taken to Boscawen Jail, where Dr. Willard Uphaus was recently imprisoned for a year for invoking the First Amendment. Both men were sentenced for indeterminated terms of at least one year, and the Attorney General has already stated that he hopes to start proceedings against them all over again at the end of the year terms.

In a statement issued just before he was jailed, De Gregory said, "The state has shown once more that it is stronger than the individual. But it has also demonstrated that it is powerless to compel an individual to commit an indecent act. I still refuse to become an informer for Mr. Wyman—to help him slander people I know to be completely innocent of any wrongdoing. I go to jail with a clear conscience."

The De Gregory Defense Committee is working to let people know about New Hampshire's contempt for civil liberty that has put these men in jail, and to raise funds for appealing the little-publicized De Gregory case to the higher courts. If you would like to help, please contact the committee at the address below.

PRISCILLA DI GIOVANNI, treasurer
De Gregory Defense Committee
Box 103, Hanover Street Station
Boston 13, Mass.

An Appeal for Help

Editors:

A team of investigators, just returned from Fayette and Haywood Counties, in Tennessee, report conditions are fully as bad as the press has pictured them.

Fayette and Haywood Counties lie in the extreme southwest corner of Tennessee. The population of Haywood Country is 27,000, 52% of whom are Negro, and that of Fayette County is 35,000, 78% of whom are Negro.

Early in 1960 State Charters were granted to the Fayette County Civic and Welfare League and to the Haywood County Civic Welfare League. The immediate purpose of these organizations was to launch a Negro registration and voting campaign. Counter organizations of White Citizens' Council groups, meeting in local churches, were formed immediately. The names of the charter members of the two Negro Leagues were circulated promptly among all white business and professional people in the two Counties and later the names of those who had registered were added and all, under threat of themselves being boycotted if they did not comply, were ordered to have no business or professional dealings with League members or voting registrants. O'Dell Sanders, Haywood County leader, was forced to close his grocery in Brownsville. Thirty salesmen once called upon him but they all quit within a two-week period under pressure from white landowners. Health services have been cut off and these farmers are unable to buy food, clothing or gasoline for their machinery.

In Haywood County 300 families and in Fayette County, 400, were ordered to move by January 1, 1961. Only one of the 700 had *not* registered to vote. Machines are displacing tenant farmers and sharecroppers all over the south, and in the past some have moved from Haywood and Fayette Counties for this reason. However, this is *not* the issue in these present evictions.

The injunction order of the Circuit Federal Court of Appeals on December 30 effected a six weeks injunction, ordering that there be no evictions until the court can determine why the eviction orders have been given. The Federal Civil Rights law says that no action shall be taken which seeks to prevent a citizen from exercising his voting rights. The government contends that this right has been breached in these eviction orders in Fayette and Haywood Counties.

Because of the injunction order, only nine of the 700 families have actually

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left their farms. Under threat a few have left, since the court injunction. The others wait the final court decision.

The nine families already evicted are resettled on the land of a Negro farm owner, Shepherd Toles. They call their settlement *"Freedom Village."* The morale of the village is high but living conditions are hazardous and difficult. Families are living on dirt floors. Drainage and sanitary facilities must be made safe, or serious illness is a threat. Forty-three children and 16 adults are now living in Freedom Village. Food, shelter and clothing for as many as five thousand people will need to be provided in Freedom Village for an indefinite period. There is an immediate need for cash. Supplies of various kinds must be purchased. There is need to raise a large sum of money for a loan fund "to make the crop." All these people have intangible needs also. They are out in the front line, standing up for freedom and human dignity. The urgent need is for a LOAN FUND. The Civic and Welfare League in each County, will set up boards or committees to administer the fund. If you can buy some share in financing this, please send your check to: Operation Freedom, c/o Rev. Maurice McCrackin, 1111 Dayton Street, Cincinnati 14, Ohio.

ROSS ANDERSON, WALLACE NELSON, MAURICE MCCRACKIN — *a deputation team from Peacemakers.*

ARGUMENTS

(Cahiers trimestriels)

4e année, N° 20, 4e trimestre 1960.

LES INTELLECTUELS

Platon et les Sophistes (P. Elthen). *Rousseau et les encyclopédistes* (G. Lapassade). *Marx et les idéologues* (Mazzola). Et un texte important de M. Heidegger: *Principes de la pensée.*

La crise des intellectuels

Analysée par: E. Morin, R. Barthes, P. Fougeyrollas, J. Duvignaud, B. Cazes.

Textes et documents

Un fragment inédit de B. Groethuysen sur *L'esprit bourgeois.* Une polémique Bruno Rizzi-Pierre Naville sur la bureaucratie. Une récente déclaration de Georg Lukàcs.

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5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: (This information is required by the act of June 11, 1960 to be included in all statements regardless of frequency of issue.) 2,138. Stanley Plastrik. (Signature of business manager.) Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of Sept. 1960. Irving Light, Qualified in New York County. (My commission expires March 31, 1961.)

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